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			Abstract		
Objective:	 	 	 To	 analyse	 possible	 benefits	 of	 the	 enduring	 territorial	 dispute	 of	 the	Senkaku	 Islands	 from	 Japan’s	 perspective	 and	 compare	 whether	 a	 peaceful,	 final	dispute	resolution	would	in	fact	be	less	beneficial	for	Japan	than	an	active	unresolved	dispute.	
Method:		Analysis	of	peace	theory	scenarios	by	Johan	Galtung	(1967),	game	theory	as	a	 tool	 for	 conflict	 and	 cooperation	 analysis	 (Straffin,	 1993),	 theories	 of	 bargaining	leverage,	domestic	politics	 and	nationalistic	 agendas	and	 relations	 to	other	disputes	from	the	perspective	of	an	enduring	territorial	dispute	(Wiegand,	2011).	
Results:	 	 	The	enduring	territorial	dispute	of	 the	Senkaku	Islands	has	granted	 Japan	four	 major	 areas	 of	 benefits:	 a	 tool	 for	 gaining	 domestic	 popularity	 in	 politics	 and	further	 nationalistic	 agendas;	 bargaining	 leverage	 in	 diplomatic	 and	 economic	relations;	 a	 stronger	 security	 alliance	 with	 the	 United	 States	 to	 balance	 the	 overall	security	situation	in	East	Asia;	and	a	comparison	point	for	other	territorial	disputes	in	the	East	Asian	region.		
Conclusion:	 Although	Japan	can	be	said	to	gain	benefits	from	an	enduring	territorial	dispute	 such	 as	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute,	 the	 benefits	 are	 not	 great	 enough	 to	diminish	the	idea	of	a	final	dispute	resolution.	Although	Japan	is	currently	benefiting	more	 from	 an	 active	 dispute	 than	 from	 pushing	 for	 a	 final	 peaceful	 resolution,	 the	benefits	do	not	negate	a	possibility	for	a	dispute	resolution.	
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1.	INTRODUCTION		The	Senkaku	Islands	have	been	disputed	for	decades.	The	islands	are	officially	Japanese	territory;	 however,	 both	 China	 and	 Taiwan	 have	 made	 claims	 on	 the	 islands.	 In	 this	research,	I	will	solely	focus	on	the	conflict	between	China	and	Japan.	The	two	countries	have	 tiptoed	 around	 the	 subject	 in	 fear	 of	 dispute	 escalation,	 deterioration	 of	mutual	relationships	 and	 international	 backlash.	 Japan	 has	 never	 officially	 admitted	 that	 the	Senkaku	Islands	issue	is	a	dispute,	but	it	is	clear	that	this	subject	is	a	thorn	in	the	side	of	both	parties.	The	two	states	have	a	volatile	past	with	unresolved	issues	dating	back	to	the	Second	 World	 War	 and	 beyond.	 Japan	 has	 tarnished	 its	 relationship	 with	 several	neighbouring	countries,	and	this	is	often	seen	as	a	reason	why	territorial	disputes	in	the	area	 remain	 unresolved.	 Previous	 disputes	 and	 unresolved	 issues	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	blown	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	out	of	proportion	since	the	significance	of	the	islands	is	undetermined.		The	 United	 Nations’	 Economic	 Commission	 for	 Asia	 and	 the	 Far	 East	 (UNECAFE)	conducted	 a	 research	 that	 concluded	 that	 there	might	 be	 vast	 oil	 reserves	 under	 the	islands.	However,	due	to	the	territorial	dispute,	this	has	never	been	fully	investigated.	The	possible	economic	gain	of	the	area	raised	the	stakes	of	the	outcome.	Throughout	the	years,	both	parties	have	been	reluctant	to	discuss	the	issue	and	make	an	agreement	about	the	ownership	of	the	Senkaku	Islands.	There	have	been	numerous	clashes,	some	more	violent	than	others,	that	have	made	the	Senkaku	Islands	one	of	the	most	volatile	disputes	in	East	Asia.	When	two	main	powers	of	the	region	are	locked	in	a	disagreement	with	each	other,	any	escalation	may	have	drastic	repercussions	for	the	overall	security	of	East	Asia.	Although	China	and	Japan	have	had	a	relatively	complicated	past,	they	also	have	a	very	close	 relationship	 regarding	 trade.	 They	 have	 also	 engaged	 in	 numerous	 successful	diplomatic	negotiations	considering	different	aspects	of	their	relationship.	Due	to	their	lucrative	mutual	trade,	both	countries	would	have	much	to	 lose	 in	case	of	a	 full-blown	conflict.	 The	 international	 response	 is	 also	 something	both	disputing	parties	 take	 into	consideration.	Due	to	Japan’s	questionable	measures	of	dealing	with	its	wartime	past	with	other	Asian	countries,	any	aggressive	action	would	be	heavily	scrutinized	and	create	a	major	backlash.	China,	in	turn,	has	questionable	relations	and	unexplained		
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aggressive	 behaviour	 for	 instance	 in	 Hong	 Kong,	 Taiwan	 and	 Tibet.	 These	 offensive	measures	 in	China’s	case	have	raised	the	bar	 for	any	acceptance	or	tolerance	of	 future	conflicts	of	territory	in	the	eyes	of	the	international	community.	Both	countries	are	heavily	dependent	on	the	international	community,	and	therefore	any	acts	of	aggression	or	conflict	escalation	would	affect	them	negatively.	Perception	of	these	 countries	 is	 also	 a	 complicated	 issue	 because	 the	 national	 opinion	 on	 possible	conflict	 escalation	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 is	 often	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 international	community’s	opinion.	This	issue	is	linked	to	national	pride	often	with	less	consideration	of	other	consequences.	There	have	been	demonstrations,	sometimes	violent,	to	show	the	citizens’	opinion	on	the	matter.	This	has	led	to	politicians	taking	advantage	of	the	passion	of	the	people	to	drive	their	own	agenda.	This	in	turn	has	often	damaged	the	relationship	between	 China	 and	 Japan,	 since	 any	 negative	 official	 opinions	 in	 public	 are	 criticised	extensively	by	the	target	country.	All	in	all,	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	seems	to	be	more	concerned	with	public	opinion	and	wartime	past	than	the	actual	islands.	Although	possible	oil	reserves	under	the	islands	could	be	a	lucrative	addition	to	either	country’s	economy,	it	is	hard	to	see	that	economic	gain	would	be	the	only	driving	force	for	the	conflict.	This	dispute,	albeit	frozen,	has	been	ongoing	for	decades	without	any	proper	attempts	at	solving	it.		 1.1	RESEARCH	QUESTION		 Is	peace	as	a	final	dispute	resolution	the	best	outcome	or	does	Japan	benefit	more	from	an	enduring	dispute?		The	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 analyse	 how	 Japan	 has	 possibly	 benefited	 from	 an	ongoing	dispute	and	whether	peace	as	an	end-game	is	in	fact	the	best	outcome.	I	will	look	in	detail	into	the	main	areas	where	Japan	has	benefited	from	the	dispute:	domestic	politics	and	 nationalist	 agendas,	 using	 the	 dispute	 as	 bargaining	 leverage,	 keeping	 the	 United	States	firmly	as	an	ally	in	the	region,	and	the	effect	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	on	the	outcome	of	other	ongoing	territorial	disputes.	Although	one	major	issue	in	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	is	to	analyse	whether	Japan	does	in	fact	have	the	right	to	claim	the	islands,	
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I	will	merely	present	claims	made	by	China	and	Japan’s	rebuttals,	and	mainly	focus	on	the	dispute	in	the	current	status	quo.			 1.2	WHAT	ARE	THE	SENKAKU	ISLANDS?		The	 Senkaku	 Islands	 are	 situated	 in	 the	 East	 China	 Sea,	 east	 from	 China	 and	west	 of	Okinawa,	Japan.	Officially	the	Senkaku	Islands	is	a	group	of	five	islands	and	three	rocks.	The	Japanese	refer	to	the	islands	as	Senkaku	Islands,	whereas	the	Chinese	refer	to	them	as	the	Diaoyu	Islands	or	the	Diaoyu-tai	Islands.	
Japanese	Name	 Chinese	Name	 Area	(km2)	Uotsuri-shima	 Diaoyu	Dao	 3.81	Taisho-to	 Chiwei	yu	 0.06	Kuba-shima	 Huangwei	Yu	 0.91	Kitakojima	 Bei	Xiaodao	 0.31	Minamikojima	 Nan	Xiaodao	 0.40	Okinokitaiwa	 Da	Bei	Xiaodao	 0.03	Okinominamiiwa	 Da	Nan	Xiaodao	 0.01	Tobise	 Fei	Jiao	Yan	 0.002		 	 Total	5.53	Table	1.1	Senkaku	Islands	and	their	respective	areas		 The	Senkaku	islands	are	located	230	kilometres	west	of	Okinawa	and	175	kilometres	northeast	of	Taiwan	(Swanström,	2005).	They	are	part	of	the	Nansei	Shoto	islands	and	currently	belong	to	Ishigaki	City,	Okinawa	Prefecture	of	Japan.	The	Senkaku	Islands	are	located	between	longitude	123°30’	and	124°35’	E	and	latitude	25°45’	and	26°0’	N.	The	total	land	area	of	the	Senkaku	islands	is	merely	5,53	km2	(Okuhara,	2015).	
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	Table	1.2.	Map	of	 the	Senkaku	 Islands.	Map	retrieved	 from	 the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Japan.		 							
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2.	HISTORY	OF	SINO-JAPANESE	CONFLICTS		Japan	 has	 a	 very	 complicated	 past	 with	 China,	 riddled	 with	 conflicts	 and	 acts	 of	aggressions.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Meiji	 Restoration	 in	 Japan	when	 the	whole	 state,	including	the	military,	was	drastically	and	rapidly	industrialized	and	Westernized,	Japan’s	imperial	policies	drove	the	country	to	employ	aggressive	tactics	on	foreign	territory.	In	1879,	 the	 Ryukyu	 Islands	 (Okinawa)	 were	 officially	 annexed	 into	 Japan,	 bringing	 the	Japanese	territory	much	closer	to	China	and	its	territorial	waters	(Mason,	1997).	The	first	Sino-Japanese	War	was	mainly	about	control	over	the	Korean	Peninsula,	where	most	of	the	battles	took	place.	The	war	lasted	from	1894	to	1895,	resulting	in	victory	for	Japan.	This	was	the	first	victory	for	the	newly	industrialized	and	Westernized	Imperial	Army	and	prompted	 Japan	 to	 be	 recognized	 as	 a	 forceful	 power	 in	 the	 region.	 Japan	drafted	 the	Treaty	of	Shimonoseki	to	establish	terms	of	surrender	for	China	on	April	17th,	1895	(See	Appendix	I).	The	main	points	of	the	treaty	were	China’s	recognition	of	full	independence	and	autonomy	of	Korea,	China’s	cede	of	the	southern	part	of	Fengtien	province,	the	island	of	 Formosa	 (Taiwan)	 and	 all	 islands	 belonging	 to	 Formosa,	 as	well	 as	 the	 Pescadores	Group.	 The	 island	 of	 Formosa	was	 especially	 seen	 as	 a	 potentially	 significant	 gain	 for	Japan’s	economy	(Mason,	1997).	Japan’s	 Imperial	Army	 continued	 to	 occupy	parts	 of	 Chinese	 territory	 and	 in	 1910	Japan	annexed	the	independent	Korean	Empire.	At	the	beginning	of	the	century	leading	up	to	the	second	Sino-Japanese	War,	Japan	and	China	clashed	several	times	in	what	was	downplayed	as	“incidents”,	such	as	 the	Mukden	Incident	of	1931	that	set	 the	stage	 for	Japan’s	 invasion	 of	 Manchuria,	 and	 the	Marco	 Polo	 Bridge	 incident	 of	 1937	 that	 also	defined	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 second	 Sino-Japanese	 War.	 During	 this	 war,	 China	 was	granted	aid	from	the	Soviet	Union,	the	United	States	and	Germany	against	Japan.	Still,	the	war	was	mainly	between	China	and	 Japan	until	 Japan	 launched	 the	 surprise	attack	on	Pearl	Harbor	in	1941,	merging	the	Sino-Japanese	War	into	World	War	II	where	it	became	known	 as	 the	 Pacific	 War.	 The	 war	 was	 the	 result	 of	 decades	 of	 oppression	 and	imperialistic	ideologies	by	Japan	to	expand	further	into	East	Asia	to	secure	raw	materials	and	economic	resources	in	the	area.	It	was	the	largest	war	in	Asia	in	the	20th	Century,	with	the	 Sino-Japanese	War	 itself	 responsible	 for	 over	 90%	 of	 casualties	 during	 the	 entire	
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Pacific	War.	Estimates	vary	greatly,	but	 Japan's	 invasion	of	China	 could	have	 led	 to	as	many	as	10-20	million	Chinese	lives	lost	(Andrews,	2015).	Even	 today	 the	 relations	 between	 China	 and	 Japan	 are	 often	 strained	 due	 to	resentment	from	China’s	part,	mostly	due	to	how	poorly	Japan	has	handled	its	wartime	past	 in	 China’s	 opinion.	 Most	 notably,	 Japan	 has	 tried	 to	 glorify	 the	 Imperial	 Army’s	actions	in	textbook	reforms,	leaving	out	atrocities	carried	out	by	them;	China	also	feels	that	Japan	has	not	officially	apologised	enough	or	made	enough	of	an	attempt	to	make	up	for	war	crimes	conducted	in	China,	such	as	the	Nanjing	Massacre.	Although	the	second	Sino-Japanese	War	 and	 the	 Second	World	War	 ended	 in	1945	with	 Japan’s	 surrender,	many	smaller	conflicts	still	stem	from	this	time.	This	is	also	true	for	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	which	has	emerged	from	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	War,	from	what	is	often	referred	to	as	the	San	Francisco	System,	named	after	the	Treaty	of	San	Francisco	(See	appendix	IV).		 2.1.	HISTORY	OF	THE	SENKAKU	ISLANDS	DISPUTE		
	“No	one	can	be	truly	confident	that	these	arguments,	over	bits	of	rock	
or	expanses	of	ocean,	will	not	 lead	 to	armed	conflict	–	whether	by	
design	or	by	human	error.”	(Andrews,	2015,	p.	2)	Territorial	disputes	are	intrastate	cases	where	two	or	more	governments	disagree	over	locations	of	borders,	either	land	or	maritime	borders.	“Territorial	disputes	may	take	place	when	one	government	occupies	the	national	territory	of	another	and	refuses	to	relinquish	control	or	withdraw;	when	one	government	does	not	recognize	the	sovereignty	of	another	over	 some	 portion	 of	 territory	 within	 the	 border	 of	 that	 government;	 or	 when	 a	government	 does	 not	 recognize	 the	 independence	 and	 sovereignty	 of	 another	government,	and	seeks	to	annex	some	or	all	of	its	territory”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	2).	The	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	has	been	unresolved	for	decades.			
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2.1.1.	1879-1945		The	Senkaku	Islands	have	for	a	long	time	been	under	Japanese	control,	apart	from	a	brief	period	after	the	war	when	the	United	States	controlled	the	islands	on	Japan’s	behalf	due	to	the	terms	of	Japan’s	defeat.	However,	both	China	and	Taiwan	have	claimed	the	islands.		The	beginning	of	 the	dispute	 can	be	dated	back	 to	1879	when	 Japan	 incorporated	 the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	(Okinawa)	into	Japan	(Mason,	1997).	The	Senkaku	islands	were	seen	as	the	border	between	China	and	Japan,	but	at	 this	point	the	 islands	were	still	unclaimed	territory.	In	1895	Japan	officially	claimed	the	islands	as	part	of	Okinawa,	stating	that	they	had	conducted	surveys	since	1884	to	show	the	islands	were	in	fact	terra	nullius,	no-man’s	land,	with	no	evidence	to	show	that	they	were	under	Chinese	rule	(Mason,	1997).		After	Japan’s	victory	in	the	first	Sino-Japanese	War,	China	was	forced	to	sign	the	Treaty	of	Shimonoseki,	according	to	which	China	had	to	give	up	the	 island	of	Formosa	(Taiwan)	and	all	islands	belonging	to	Formosa,	as	well	as	the	Pescadores	Group,	among	other	 conditions.	 There	 was	 no	 mention	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 in	 this	 treaty	 (See	Appendix	I).	The	same	pattern	continued	in	following	treaties	and	declarations	as	well:	none	of	them	 specifically	 mention	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 by	 name.	 The	 Cairo	 Declaration	 (See	Appendix	II)	was	drafted	on	September	4th,	1943,	by	the	President	of	the	United	States	Theodore	Roosevelt;	the	President	of	the	National	Government	of	the	Republic	of	China	Chiang	Kai-shek;	and	the	Prime	Minister	of	Great	Britain	Winston	Churchill.	The	purpose	of	the	Cairo	Declaration	was	to	create	a	plan	for	the	post-war	order	once	the	time	came.	In	the	Cairo	Declaration,	the	following	statement	was	made	about	Japan	and	its	occupied	territory:	“[…]	Japan	shall	be	stripped	of	all	the	islands	in	the	Pacific	which	she	has	seized	or	occupied	since	the	beginning	of	the	first	World	War	in	1914,	and	that	all	the	territories	Japan	has	stolen	from	the	Chinese,	such	as	Manchuria,	Formosa,	and	The	Pescadores,	shall	be	restored	to	the	Republic	of	China.	Japan	will	also	be	expelled	from	all	other	territories	which	she	has	taken	by	violence	and	greed.	The	aforesaid	three	great	powers,	mindful	of	the	enslavement	of	the	people	of	
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Korea,	 are	 determined	 that	 in	 due	 course	 Korea	 shall	 become	 free	 and	independent.”	(The	Cairo	Declaration)	The	 Potsdam	 Declaration	 (See	 Appendix	 III)	 defined	 the	 terms	 of	 Japan’s	surrender.	 It	was	written	 by	 the	 President	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Harry	 S.	 Truman;	 the	President	of	the	National	Government	of	the	Republic	of	China	Chiang	Kai-shek;	and	the	Prime	Minister	 of	 Great	 Britain	Winston	 Churchill,	 on	 July	 26th,	 1945.	 Clause	 8	 of	 the	Potsdam	Declaration	refers	to	the	Cairo	Declaration	and	reads	as	follows:		“The	 terms	 of	 the	 Cairo	 Declaration	 shall	 be	 carried	 out	 and	 Japanese	sovereignty	 shall	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 islands	 of	 Honshu,	 Hokkaido,	 Kyushu,	Shikoku	 and	 such	 minor	 islands	 as	 we	 determine.”	 (Potsdam	 Declaration,	Appendix	III)	The	Potsdam	Declaration	is	also	mentioned	in	Japan’s	Instrument	of	Surrender	that	stated	Japan’s	full	acceptance	of	the	Potsdam	Declaration.	The	final	treaty	of	defeat	was	the	Treaty	of	San	Francisco	(See	Appendix	VI),	signed	between	Japan	and	part	of	the	Allied	Powers	in	1951.			In	the	Treaty	of	San	Francisco,	Formosa	and	Pescadores	are	once	again	mentioned,	as	well	as	the	Japanese	territory	put	under	administration	of	the	United	States:	“Chapter	II,	Article	2	(b)	Japan	renounces	all	right,	title	and	claim	to	Formosa	and	the	Pescadores.	Chapter	II,	Article	3	Japan	will	concur	in	any	proposal	of	the	United	States	to	the	United	Nations	to	place	 under	 its	 trusteeship	 system,	 with	 the	 United	 States	 as	 the	 sole	administering	authority,	Nansei	Shoto	south	of	29	north	 latitude	(including,	the	 Ryukyu	 Islands	 and	 the	Daito	 Islands),	 Nanpo	 Shoto	 south	 of	 Sofu	 Gan	(including	 the	 Bonin	 Islands,	 Rosario	 Island	 and	 the	 Volcano	 Islands)	 and	Parece	 Vel	 and	Marcus	 Island.	 Pending	 the	making	 of	 such	 a	 proposal	 and	affirmative	action	thereon,	the	United	States	will	have	the	right	to	exercise	all	and	 any	 powers	 of	 administration,	 legislation	 and	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	
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territory	and	inhabitants	of	these	islands,	 including	their	territorial	waters.”	(Treaty	of	San	Francisco)	The	Treaty	of	San	Francisco	is	argued	to	be	invalid	on	both	China’s	and	Taiwan’s	behalf,	since	neither	of	them	were	present	when	devising	the	treaty,	due	to	the	Chinese	Civil	War	and	the	questionable	 legitimacy	of	 their	governments.	The	Treaty,	 therefore,	created	the	issue	of	Taiwan’s	legal	status,	since	the	Treaty	did	not	in	fact	specify	to	whom	Taiwan	was	to	be	returned.	This	led	to	the	Taiwan	independence	movement	claiming	that	the	 administration	 of	 Taiwan	 is	 still	 held	 by	 the	Allied	 Forces,	 particularly	 the	United	States.	 Because	 China	 was	 not	 present	 when	 the	 Treaty	 was	 signed,	 the	 Chinese	government	 did	 in	 fact	 denounce	 the	 treaty	 as	 being	 illegal,	 and	 that	 China	 did	 not	recognize	it	as	being	official.	The	treaty	was	not	specific	enough	about	to	whom	Japan’s	surrendered	areas	were	to	be	returned,	which	has	led	to	numerous	island	disputes	in	East	Asia.	Because	China	does	not	recognize	 the	Treaty	of	San	Francisco,	 their	claim	on	the	Senkaku	Islands	is	based	on	the	Cairo	and	Potsdam	Declarations.	The	new	economic	order	in	East	Asia	because	of	the	San	Francisco	Peace	Treaty	made	Japan	the	United	States’	key	player	 in	 the	 area	 to	 fight	 communism.	 Although	 the	 San	 Francisco	 Peace	 Treaty	was	controversial	and	polarizing	due	to	China’s	absence,	the	treaty	had	managed	to	separate	Japan	and	China,	and	eliminate	any	chance	of	military	confrontation	(Koo,	2010).		 2.1.2.	1945-1990		The	initial	resurgence	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	occurred	in	1968.	The	Committee	for	 Coordination	 of	 Joint	 Prospecting	 for	 Mineral	 Resources	 in	 Asian	 Offshore	 Areas	(CCOP)	 under	 the	 United	 Nations	 Economic	 Commission	 for	 Asia	 and	 the	 Far	 East	(UNECAFE)	published	a	geological	survey	concluding	that	“a	high	probability	exists	that	the	 continental	 shelf	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 Japan	 may	 be	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prolific	 oil	reservoirs	in	the	world,	with	potential	estimated	at	between	10	and	100	billion	barrels”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	109).	In	 September	 1970,	 the	 dispute	 quickly	 escalated	 because	 of	 a	 Taiwanese	journalist	 who	 raised	 the	 Taiwanese	 flag	 on	 Uotsuri,	 the	 main	 island	 of	 the	 Senkaku	
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Islands.	 The	 Okinawa	 police	 took	 down	 the	 flag,	 which	 in	 turn	 triggered	 worldwide	demonstrations	against	a	militarist	Japan	and	“the	need	to	defend	Chinese	sovereignty	on	the	Senkaku	Islands”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	109).	To	minimise	damage,	Japan	initiated	the	United	Oceanic	 Development	 Company	 (UODC)	 with	 Taiwan	 and	 South	 Korea	 to	 develop	resources	 from	an	 adjacent	 continental	 shelf	 as	 partners.	 China	quickly	 intervened	by	claiming	that	the	Senkaku	Islands,	as	well	as	Taiwan,	“were	China’s	sacred	territory	and	that	exploitation	of	the	area	by	foreign	countries	would	not	be	tolerated.”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	110).	Before	this	claim,	the	Senkaku	Islands	had	never	been	disputed	before,	so	the	claim	came	as	a	surprise	 to	 Japan	who	had	presided	over	 the	 islands	since	claiming	 them	in	1895.		 In	1972,	the	United	States	reverted	Okinawa	back	to	Japan	(See	Appendix	V).	Since	the	Senkaku	Islands	had	been	seen	as	a	part	of	Okinawa,	the	islands	were	also	given	back	to	 Japan.	 The	 reversion	 and	 the	 UNECAFE	 report	 quickly	 made	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	dispute	the	most	significant	issue	between	China	and	Japan	at	the	time.	In	the	beginning	of	the	1970s,	the	dispute	dropped	in	importance	to	make	room	for	more	pressing	matters	in	 the	 area.	 The	 growing	 economic	 interest	 between	 China	 and	 Japan	 also	 played	 an	important	part	in	de-escalating	the	issue,	since	it	became	increasingly	important	to	reach	better	Sino-Japanese	relations	to	achieve	a	beneficial,	mutual	economic	partnership	(Koo,	2010).	In	 1975	 China	 and	 Japan	 started	 bilateral	 negotiations	 to	 normalise	 their	relationship.	These	negotiations	concluded	in	signing	the	Treaty	of	Peace	and	Friendship	(PFT)	in	1978	(Swanström,	2005).	The	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	was	left	out	of	the	treaty,	with	China’s	leader	Deng	Xiaoping	declaring	that	the	status	quo	of	the	islands	should	be	maintained	until	“a	future	generation	has	the	wisdom	to	settle	it	peacefully”	(Swanström,	2005,	p.	233).	Earlier	in	1978,	the	dispute	escalated	to	a	point	never	reached	before,	aimed	to	sway	the	ongoing	PFT	negotiations.	National	politicians	and	activist	groups	from	Japan	strongly	 advocated	 including	 the	 sovereignty	 issue	 in	 the	 PFT	 negotiations,	 which	resulted	in	a	complete	halt	in	negotiations	altogether	and	turned	all	discussion	towards	the	 sovereignty	 issue	 instead.	 (Koo,	2010).	This	 left	China’s	 leader	Deng	Xiaoping	 in	 a	difficult	position.	If	he	confronted	Japan	about	the	claim,	he	risked	losing	the	important	PFT	completely,	but	if	he	stayed	silent,	he	risked	potentially	angering	domestic	powers	in	China.	His	urgent	decision	was	to	inflate	the	dispute	even	more	by	backing	the	Chinese	
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domestic	agenda.	This	move	showed	how	easy	it	was	for	domestic	parties	to	ambush	the	issue	with	their	own	agenda.	In	August	1978,	Seirankai,	a	right-winged	Japanese	group,	built	a	lighthouse	on	Uotsuri	Island	to	further	emphasise	Japan’s	claim	to	the	islands.	The	escalations	 in	 1978	 clearly	 showed	 how	 the	 dispute	 could	 easily	 be	 derailed	 by	ultranationalist	groups	to	further	their	agenda,	when	politicians	found	it	difficult	not	to	back	them	up.	Although	the	issues	had	turned	Japan	and	China	increasingly	against	each	other,	neither	party	wanted	 the	dispute	 to	 turn	 into	an	actual,	 full-blown	conflict.	The	parties	managed	to	continue	the	PFT	negotiations,	reaching	an	amicable	agreement	that	would	help	both	parties	further	their	trade	relationship.	(Koo,	2010)	In	the	1980s	the	Sino-Japanese	relations	were	at	an	all-time	high,	mostly	due	to	China’s	heavy	dependence	on	Japanese	ODA	loans	to	boost	the	growing	economy.	Another	reason	 for	 the	 lack	of	 provocation	 and	 reaction	 from	China’s	 side	was	 the	Tiananmen	Square	 Protests	 of	 1989,	 which	 launched	 sanctions	 against	 China	 from	 numerous	countries	in	the	international	community,	including	Japan.	In	addition,	the	Soviet	Union’s	involvement	 in	 Cambodia,	 Sino-Soviet	 territorial	 issues,	 and	 the	 Soviet	 invasion	 of	Afghanistan	prompted	China	to	join	an	alliance	with	Japan	and	the	United	States,	as	a	way	to	 balance	 against	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 The	 existence	 of	 mutual	 goals,	 as	 well	 as	 the	importance	of	 Japanese	ODA	and	 strong	economic	 ties	kept	China	 in	 check	during	 the	1980s	(Wiegand,	2011).	At	the	end	of	the	decade,	China	made	peace	with	the	Soviet	Union,	and	soon	relations	between	Japan	and	China	started	to	become	tense	again.		 2.1.3.	1990-2000		In	1990-1991,	 a	 third	 round	of	 serious	 escalations	 took	place.	Although	Seirankai	 had	erected	a	 lighthouse	 in	1978,	 it	did	not	have	official	 lighthouse	status	yet.	However,	 in	1990,	 Nihon	 Seinensha	 (Japanese	 Youth	 Federation)	 petitioned	 for	 official	 lighthouse	status	and	was	able	to	get	the	application	accepted	for	review	by	the	government.	Once	again,	 an	ultranationalist	 group	had	managed	 to	 escalate	 the	dispute	by	pushing	 their	agenda	onto	the	government	(Koo,	2010).	The	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	forced	China	to	re-evaluate	their	policies,	thus	pressing	the	matter	to	calm	domestic	voices.	Japan,	on	the	other	hand,	had	to	satisfy	the	Japanese	people	as	well	as	the	international	community	
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after	receiving	heavy	criticism	about	the	possible	Japanese	involvement	in	the	Gulf	War.	Japan	had	been	preparing	a	Gulf	Cooperation	Bill	(GCB)	that	would	have	dispatched	the	Japanese	Self	Defence	Forces	(SDF)	to	the	Gulf	region,	although	without	combat	capacity,	due	to	the	restrictions	of	Article	9	of	the	Japanese	Constitution	(Koo,	2010).	Article	9	of	Japan’s	constitution	reads	as	follows:	“Renunciation	 of	 War:	 Aspiring	 sincerely	 to	 an	 international	 peace	based	on	 justice	 and	order,	 the	 Japanese	people	 forever	 renounce	war	 as	 a	sovereign	right	of	the	nation	and	the	threat	or	use	of	force	as	means	of	settling	international	 disputes.	 In	 order	 to	 accomplish	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 preceding	paragraph,	land,	sea,	and	air	forces,	as	well	as	other	war	potential,	will	never	be	maintained.	The	right	of	belligerency	of	the	state	will	not	be	recognized.”	(Japan	Const.	Ch.	II,	Art.	IX)	Article	 9	 has	 not	 been	 amended	 since	 it	was	 first	written;	 however,	 it	 has	 been	reinterpreted	 a	 few	 times	 to	 change	 Japan’s	 rights	 to	 a	 self-defence	 force.	 The	 first	reinterpretation	followed	the	backlash	of	Japan’s	actions	regarding	the	Gulf	War	(Umeda,	2015).	 Luckily,	 both	 governments	 opted	 for	 de-escalation.	 The	 Japanese	 government	declined	the	lighthouse	status	application	by	Nihon	Seinensha.	Japan	also	formally	noted	that	the	GCB	debate	was	only	concerning	the	Gulf	War	and	would	in	no	way	affect	East	Asian	relations.	China,	being	worried	about	domestic	unrest	after	 the	 fall	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	 decided	 that	 it	was	more	 important	 to	 keep	 good	 relations	with	 Japan	 than	 to	escalate	 the	dispute.	 Through	 growing	 economic	 relations	 as	well	 as	 Japanese	ODA	 to	China,	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	was	once	again	shelved	(Koo,	2010).	In	1996,	Nihon	Seinensha	built	a	second	lighthouse,	this	time	on	Kita-Kojima	Island	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	group.	China	required	the	Japanese	Government	to	take	an	official	stance	on	the	ownership	issue	of	the	islands,	but	Japan	declined	under	the	pretence	that	the	government	had	nothing	to	do	with	building	the	lighthouse.	However,	Japan	shortly	after	declared	its	Exclusive	Economic	Zone	(EEZ)	that	included	the	Senkaku	Islands,	as	required	by	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	that	had	recently	come	 to	 force	 (Koo,	 2010).	 On	August	 28th,	 1996,	 Japanese	 Foreign	Minister	 Yukihiko	Ikeda	finally	made	a	statement	making	Japan’s	stance	fully	clear:	“Senkakus	have	always	
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been	Japanese	territory;	Japan	already	effectively	governs	the	islands,	so	the	territorial	issue	does	not	exist.”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	121).		Ikeda’s	statement	forced	China	to	give	Japan	a	warning	and	they	condemned	the	remarks	as	irresponsible,	blaming	any	actions	by	ultranationalist	groups	on	the	general	attitude	 conveyed	 by	 the	 Japanese	 government.	 China’s	 government	 also	 completely	ignored	 the	 blatant	 anti-Japanese	 propaganda	 being	 put	 forth	 by	 the	 Chinese	 media,	presumably	to	satisfy	domestic	opinion.	The	backlash	from	Ikeda’s	statement	snowballed	and	ended	up	turning	the	dispute	into	a	full-blown	crisis.	Within	one	month	the	Japanese	Maritime	Safety	Agency	(JMSA)	forcefully	detained	a	Taiwanese	fishing	vessel	near	the	islands,	 drove	 out	 a	Hong	Kong	TV	 crew,	Nihon	 Seinensha	 returned	 to	 repair	 the	 new	lighthouse,	reapplied	for	official	recognition,	the	People’s	Liberation	Army	Navy	(PLAN)	practiced	blockades	and	landing	on	islands,	a	pro-China	activist	drowned	after	the	JMSA	prevented	his	vessel	to	dock	on	the	Senkaku	Islands	which	resulted	in	large-scale	anti-Japanese	 protests	 around	 the	 world,	 and	 activists	 from	 both	 Taiwan	 and	 Hong	 Kong	landed	on	the	Senkaku	Islands	to	raise	their	flags	(Wiegand,	2011).	At	the	same	time,	UNCLOS	was	in	the	final	process	of	ratifying,	with	both	China	and	Japan	 announcing	 their	 respective	 EEZs,	 overlapping	 in	 many	 areas,	 including	 the	Senkaku	Islands.	During	this	time,	Japan	started	to	more	forcefully	defend	its	claim	on	the	Senkaku	Islands,	while	still	insisting	that	it	was	willing	to	keep	the	sovereignty	issue	apart	from	negotiations	on	EEZs	and	economic	relations	(Koo,	2010).	Japan’s	domestic	politics	had	 changed	 from	 the	 previously	 more	 China-friendly	 approach	 to	 a	 more	 domestic,	nationalistic	view.	China’s	continuous	nuclear	testing	also	put	a	strain	on	the	relations.	China	was	at	the	time	occupied	with	issues	concerning	Taiwan,	and	all	this	resulted	in	the	United	States	and	Japan	strengthening	their	mutual	security	relations	(Koo,	2010).	The	death	of	the	Hong	Kong	activist	resulted	in	both	the	Chinese	and	Japanese	governments	attempting	 to	get	 the	dispute	under	control.	Both	governments	made	sure	no	national	activists	could	re-escalate	 the	already	tense	dispute.	The	United	States	also	helped	the	situation	by	stating	that	the	United	States-Japanese	security	treaty	(see	appendix	VI)	did	in	fact	not	cover	the	Senkaku	Islands.	This	statement	clarified	the	United	States’	opinion	on	the	matter,	which	in	turn	helped	mend	both	Sino-Japanese	and	Sino-US	relations	(Koo,	2010).		
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During	the	1996	escalation,	trade	relations	played	an	important	part	in	moulding	the	strategies	of	dealing	with	the	strained	sovereignty	dispute	(Koo,	2010).	At	the	time,	any	military	action	concerning	the	Senkaku	Islands	was	not	an	option	for	China	due	to	the	profitable	 economic	 relationship	with	 Japan.	 Furthermore,	military	 action	would	 have	brought	 the	 United	 States	 to	 intervene.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 United	 States	 also	pressured	Japan	not	to	aggravate	China	on	the	matter	of	legitimacy.	In	the	Reversion	of	Okinawa	(See	Appendix	IV),	the	United	States	had	made	it	clear	that	the	Senkaku	Islands	were	 not	 covered	 by	 their	 mutual	 Security	 Agreement	 (See	 Appendix	 VI),	 pressuring	Japan	to	avoid	any	military	action	at	all	costs	(Koo,	2010).		 2.1.4.	2000-PRESENT		 	 “If	there	is	a	flash	point	to	ignite	a	third	Sino-Japanese	War,	it	will	
be	the	ownership	of	the	Diaoyu	Islands	[Senkaku	Islands]	in	the	East	
China	Sea.”	(Wiegand,	2011,	p.	95).	Since	the	normalization	of	the	Sino-Japanese	relationship	in	1972,	the	economic	relations	were	more	important	to	China	than	to	Japan.	At	the	beginning	of	the	new	millennium,	a	slow	shift	started,	with	China’s	growing	economy	making	the	Japanese	relations	to	China	all	 the	 less	 important.	 Economic	 independence	 was	 getting	 more	 equal	 between	 the	countries,	 lessening	 the	 importance	 of	 their	 mutual	 economic	 relations.	 However,	economic	 independence	also	made	 the	cost	of	 conflicts	more	 important,	which	 in	 turn	worked	as	an	 incentive	 for	both	parties	 to	avoid	conflict.	The	biggest	change	resulting	from	this	could	be	seen	in	negotiation	leverage.	China	became	a	much	more	equal	partner,	with	Japan	losing	its	leverage	of	economic	aid	in	the	form	of	ODA.	Japan	also	saw	China’s	economic	 and	 military	 rise	 as	 more	 threatening	 than	 before,	 triggering	 more	 drastic	reactions	to	any	negativity	by	the	ultranationalists	of	both	countries	(Koo,	2010).	The	 main	 focus	 of	 the	 dispute	 has	 shifted	 to	 the	 possible	 oil	 and	 natural	 gas	reserves	in	the	sea	surrounding	the	islands.	China	has	been	pursuing	the	development	of	gas	fields	and	oil	rigs	in	order	to	secure	energy	production	(Swanström,	2005).	In	2003,	China	started	the	Chunxiao	gas	field	development,	which	Japan	protested	by	conducting	their	 own	development	 research	 in	 their	waters.	 This	 turned	 the	 dispute	 into	 a	more	
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heated	one,	resulting	in	research	vessels	and	security	patrol	vessels	being	dispatched	into	proximity	by	both	parties	(Swanström,	2005).	In	2004,	the	saying	“while	economy	is	hot,	politics	is	cold”	became	well-known	in	both	Japan	and	China,	as	the	already	strained	relationship	became	even	more	complicated	and	 has	 continued	 to	 play	 a	 part	 in	 their	mutual	 relationship	 ever	 since	 (Koo,	 2010).	Economic	 relations	 between	 the	 nations	were	 strong	 and	 growing,	 yet,	 politically	 the	relations	were	cold	and	at	a	 standstill.	 In	2004,	at	an	ASEAN	summit	meeting	 in	Laos,	China	declined	Japan’s	Prime	Minister	Junichiro	Koizumi’s	invitation	to	visit	Japan,	and	also	 withheld	 China’s	 support	 for	 Japan	 in	 Japan’s	 campaign	 to	 become	 a	 permanent	member	of	the	United	Nations’	Security	Council.	Koizumi’s	cabinet	announced	in	Japan’s	National	 Defence	 Program	 Outline	 that	 China	 was	 now	 counted	 as	 a	 potential	 threat	against	Japan,	together	with	North	Korea	out	of	the	East	Asian	states.	This	was	the	first	time	China	was	mentioned	by	name	as	a	threat	to	Japan	in	an	official	setting	(Swanström,	2005).	During	this	time,	China	published	a	Defence	White	Paper	where	it	mentioned	its	“concern	about	Japan’s	increasing	security	consciousness”	(Swanström,	2005,	p.	237).	This	time	the	initial	issue	started	with	activists	from	mainland	China	landing	on	Uotsuri	 Island	 in	 March	 2004.	 The	 Japanese	 Coast	 Guard	 arrested	 the	 activists	 and	deported	them	back	to	China.	China	protested	the	arrest	of	Chinese	citizens,	which	in	turn	triggered	Nihon	Seinensha	to	visit	the	Senkaku	Islands.	This	led	to	a	public	opinion	that	was	decidedly	anti-Japanese	by	the	Chinese	people	(Koo,	2010).	What	made	matters	even	worse	 was	 the	 dispatch	 of	 Japanese	 SDF	 to	 Iraq,	 Japanese	 Prime	 Minister	 Junichiro	Koizumi’s	visit	to	the	infamous	Yasukuni	shrine,	dedicated	to	victims	of	the	Second	World	War,	including	Class	A	war	criminals,	and	the	widely-held	opinion	in	China	that	Japan	had	not	apologized	nor	had	they	shown	enough	remorse	for	atrocities	and	occupations	during	World	War	II.	All	these	combined	led	to	enormous	pressure	by	the	public	on	the	Chinese	Government	 to	 make	 an	 official	 claim	 on	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 and	 express	 that	 no	compromise	on	the	matter	was	possible	(Koo,	2010).	In	Japan,	the	ultranationalists,	who	also	 refused	 to	 admit	 Japan’s	 faults	 in	 the	 Pacific	 War	 and	 denied	 all	 of	 Japan’s	 war	atrocities,	started	a	strong	campaign	to	put	more	pressure	on	the	Japanese	government	to	 counter	 China’s	move.	 Once	 again,	 the	 ultranationalists	 of	 both	 countries	were	 the	driving	force	behind	the	governments’	actions.	Although	the	groups	were	in	fact	small,	they	were	loud	enough	for	the	opposite	country’s	government	not	to	ignore	them.	The	
	16		
dispute	flared	up	even	further	in	May	2004,	when	a	Chinese	research	ship	was	conducting	research	in	what	Japan	considers	to	be	its	EEZ.	Although	Japan	strongly	advised	China	to	end	 all	 activity	 in	 the	 zone,	 China	 decided	 to	 ignore	 this	 heavy	 request	 and	 started	constructing	 a	 natural	 gas	 drilling	 facility	 in	 the	 disputed	 area.	 Japan	 countered	 by	launching	its	own	research	on	natural	gas	exploration	in	the	area.	Both	countries	deemed	the	others’	research	and	exploration	as	illegal	(Koo,	2010).	In	2005,	 the	Japanese	Coast	Guard	took	possession	of	 the	 lighthouse	on	Uotsuri	Island,	when	the	former	private	owner	gave	up	his	ownership	claim.	This	was	strongly	criticized	by	China.	Numerous	anti-Japanese	protests	flared	up	around	China,	leading	to	the	biggest	strain	on	bilateral	relations	in	decades.	Both	countries	still	agreed	on	working	together	to	relieve	tension,	and	efforts	on	both	sides	were	successful	(Koo,	2010).	Despite	that,	Japan	still	developed	a	detailed	military	plan	for	a	potential	military	escalation	with	China	 regarding	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 in	 2007	 (Wiegand,	 2011).	 After	 exhaustive	negotiations,	the	two	countries	reached	a	conclusion	for	a	joint	development	of	natural	gas	field	research	in	2008.	Once	again,	the	economic	considerations	were	the	key	to	de-escalating	the	tensions	between	China	and	Japan	(Koo,	2010).	Although	economics	seems	to	have	played	an	important	role	throughout	the	history	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	it	is	not	enough	to	keep	the	peace	completely.	Only	one	week	after	the	joint	development	agreement	 in	 2008,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 started	 an	 official	 protest	 against	 Japan	concerning	aerial	inspections	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	(Wiegand,	2011).			There	were	countless	clashes	at	the	time:	both	Japanese	and	Chinese	patrol	and	military	ships	circled	the	disputed	waters,	Chinese	submarines	were	spotted	in	the	area,	natural	gas	and	oil	research	occurred	in	the	disputed	areas	by	both	China	and	Japan,	and	in	2009,	there	was	even	a	fighter	plane	incident	where	two	Chinese	fighter	planes	chased	Japanese	fighter	planes	in	the	disputed	area	(East	Asian	Territorial	Disputes	–	A	Timeline,	n.d.).	 In	2010,	Japan	and	the	United	States	organised	a	joint	military	exercise	in	the	East	China	Sea,	possibly	 to	signal	China	 that	 the	countries	are	ready	 for	possible	escalation	from	China’s	 side	 in	 the	 future	 (Wiegand,	2011).	This	was	a	dangerous	 strategy,	 since	feather-ruffling	could	end	up	provoking	China	even	 further,	 increasingly	damaging	 the	mutual	relations.	
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The	biggest	 source	 of	 dispute	 between	China	 and	 Japan	 regarding	 the	 Senkaku	Islands	in	recent	years	was	the	decision	by	the	Japanese	government	to	purchase	three	of	the	islands	from	a	private	owner	in	2012.	This	sparked	an	outrage	in	China,	resulting	in	violent	demonstrations	against	Japanese	businesses	and	institutions	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	 of	 Japan,	 2016).	 	 China	 issued	 a	 very	 straightforward	 statement,	 blaming	 the	Japanese	government	for	instigating	“a	political	storm	around	the	issue	of	“purchasing”	the	islands”	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).		The	statement	ended	in	a	very	strong	threat	that	if	Japan	went	through	with	the	purchase	plan,	China	would	react:	“The	Japanese	government	pulled	off	its	mask	and	revealed	its	own	intention	to	 “purchase”	 and	 “nationalize”	 Diaoyu	 Island,	 Nanxiao	 Island	 and	 Beixiao	Island.	 By	 “nationalizing”	 the	 islands,	 the	 Japanese	 government	 aims	 to	reinforce	 its	 “actual	control”	over	Diaoyu	Islands	and	eventually	occupy	the	islands.	[…]	We	advise	the	Japanese	government	to	recognize	the	gravity	of	the	situation,	 pull	 back	 from	 the	 precipice,	 and	 immediately	 cease	 all	 acts	 that	violate	 China’s	 territorial	 sovereignty.	 The	 determination	 of	 the	 Chinese	government	and	the	Chinese	people	to	defend	their	territorial	sovereignty	is	firm	and	unshakable.	We	have	the	will	and	the	ability	to	defend	our	territorial	sovereignty.	Any	attempt	by	Japan	to	covet	Diaoyu	Islands	will	end	in	failure”	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).		Japan	has	been	very	quiet	on	how	the	purchase	deal	played	out	without	releasing	any	official	 statements	on	 the	 topic.	However,	 according	 to	Kyodo	News,	 the	 Japanese	government	purchased	three	of	the	five	main	islands	from	a	private	Japanese	owner	in	September	2012	(Kyodo	News,	2013).	In	 2013,	 China	 established	 an	 air	 identification	 zone	 called	 “East	 China	 Sea	Air	Defence	Identification	Zone”	(ADIZ),	that	arguably	served	as	a	counter	measure	for	the	purchase	debacle.	In	an	official	statement	by	the	Chinese	government,	it	is	explained	that	ADIZ	will	cover	China’s	territory	as	well	as	the	outer	limit	of	the	territorial	sea.	When	an	aircraft	enters	 the	 identification	zone,	 they	are	required	 to	 identify	 themselves,	 report	flight	 plans	 and	 convey	 their	 exact	 location	 (see	 appendix	 VII)	 (Qiang,	 2013).	 If	 not	complied,	the	aircraft	risks	being	subjected	to	unspecified	emergency	defensive	measures	
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by	Chinese	authorities.	This	time,	Japan	heavily	criticized	the	plan	of	ADIZ	and	was	backed	up	by	 the	United	States	 and	 the	ASEAN	 to	 combat	 the	growing	assertiveness	of	China	regarding	territorial	disputes	at	sea	(Kyodo	News,	2013).		In	April	2014	at	the	Japan-US	summit	meeting,	US	President	Obama	stated	that	the	Senkaku	 Islands	 were	 unquestionably	 covered	 by	 the	 Japan-US	 Security	 Treaty	 (see	appendix	VI),	stipulating	an	obligation	of	the	United	States	to	defend	the	Senkaku	Islands	as	part	of	Japan.	This	was	the	first	time	the	President	of	the	United	States	had	made	such	a	clear	statement	on	the	issue	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	regarding	the	United	States	(Iizuka,	2014).	Since	2014	the	situation	has	stayed	relatively	calm,	however,	countless	breaches	into	both	parties’	EEZs	respectively	have	been	common.	The	future	will	show	what	kind	of	effects	 current	 changes	 in	politics	 in	 the	United	States	have	on	 the	Senkaku	 Islands	dispute.	In	2017,	after	a	tumultuous	presidential	campaign	in	the	United	States,	President	Donald	Trump’s	defence	secretary	James	Mattis	specifically	mentioned	that	the	Senkaku	Islands	are	 still	 covered	 by	 the	 Security	 Treaty	 between	 Japan	 and	 the	 United	 States	 (See	Appendix	VI).	This	was	a	welcomed	gesture	 for	 Japan,	especially	after	Donald	Trump’s	somewhat	alarming	comments	during	his	campaign	about	weakening	the	security	treaty	(Panda,	2017).	Enduring	 territorial	 disputes	 are	 disputes	 that	 have	 lasted	 for	 over	 ten	 years,	with	 or	without	militarized	conflict	(Wiegand,	2011).	The	issue	with	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	is	 that	 although	 the	 dispute	 has	 been	 ongoing	 for	 decades,	 there	 has	 never	 been	 any	attempts	 to	 actually	 resolve	 the	 dispute.	 China	 and	 Japan	 have	 never	 even	 come	 to	 a	mutual	conclusion	on	whether	the	Senkaku	Islands	is	in	fact	disputed	at	all.			 			
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3.	CURRENT	STATUS	QUO	AND	CLAIMS		 3.1.	CLAIMS	OF	THE	SENKAKU	ISLANDS:	THE	VIEW	OF		INTERNATIONAL	LAW	ON	ATTRIBUTION	OF	TERRITORY		According	to	international	law	a	territory	belongs	to	the	state	that	holds	the	title	to	that	territory.	A	 state’s	 right	 to	 exercise	 sovereignty	over	 specific	 territory	 is	based	on	 the	territorial	title	(Hamakawa,	2007).	In	international	law,	there	can	be	said	to	be	one	main	quality	in	regard	to	the	title	to	territorial	sovereignty,	that	is,	the	importance	of	effective	control.	This	is	important	in	both	creating	and	maintaining	a	title	to	a	territory.	Since	the	16th	century,	mere	discovery	of	a	territory	has	not	been	enough	in	the	eyes	of	international	law,	not	even	with	intent	to	occupy.	According	to	international	law	a	title	to	sovereignty	is	a	title	erga	omnes,	meaning	a	real,	statutory	entitlement	owed	towards	all.	However,	history	shows	that	a	decision	made	between	two	competing	claims	is	in	fact	enough	to	establish	a	title	holder	(Jennings,	1963).	A	well-known	example	of	this,	and	in	many	ways	one	of	the	earliest,	is	the	judging	of	the	case	on	Eastern	Greenland	by	the	Permanent	Court	of	International	Justice:	“Another	circumstance	which	must	be	taken	into	account	by	any	tribunal	which	has	to	adjudicate	upon	a	claim	over	a	particular	territory,	is	the	extent	to	which	sovereignty	is	also	claimed	by	some	other	Power.	In	most	of	the	cases	involving	 claims	 to	 territorial	 sovereignty	 there	 have	 been	 two	 competing	claims	to	sovereignty,	and	the	tribunal	has	had	to	decide	which	of	the	two	is	stronger”	(Jennings,	1963,	p.	5).	There	are	five	modes	of	territorial	change	through	which	states	can	gain	the	title	to	territory:	occupation,	prescription,	cession,	accession	(also	known	as	accretion)	and	subjugation	(previously	known	as	conquest).	These	means	deal	not	only	with	changes	in	actual	occupation	but	 changes	 in	 the	 rights	 to	 territorial	 sovereignty	 (Jennings,	1963).	Japan	bases	its	title	to	the	Senkaku	Islands	on	occupation	(Hamakawa,	2007).		
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3.1.1.	THEORY	OF	OCCUPATION	AND	THE	AFTERMATH	IN	THE	EYES	OF		INTERNATIONAL	LAW		Occupation	according	to	international	law	is	“the	appropriation	by	a	state	of	a	territory	which	is	not	at	the	time	subject	to	the	sovereignty	of	any	state”	(Jennings,	1963,	p.20).	The	territory	in	question	does	not	need	to	be	uninhabited.	Many	international	disputes	can	be	said	to	stem	from	this	clause,	since	indigenous	peoples	do	not	have	sovereignty	over	their	land,	only	states	can	act	as	titleholders	(Jennings,	1963).	For	a	territory	to	be	occupied	it	needs	to	be	terra	nullius,	a	territory	not	belonging	to	any	state.	The	occupying	state	usually	brings	out	their	intent	to	occupy	a	specific	territory	through	a	declaration	or	notification	to	the	international	community	that	the	territory	in	question	will	be	incorporated	to	the	state	 in	question.	However,	neither	 is	required	for	an	occupation	to	be	seen	as	 legal,	a	clear	 show	 of	 intention	 to	 incorporate	 the	 territory	 into	 the	 state	 is	 enough.	 So,	 to	successfully	 occupy	 a	 territory,	 the	 state	 must	 effectively	 prove	 the	 intention	 of	occupation	 (Hamakawa,	 2007).	The	main	 legal	 issue	with	occupation	 is	 that	 legally	 to	occupy	a	territory,	the	state	needs	to	acquire	the	title	to	it.	Both	the	title	to	territory	and	the	 exact	 territory	 in	 question	 need	 to	 be	 clearly	 defined	 for	 the	 occupation	 to	 be	considered	legally	bound	by	international	law	(Jennings,	1963).	In	the	theory	of	 law,	once	a	state	has	acquired	territorial	 title,	 it	 is	 immediately	open	for	scrutiny	by	other	states.	Therefore,	there	should	in	theory	not	be	any	claims	on	the	same	territory	title	among	different	states.	In	reality,	this	is	not	as	black	and	white.	Many	territorial	disputes	rise	from	the	notion	of	not	being	clear	to	whom	the	territory	title	belongs	to.	There	might	be	different	views	on	whether	the	title	has	been	acclaimed	the	right	way	or	at	all.	This	makes	the	role	of	international	law	more	difficult,	since	there	is	no	specific	mention	on	situations	where	territory	title	is	not	clearly	decided	upon	by	dispute	parties.	This	 is	where	a	combined	view	of	 the	 theory	on	occupation	as	well	as	prescription	can	be	used	(Hamakawa,	1963).		Prescription	is	related	to	the	theory	of	occupation.	As	a	legal	concept	prescription	is	a	bit	more	complex	than	occupation.	It	means	acquisition	of	title	by	a	long-continued	and	undisturbed	possession.	There	are	two	main	understandings	of	precession;	extinctive	prescription	 and	 acquisitive	 prescription.	 Extinctive	 prescription	 refers	 to	 a	 failure	 to	
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present	 a	 claim	within	 a	 reasonable	 time	 of	 a	 specific	 territory,	 however,	 this	 has	 no	relations	to	title	and	is	therefore	not	as	relevant	as	acquisitive	prescription.	Acquisitive	prescription	refers	to	the	situation	where	“a	substantive	right	of	the	former	owner	of	the	title	is	extinguished”	(Jennings,	1963,	p.	21).	However,	no	specific	time	frame	for	this	is	specified	in	the	context	of	international	law.		Acquisitive	prescription	can	still	be	interpreted	in	two	ways:	1. “A	possession	that	has	so	long	been	established	that	its	origins	are	not	only	now	beyond	question	but	also	unknown.	2. A	 prescription	 strictly	 so-called,	 where	 the	 actual	 exercise	 of	 sovereign	rights	over	a	period	of	time	is	allowed	to	cure	a	defect	in	title;	where	the	exercise	 of	 sovereign	 rights	 either	 rests	 upon	 a	 demonstrably	 defective	title	or	is	even	in	origin	wrongful.	In	this	case	the	title	is	acquired	by	means	of	an	“adverse”	possession”	(Jennings,	1963,	p.	22)	In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute,	 although	 Japan’s	 claim	 is	 based	 on	occupation,	as	this	claim	is	not	accepted	by	China	and	could	in	fact	be	disputed,	Japan	has	time	on	its	side.	Since	the	Senkaku	Islands	are	under	Japanese	governance	and	according	to	international	law	Japan	is	in	fact	the	titleholder	for	the	disputed	islands,	continuously	and	effectively	exercising	sovereign	rights	over	the	territory.	In	the	well-known	case	of	
Islands	of	Palmas	in	1928,	the	traditional	modes	of	acquiring	territory	were	combined	and	reapplied	by	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	as	follows:	“The	continuous	and	peaceful	display	of	territorial	sovereignty…	is	as	good	as	a	title.	 Territorial	 sovereignty,	 as	 has	 already	 been	 said,	 involves	 the	 exclusive	 right	 to	display	the	activities	of	a	State.		This	right	has	a	corollary,	a	duty:	the	obligation	to	protect	within	 the	 territory	 the	 rights	of	other	 states,	 in	particular	 their	 right	 to	 integrity	and	inviolability	in	peace	and	in	war,	together	with	the	rights	which	each	State	may	claim	for	its	 nationals	 in	 foreign	 territory.		 Without	 manifesting	 its	 territorial	 sovereignty	 in	 a	manner	 corresponding	 to	 circumstances,	 the	 State	 cannot	 fulfil	 this	 duty.		 Territorial	sovereignty	cannot	limit	itself	to	its	negative	side,	i.e.	to	excluding	the	activities	of	other	states....”	(Huber,	1928).	
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Since	the	Island	of	Palmas	case,	the	importance	of	effective	control	has	preceded	the	importance	of	title	in	territorial	disputes.	(Hamakawa,	2007)	Since	it	was	founded	on	the	 continuous	and	peaceful	display	of	 territorial	 sovereignty,	 the	 case	 arbitrator	Max	Huber	pointed	out	that	“the	Spanish	had	a	title	to	the	island	by	discovery	and	that	this	must	be	considered	as	included	in	the	cession	under	Article	III	of	the	Treaty	of	Paris,	an	inchoate	title	could	not	prevail	over	the	continuous	and	peaceful	display	of	authority	by	another;	 for	such	a	display	may	prevail	even	over	a	prior,	definite	title	put	towards	by	another	state”	(Jennings,	1963,	p.	22)	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	“critical	date”	of	a	territorial	dispute	plays	an	important	role	in	how	international	law	views	the	dispute.	According	to	international	law,	only	facts	and	state	activities	that	occurred	prior	to	the	critical	 date	 of	 a	 dispute	 are	 accepted	 as	 evidence.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 easy	way	 to	determine	the	critical	date.	This	is	often	left	to	the	judgment	of	a	court,	in	the	case	of	the	dispute	being	taken	to	court	(Hamakawa,	2007).		 3.1.2.	CLAIMS	BY	CHINA	AND	JAPANESE	REBUTTAL		 China	bases	the	claims	on	Senkaku	Islands	on	three	main	points;	initial	discovery,	jurisdiction,	and	maps	depicting	the	islands	as	Chinese	territory.		 CLAIM	1:	THE	SENKAKU	ISLANDS	WERE	DISCOVERED	BY	CHINA		According	 to	 China,	 the	 earliest	 record	 of	 the	 Diaoyu	 Dao	 (the	 Chinese	 name	 for	 the	Senkaku	Islands)	being	used	to	depict	said	islands	was	in	Voyage	with	a	Tail	Wind	(Shun	Feng	Xiang	Song),	published	as	early	as	1403	in	the	Ming	Dynasty.	In	1372,	the	King	of	Ryukyu	started	paying	tribute	to	China;	in	return,	Chinese	imperial	envoys	were	sent	to	the	Ryukyu	Islands.	Between	1372	and	1866	China	sent	a	total	of	24	envoys	to	the	Ryukyu	Islands,	and	 the	Senkaku	 Islands	were	situated	en	route.	China	has	noted	 that	 there	 is	countless	evidence	of	mentions	of	 the	Diaoyu	Dao	(Senkaku	 Islands)	 in	 reports	by	 the	imperial	envoys.	 	 In	1650,	the	first	official	historical	record	of	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	by	Ryukyu’s	 Prime	Minister	Kozoken	 (Xiang	 Xiangxian)	mentioned	Gumi	Mountain	 (later	
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named	Kume	Island	of	Okinawa)	and	Sekibi-sho	(Chiwei	Island)	as	the	boundary	between	China	and	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom.	This	has	later	been	mentioned	in	numerous	published	works	during	the	tribute-relations	between	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	and	China	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).	Japanese	scholars	and	researchers	have	counterclaimed	that	these	mentions	only	prove	that	Kume	Islands	was	part	of	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom,	and	no	mention	of	whether	China	in	fact	did	own	Sekibi-sho	Island,	or	merely	used	it	as	navigational	help.	Since	the	Senkaku	 Islands	 are	 located	 almost	 right	 between	 Fuzhou	 in	 China	 and	 Naha	 in	 the	Ryukyu	 Kingdom,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	mention	 of	 Sekibi-sho	 Island	 and	 Gumi	Mountain	was	merely	made	to	point	out	where	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	ends,	but	there	is	no	specific	mention	that	these	two	in	fact	were	part	of	 the	border	between	China	and	the	Ryukyu	 Kingdom,	 let	 alone	 any	 mention	 of	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	(Hamakawa,	2007).	China	 also	 claims	 that	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	were	 in	 fact	not	part	 of	 the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	 and	 therefore	 not	 part	 of	 current	 Okinawa	 that	was	 reversed	 to	 Japan	 after	World	War	II	(See	Appendix	V).	During	negotiations	about	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	in	1879,	both	parties	did	recognize	that	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	consisted	of	36	islands,	which	did	not	include	the	Senkaku	Islands.	Although	both	parties	were	of	the	same	opinion,	Japan	claims	that	the	reason	why	the	Senkaku	Islands	was	not	included	in	the	36	islands	of	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	was	that	in	order	to	be	counted	as	one	of	the	36	official	islands	of	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom,	the	island	had	to	be	inhabited	and	pay	tribute	to	the	capital.	Only	islands	that	met	these	conditions	were	counted	as	official	islands	of	the	Kingdom.	This	did	not	mean	that	other	islands	were	not	part	of	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom,	they	merely	did	not	count	towards	the	official	islands	of	administration	(Hamakawa,	2007).		 CLAIM	2:	THE	SENKAKU	ISLANDS	WERE	UNDER	CHINESE	JURISDICTION		In	the	1560s	wako,	Japanese	pirates,	frequently	raided	China’s	coastline	cities	and	villages.	China	established	a	coastal	defence	zone	to	counter	any	attacks	by	wako	and	according	to	China,	the	Senkaku	Islands	were	part	of	its’	coastal	defence	zone.	(Hamakawa,	2007).	In	1561,	An	illustrated	Compendium	on	Maritime	Security	(Chou	Hai	Tu	Bian)	compiled	under	
	24		
supervision	by	Hu	Zongxian,	the	supreme	commander	of	the	southeast	coastal	defence	of	the	imperial	court	included	the	Senkaku	Islands	into	the	jurisdiction	of	the	coastal	defence	of	the	imperial	court	in	several	map	depictions.	China	presents	this	as	proof	that	they	did	in	fact	have	jurisdiction	over	the	Senkaku	Islands	at	the	time	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).	This	source	has	been	questioned	by	Japan,	since	
An	 illustrated	 Compendium	 on	Maritime	 Security	 also	 includes	 other	maps	 that	 do	 not	depict	Taiwan,	Keelung	Islet,	Pengjia	Islet	or	the	Senkaku	Islands	at	all,	showing	that	the	maps	are	 inaccurate.	 Japan	has	also	suggested	that	the	reason	the	Senkaku	Islands	are	depicted	on	the	defence	zone	map	but	no	other	map	might	just	focus	on	the	areas	where	raids	were	more	 frequent	 and	 needed	more	 attention	 by	 security	 forces	 (Hamakawa,	2007).	According	 to	 China,	 the	 Qing	 imperial	 court	 placed	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 under	jurisdiction	 of	 Taiwan’s	 local	 government,	 thus	 making	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 part	 of	Taiwan,	which	 in	 turn	was	 incorporated	 into	China	 (Ministry	of	 Foreign	Affairs	 of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).	This	claim	stems	 from	a	description	of	 the	Senkaku	Islands	in	the	Chinese	publication	Riben	Yijian	(A	mirror	of	Japan)	published	in	1556	as	
xiaodong	xiaoyu	ye,	small	island	of	Xiaodong,	Taiwan,	however,	this	was	before	Taiwan	was	incorporated	into	China,	so	China	had	no	jurisdiction	over	the	area	at	that	time.	When	Taiwan	was	 incorporated	 into	China,	areas	of	Northern	Taiwan,	such	as	Huaping	 Islet,	Mianhua	Islet	and	Pengjia	Islet	were	not	included	into	Taiwan	and	therefore	China.	The	Senkaku	Islands	are	situated	even	further	away	from	Taiwan	than	the	aforementioned	islets,	which	in	turn	made	Japan	claim	that	this	can	be	taken	as	an	assumption	that	the	Senkaku	Islands	were	also	not	included	into	the	Taiwanese	area	that	was	incorporated	into	China	(Hamakawa,	2007).				CLAIM	3:	BOTH	CHINESE	AND	FOREIGN	MAPS	SHOW	THE	SENKAKU	ISLANDS	AS	CHINESE	TERRITORY		
The	Roadmap	to	Ryukyu	in	the	Shi	Liu	Qiu	Lu	by	a	Chinese	envoy	in	1579,	The	Record	of	
the	 Interpreters	of	August	Ming	written	by	Mao	Ruizheng	 in	1629,	The	Great	Universal	
Geographic	Map	from	1767	and	The	Atlas	of	the	Great	Qing	Dynasty	from	1863	have	all,	according	to	China,	depicted	the	Senkaku	Islands	as	part	of	China.	China	claims	that	one	
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of	 the	 most	 compelling	 evidence	 based	 on	 maps	 is	 The	 Illustrated	 Outline	 of	 Three	
Countries	 (Sangoku	 Tsuran	 Zusetsu),	 from	 1786	 by	 Japanese	 Hayashi	 Shihei.	 The	publication	includes	The	map	of	the	three	provinces	and	36	islands	of	Ryukyu,	which	is	in	fact	a	coloured	map	from	the	Edo	Period.	In	this	map	clear	Japanese	territories,	such	as	the	island	of	Kyushu	are	depicted	in	green,	territories	belonging	to	the	Ryukyu	Kingdom	are	 depicted	 in	 brown,	 and	 Chinese	 territories	 are	 depicted	 in	 pink.	 In	 this	 map,	 the	Senkaku	Islands	are	also	depicted	in	pink.	This	map,	illustrated	and	published	in	Japan	is	one	of	the	main	evidences	brought	forth	by	China	to	prove	that	Japan	was	in	fact	in	the	know	 that	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 were	 not	 terra	 nullius,	 but	 part	 of	 Chinese	 territory	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).	Japan,	on	the	other	hand,	has	pointed	out	that	the	map	was	illustrated	after	Taiwan	was	already	incorporated	into	China,	however	Taiwan	is	not	depicted	in	pink,	it	shows	the	territories	in	different	colours,	the	map	contains	many	inaccuracies,	such	as	the	sizes	of	various	territories,	and	most	importantly,	Sangoku	Tsuran	Zusetsu	was	written	and	published	by	Hayashi	Shihei	as	 a	 private	 citizen	 and	 can	 therefore	 not	 be	 said	 to	 show	 Japan’s	 official	 stance.	(Hamakawa,	2007)	A	French	cartographer,	Pierre	Lapie,	illustrated	the	Senkaku	Islands,	Taiwan,	Sekibi-sho	Island	among	others	all	the	same	colour	in	The	Map	of	East	China	Sea	Littoral	States	published	in	1809.	China	has	also	mentioned	several	other	foreign	map	publications	that	according	to	China	show	the	Senkaku	Islands	as	part	of	China;	A	New	Map	of	China	from	
the	Latest	Authorities	published	in	Britain	in	1811,	Colton’s	China	published	in	the	United	States	in	1859	and	A	Map	of	China’s	East	Coast:	Hong	Kong	to	Gulf	of	Liao-Tung	published	by	the	British	Navy	in	1877	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	2012).					
	 	
	26		
	 	
	27	 	
4.	PEACE	THEORY:		STRIVING	FOR	PEACE	-	KNOWING	WHAT	TO	STRIVE	FOR		
“A	peace	based	 exclusively	upon	 the	political	 and	 economic	
arrangements	 of	 governments	 would	 not	 be	 a	 peace	 which	 could	
secure	the	unanimous,	lasting	and	sincere	support	of	the	peoples	of	
the	world	[…]	and	peace	must	therefore	be	founded,	if	it	is	not	to	fail,	
upon	the	intellectual	and	moral	solidarity	of	mankind”	(SIPRI,	1998,	
p.	7)	A	territorial	dispute	might	 increase	 the	risk	of	war,	 it	will	 in	 the	end	only	 lead	 to	war	depending	on	how	disputing	parties	handle	the	raised	power	play	of	territorial	disputes.	“Such	practices	include	the	threat,	display	and	use	of	force,	the	making	of	alliances,	and	the	building	up	of	one’s	military	to	increase	power”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	4).	Striving	for	peace	is	something	 that	 is	 generally	 seen	 as	 an	 obvious	 answer	when	 it	 comes	 to	 dispute	 and	conflict	resolution.	However,	can	it	be	that	in	some	situations	a	dispute	or	a	conflict	is	in	fact	 a	 better	 option	 for	 a	 state	 than	 peace?	 In	 order	 to	 consider	 this	 question,	 it	 is	necessary	to	first	define	exactly	what	is	meant	by	the	term	‘peace’.	Peace	is	often	viewed	as	a	synonym	for	stability.	It	can	refer	to	stability	in	the	world	order,	 an	 equilibrium	 of	 power	 or	 inner	 stability	 of	 the	 mind.	 This	 view	 of	 peace	 is	however	very	narrow	and	needs	to	be	elaborated	on.	According	to	SIPRI	(1998),	the	current	culture	of	violence	in	the	world	that	grows	of	 mistrust,	 intolerance,	 suspicion	 should	 be	 replaced	 with	 a	 culture	 based	 on	nonviolence,	tolerance	and	solidarity.	The	culture	of	peace	should	be	seen	as	a	collection	of	peaceful,	nonviolent	behavioural	patterns	and	skills.	It	is	also	important	to	remember	that	 peace	 in	 itself	 is	 not	 a	 fixed	 state	 of	 existence.	 The	 culture	 of	 peace	 “cannot	 be	preserved	 if	 the	 basic	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 of	 individuals	 or	 groups	 are	violated	 and	 when	 discrimination	 and	 exclusion	 generate	 conflict.	 Therefore,	 the	protection	of	human	rights	and	 the	promotion	of	a	culture	of	democracy,	which	 imply	
inter	alia	the	formation	of	well-informed,	democratically	minded	and	responsible	citizens,	become	 important	 elements	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 internal	 and	 international	 peace”	
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(SIPRI,	1998,	p.	9).	The	 irony	 is	 that	 the	more	globalized	 the	world	becomes	the	more	conflicts	and	disputes	seem	to	stem	from	domestic	issues.			 4.1.	DEFINING	THE	NOTION	OF	PEACE		Johan	Galtung,	the	principal	founder	of	the	discipline	of	peace	and	conflict	studies	refers	to	the	notion	of	peace	as	follows:	“Peace	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 “umbrella	 concept”,	 a	 general	 expression	 of	human	desires,	of	that	which	is	good,	that	which	is	ultimately	to	be	pursued.	Mankind	will	always	be	heading	for	goals,	some	of	them	very	concrete,	some	of	them	more	abstract	and	diffuse,	and	“peace”	seems	to	be	one	of	the	terms	that	 is	 used	 for	 this	 generalized	 goal.	 “Happiness”	 is	 perhaps	 another	 such	term,	 to	be	used	 at	 the	more	 individual	 level,	 “peace”	has	 the	 advantage	of	expressing	global,	collective	concerns.”	(Galtung	1967,	p.6)	Peace	is	a	very	strong	term	that	plays	a	huge	part	in	today’s	world	politics.	It	can	be	argued	that	peace	as	a	goal	is	what	motivates	any	states	to	work	together.	According	to	 Galtung,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 term	 “peace”	 is	 so	 abstract	 works	 in	 its	 favour:	 “peace	probably	 makes	 sense	 to	 many	 people	 precisely	 because	 it	 corresponds	 to	 their	experiences	and	they	can	endow	it	with	the	meanings	that	to	them	are	most	important.”	(Galtung	1967,	p.	6)	If	the	term	“peace”	would	be	more	specific	and	concrete,	it	would	lose	its	 purpose	 as	 an	 umbrella	 concept	 and	 become	much	more	 intangible	 for	 people	 to	comprehend.	However,	there	is	another	side	to	the	terminology.	While	it	can	be	argued	that	it	is	beneficial	that	the	term	“peace”	is	broad,	it	also	results	in	a	sense	of	peace	being	aloof,	confusing	and	not	possible	to	consider	as	a	concrete	goal.	This	means	that	the	value	of	peace	as	a	reachable	goal	suffers,	since	states	and	organizations	might	not	consider	it	a	possibility	and	not	clear	enough	how	to	work	towards	it.	In	today’s	world	where	wars,	conflicts	 and	 violence	 are	 regularly	 present	 it	 is	 even	more	 important	 to	 have	 a	 clear	picture	of	peace	being	possible	to	achieve.	Galtung	(1967)	argues	that	it	is	important	for	the	idea	of	peace	that	the	term	is	both	vague	and	concise,	depending	on	the	context.	 If	
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peace	is	not	seen	as	a	concrete,	achievable	outcome,	it	is	much	harder	to	motivate	people	to	work	towards	it.	At	the	same	time,	for	the	majority	of	people	to	identify	and	emotionally	attach	 themselves	 to	 the	 idea	of	 reaching	peace,	 the	notion	has	 to	be	vague	enough	 to	include	the	ideals	of	the	largest	amount	of	individual	thoughts	as	possible.	The	term	“peace”	can	be	seen	on	different	levels	and	having	different	layers,	not	as	straight	forward	as	maybe	before,	but	how	it	as	an	ideal	and	a	notion	has	the	possibility	to	be	both	vague	enough	and	concrete	enough	at	the	same	time	to	work	as	a	motivating	factor	for	states,	the	international	community	as	well	as	individuals.	Galtung	(1967)	identifies	three	directions	of	precisation	of	peace.	According	to	the	first	precisation,	peace	can	refer	to	stability,	both	external	and	internal	states	of	humans.	This	precisation	also	 covers	 the	notion	 that	peace	does	not	necessarily	have	 to	be	 the	absence	of	violence,	for	example,	a	soldier	in	a	war	situation	can	still	have	inner	peace	regardless	of	the	violence	he	is	part	of.	It	covers	the	concept	of	a	predictable	social	order,	even	if	this	said	order	is	in	fact	brought	about	by	the	use	or	threat	of	violence.	The	second	precisation	of	peace	is	what	Galtung	(1967)	calls	negative	peace.	It	is	the	absence	of	violence,	more	specifically	organized	collective	violence	between	specific	human	groups,	such	as	nations,	classes,	racial,	ethnic	or	religious	groups.	The	reason	it	is	specified	that	this	notion	of	peace	is	based	on	collective	violence	means	that	occasional	homicides	and	other	acts	of	violence	are	excluded	from	the	notion.	The	concept	of	violence	within	 negative	 peace	 is	 strictly	 used	 only	 as	 a	 clear	 change	 in	 security	 and	 violence	between	human	groups	that	crosses	the	line	of	occasional	outbursts	and	individual	acts	of	violence.	The	third	precisation,	positive	peace,	is	according	to	Galtung	(1967)	a	culmination	of	positive	and	good	actions	in	the	word	community	as	a	whole.	It	focuses	on	cooperation	and	 integration	 between	 different	 groups.	 Positive	 peace	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 ultimate	definition	of	peace	that	includes	the	most	widespread	effect	of	peace.	It	is	the	definition	most	 commonly	 affiliated	 in	 peace	 definitions.	 Although	 positive	 peace	 is	 seen	 as	 the	absolute	absence	of	violence	with	more	emphasis	on	the	positive	outcomes	of	peace,	the	notion	does	in	fact	exclude	occasional	individual	violence	acts.	Positive	peace	is	therefore	much	more	than	the	absence	of	war;	it	is	also	the	absence	of	instruments	and	institutions	of	war	(SIPRI,	1998).		
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The	first	precisation	is	irrelevant	in	most	peace	studies,	since	it	does	in	fact	include	violence	on	a	larger	scale	and	can	therefore	be	present	even	when	the	overall	situation	within	a	group	of	people	or	between	groups	of	people	are	far	from	peaceful.	The	notion	of	positive	peace	has	often	been	criticised	for	being	too	vague	to	use	in	the	study	of	peace.	Although	positive	peace	is	most	often	seen	as	the	ideal	outcome,	it	is	very	hard	to	attain	and	even	harder	to	analyse	effectively.	The	notion	of	negative	peace	is	most	often	used	in	peace	studies,	mainly	for	the	reason	that	it	is	the	easiest	of	these	three	precisations	to	analyse	and	study	objectively.	It	is	often	concised	in	the	form	of	“absence	of	organized,	collective	violence”	(Galtung	1967,	p.12).	However,	the	notion	of	negative	peace	is	still	problematic,	mostly	because	for	the	notion	to	be	effectively	used	and	understood	in	research,	it	is	important	to	conceptualize	all	aspects	of	the	notion.	So,	in	order	to	use	this	notion	of	peace,	one	also	has	to	define	the	notion	of	(organized,	collective)	violence	(Galtung	1967).	The	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Conflict	 Resolution	 (1997)	 refers	 to	 violence	 as	 “the	intentional	infliction	of	physical	harm	on	another.	[…]	Physical	violence	is	also	a	common	result	 of	 uncontrolled	 conflict	 escalation.	 […]	 Although	 conflicts	 can	 be	 resolved	 after	violence	has	occurred,	conflict	resolution	becomes	much	more	difficult	at	that	point”	(p.	303-304)	According	to	the	United	States	Institute	of	Peace,	violence	is	“Psychological	or	physical	 force	 exerted	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 threatening,	 injuring,	 damaging,	 or	 abusing	people	or	property.	In	international	relations,	violent	conflict	typically	refers	to	a	clash	of	political	interests	between	organized	groups	characterized	by	a	sustained	and	large-scale	use	 of	 force”	 (Snodderly,	 2011,	 p.	 53).	 Galtung	 (1969)	 explains	 that	 there	 are	 several	layers	in	the	definition	of	violence,	based	on	numerous	dimensional	distinctions.	The	first	distinction	needed	is	the	distinction	between	physical	and	psychological	violence,	which	is	quite	self-explanatory.	Not	all	types	of	violence	come	with	physical	pain	or	injuries.	The	second	distinction	is	between	the	negative	and	the	positive	influence	over	someone,	more	commonly	referred	to	as	“the	carrot	or	 the	stick”-approach,	where	 influence	can	come	through	punishing	for	wrongdoings	or	rewarding	for	obeying	the	 influencer.	The	third	distinction	is	whether	or	not	there	is	a	clear	object	of	violence;	Galtung	(1969)	raises	the	question	that	 if	 there	 is	no	biological	or	physical	object	subjected	to	violence,	 is	 it	still	violence?	The	fourth	distinction	is	whether	or	not	there	is	a	subject	(actor)	acting	out	the	violence.	This	is	where	Galtung	(1969)	brings	forth	the	definition	of	structural	violence	
	31	 	
versus	personal	violence.	Structural	 (indirect)	violence	means	 that	 there	 is	no	specific	person	or	subject	of	the	violence,	but	that	the	violence	is	instead	built	into	the	structure	of	society	and	shows	in	unequal	power	balances	or	inequality.	Personal	(direct)	violence	is	what	is	considered	more	traditional	violence,	where	the	subject	acting	out	the	violence	towards	the	object	can	be	clearly	distinguished.	Sometimes	structural	violence	is	referred	to	as	social	 injustice.	The	fifth	distinction	is	whether	or	not	the	violence	is	 intended	or	unintended.	 This	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 guilt	 and	 consequences.	 The	 sixth	 distinction	 is	between	two	levels	of	violence:	the	manifest	and	the	latent.	Manifest	violence,	which	can	be	both	personal	or	structural,	 is	something	that	is	possible	to	observe,	whereas	latent	violence	is	violence	that	is	not	yet	present	but	can	easily	come	out.	 	As	Galtung	(1969)	puts	it:	“An	extended	concept	of	violence	leads	to	an	extended	concept	of	peace”	(p.	183).		 In	order	to	pursue	peace	within	a	relationship,	whether	it	is	on	a	personal	level	or	a	national	or	even	global	level,	it	is	obviously	necessary	to	minimize	negative	aspects	of	the	relations	and	maximize	positive	aspects	of	the	relations.	Galtung	(1967)	lists	examples	of	positive	relations	and	values	that	can	be	used	to	pursue	peace.	Examples	of	such	are	presence	of	cooperation,	freedom	from	fear,	freedom	from	want,	economic	development	and	growth,	absence	of	exploitation,	equality,	 justice,	 freedom	of	action,	pluralism	and	dynamism.	Galtung	elaborates	further	on	what	is	meant	by	these	values	on	an	interstate	level	between	nations.	Presence	of	cooperation	means	that	there	is	interaction	between	the	parties	and	some	level	of	exchange,	whether	in	goods,	services,	culture	or	other.	The	negative	value	related	to	this	is	isolation.	Freedom	of	fear	refers	to	just	that:	a	sense	of	security	and	predictability	of	negative	events	so	that	there	is	no	need	to	live	in	constant	fear	of	negative	events.	This	includes	natural	disasters.	Freedom	from	want	means	that	citizens	of	nations	have	their	basic	needs	fulfilled	and	enjoy	basic	human	rights	to	live	a	dignified	 and	 fulfilled	 life	 at	 least	 at	 a	 basic	 level.	 Economic	 development	 and	 growth	refers	 to	 a	 strive	 for	 growth	 in	 GDP	 per	 capita	 or	 effective	 resource	 distribution.	 The	absence	of	exploitation	is,	according	to	Galtung	(1967),	that	there	is	no	blatant	inequality	between	 nations	 involved	 that	would	 result	 in	 exploitation	 of	 one	 nation	 by	 another.	Equality	is	also	quite	self-explanatory:	nations	and	individuals	should	be	seen	as	having	the	same	essential	value	and	rights.	Justice	is	closely	related	to	equality,	focusing	mainly	on	fundamental	rights	of	individuals	or	nations.	Freedom	of	action	is	a	bit	more	complex.	Galtung	(1967)	explains	that	freedom	of	action	means	that	nations	or	 individuals	have	
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opportunities	or	possibility	of	choice	as	well	as	means	to	carry	out	these	opportunities	or	choices.	It	is	closely	linked	to	independence.	Pluralism	and	dynamism	have	been	criticised	as	being	unnecessarily	complex	when	viewed	as	positive	relations.	Galtung	adds	them	as	examples	because	they	are	an	inherent	part	of	positive	values,	whether	or	not	they	are	in	fact	too	complex	or	broad	as	concepts.	By	pluralism	Galtung	means	that	nations	should	coexist	 in	 the	 world	 order	 but	 still	 maintain	 a	 large	 social	 and	 cultural	 diversity.	Dynamism	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 means	 that	 nations	 should	 be	 constructed	 so	 that	 the	international	 community	 and	 the	 world	 order	 have	 built-in	 conditions	 for	 change	 or	chance	of	change	and	development	on	broader	level.		It	is	widely	debated	whether	negative	peace	is	enough	to	strive	for,	but	at	the	same	time	 the	 notion	 of	 positive	 peace	 is	 seen	 as	 too	 complex	 and	 broad	 to	 strive	 for	 in	 a	constructive	and	concrete	manner.	There	are	different	instruments	that	can	be	used	to	analyse	possible	outcomes	of	peace	theories	or	conflict	policies	between	nations.	One	of	the	most	well-known	is	game	theory	that	focuses	on	probability	of	different	outcomes.	Game	theory	is	often	quite	vague	and	since	it	works	merely	on	a	probable	level	of	analysis,	it	is	not	an	effective	enough	tool	to	differentiate	between	analysis	of	negative	and	positive	peace.	It	can	however	shed	light	on	conflict	analysis	and	help	narrow	down	possibilities	of	policies	as	well	as	for	example	peace	theories.		 4.2.	GAME	THEORY		Game	theory	 is	 the	 logical	analysis	of	 situations	of	conflict	and	cooperation.	A	game	 is	defined	 as	 any	 situation	with	 at	 least	 two	 different	 players,	where	 the	 players	 follow	strategies	to	determine	an	outcome.	The	players	can	be	individual	or	general	entities,	such	as	nations	or	companies.	The	players	have	a	set	of	strategies,	which	are	courses	of	actions	they	 can	 take	 in	 the	 situation	 in	 question.	 Which	 strategies	 are	 implemented	 by	 the	players	determine	the	outcome	of	the	game.	Each	outcome	is	given	a	payoff	that	represent	the	value	of	the	outcome	to	the	different	players.	Game	theory	studies	how	players	should	rationally	choose	between	different	strategies,	where	the	end	game	is	for	players	to	reach	the	outcome	with	the	largest	possible	payoff	respectively.	By	choosing	strategies	players	can	influence	the	outcome,	however,	the	outcome	always	depends	on	strategy	choices	of	
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the	 other	 players.	 This	 brings	 in	 conflict	 and	 cooperation	 into	 the	 equation	 (Straffin,	1993).	Usually	conflicts	are	seen	as	opposing	forces,	in	game	theory	this	means	there	are	two	possible	outcomes	for	opposing	forces:	a	win-lose	situation	where	one	party	wins	and	the	other	party	loses,	or	alternatively	a	compromise	between	both	parties.	However,	Miall	et	al.	(1999)	explains	that	the	most	common	outcome	in	conflict	situations	is	actually	a	lose-lose	outcome	where	neither	party	reaches	the	ultimate	outcome.	If	neither	party	is	prepared	to	compromise	or	agree	to	an	outcome,	whether	it	is	a	win	or	lose	situation,	the	cost	of	conflict	might	rise	so	drastically	that	both	parties	in	fact	become	worse	off	than	if	they	had	chosen	a	different	strategy.		In	regard	to	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	game	theory	can	be	a	tool	in	analysing	whether	keeping	the	dispute	unresolved	would	in	fact	be	more	beneficial	for	Japan	in	the	long	run.	It	can	be	used	for	example	to	predict	possible	outcomes	of	either	sides	and	that	way	further	actions	of	dispute	parties.	Straffin	(1993)	explains	that	game	theory	has	at	least	three	major	obstacles	when	it	comes	to	modelling	real	life	situations.	Any	real-world	game	is	complex,	it	might	not	be	clear	 who	 the	 players	 are,	 what	 the	 possible	 strategies	 are,	 what	 outcomes	 those	strategies	lead	to	and	what	kinds	of	payoffs	are	realistic.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	game	theory	merely	gives	a	chance	to	create	a	simplified	model	to	give	insights	to	conflict	and	cooperation	situations.	The	second	major	obstacle	is	that	in	game	theory	all	players	base	 their	 strategy	 decisions	 on	 rationality	 and	 pure	 logics.	 In	 real	 world	 games,	 all	players	might	not	be	playing	the	game	rationally,	or	at	different	levels	of	rationality.	This	makes	predicting	outcomes	and	possible	strategies	in	real	life	practically	impossible.	The	third	 major	 obstacle	 is	 that	 at	 the	 moment	 game	 theory	 does	 not	 have	 a	 specific	prescription	and	formula	for	games	where	the	players	are	not	in	fact	strictly	opposed.	There	 are	 different	 games	 and	 strategies	 for	 different	 scenarios.	 For	 example,	players	can	use	dominant	strategies,	which	means	there	is	a	single	possible	strategy	that	is	best	for	a	player	no	matter	what	strategy	the	other	player	decides	on.	If	both	players	choose	a	dominant	strategy	an	equilibrium	is	formed.	In	this	scenario	both	players	reach	the	outcome	that	is	in	their	own	best	interest.	It	is	called	an	equilibrium	because	neither	party	has	 any	desire	 to	 change	 their	 strategy	 to	 reach	 a	different	 outcome	 (Anderton,	
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2008).	In	the	case	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	one	could	say	the	dominant	strategy	for	both	parties	are	to	gain	control	over	the	islands.	This	would	mean	that	an	equilibrium	is	impossible	to	reach	in	this	dispute.		Equilibriums	in	dominant	strategies	are	very	uncommon,	since	most	of	the	time	there	is	not	a	solution	of	strategy	that	both	parties	adopt	separately	that	lead	to	the	best	outcome	for	both	parties.	In	a	dominant	strategy,	the	parties	can	also	reach	what	is	called	a	Nash	equilibrium,	named	after	John	Nash,	an	American	mathematician	who	formulated	the	 theory	 of	 the	 equilibrium.	 When	 a	 Nash	 equilibrium	 occurs,	 neither	 player	 can	improve	their	outcome	given	the	choice	of	the	other	player.	Anderton	(2008)	explains	that	this	is	called	an	equilibrium	simply	because	neither	player	has	an	incentive	to	change	their	strategy	due	to	the	strategy	chosen	by	the	other	player.	The	most	commonly	used	game	in	game	theory	is	the	zero	sum	game.	Zero	sum	games	represent	conflict	situations	and	are	often	used	to	predict	simplified	solutions	and	outcomes	of	conflicts	based	on	rationality	and	logics.	“In	a	zero	sum	game,	the	gains	of	one	player	are	matched	by	equal	and	opposite	 losses	 for	 the	other	player.	When	gains	and	losses	are	added	up,	they	always	equal	zero”	(Anderton,	2008,	p.	331).		In	a	zero	sum	game	the	players	are	always	strictly	opposed,	since	one	gamer’s	gain	is	another	one’s	loss.		
ZERO	SUM	GAME	 PLAYER	2	STRAT.	A	 PLAYER	2	STRAT.	B	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	A	 (2,	-2)	 (3,	-3)	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	B	 (0,	0)	 (2,	-2)	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	C	 (-5,	5)	 (10,	-10)	Table	2.1	Shows	payoffs	to	both	player	1	and	2.	In	the	game	presented	in	Table	2.1,	player	1	has	three	possible	strategies,	whereas	player	 2	 only	 has	 two.	 This	 means	 there	 are	 six	 possible	 outcomes	 based	 on	 these	strategies.	The	first	number	in	brackets	represent	the	payoffs	for	player	1	and	the	second	number	the	payoff	for	player	2.	Since	this	is	a	zero	sum	game,	the	payoff	to	player	2	will	always	be	the	corresponding	negative	to	player	1’s	payoff.			
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Therefore,	the	table	can	be	simplified	in	the	following	way:	
ZERO	SUM	GAME	 PLAYER	2	STRAT.	A	 PLAYER	2	STRAT.	B	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	A	 2	 3	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	B	 0	 2	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	C	 -5	 10	Table	2.2	shows	the	payoffs	to	Player	1.	Consider	that	Player	1	 is	pursuing	a	high	number	outcome,	whereas	Player	2	 is	pursuing	a	low	number	outcome.	Clearly	Player	1’s	highest	number	option	would	be	10,	which	means	they	would	choose	strategy	C	and	hope	that	Player	2	chooses	strategy	B.	Player	2	would	most	 likely	guess	the	strategy	of	choice	of	Player	1	and	instead	choose	strategy	A	to	reach	5	instead	of	-10.	Again,	Player	1	could	try	to	logically	conclude	this	step,	which	would	lead	to	Player	1	abandoning	strategy	C	and	choose	strategy	A,	which	would	result	in	payoff	2	for	Player	1	and	-2	for	Player	2.	A	zero	sum	game	could	in	this	way	continue	indefinitely,	or	at	least	until	either	player	cannot	successfully	deduce	the	opposing	player’s	choice	of	strategy	(Straffin,	1993).	As	Miall	 et	 al.	 (1999)	brings	up,	 conflict	 resolution	 is	usually	 a	 tool	brought	up	when	 conflict	 parties	 consider	 themselves	 to	 be	 in	 a	 zero	 sum	 situation.	 In	 conflict	resolution,	there	are	five	possible	approaches	based	on	game	theory:	yielding,	problem-solving,	compromising,	withdrawal	and	contending.				 					 Table	2.3	Five	conflict	approaches		
Concer
n	for	O
ther	
Concern	for	Self	
Yielding	 Problem-solving	
Compromising	
Withdrawal	 Contending	
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Opponents	 in	 conflicts	 are	 rarely	 strictly	 opposed,	 but	 instead	 have	 differing	opinions	and	hopes	of	outcomes.	This	kind	of	game	is	called	a	non-zero	sum	game.	In	a	non-zero	sum	game	strategies	can	lead	to	different	outcomes.		As	an	example,	
NON-ZERO	SUM	GAME	 PLAYER	2	STRAT.	A	 PLAYER	2	STRAT.	B	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	A	 (1,	1)	 (-2,	2)	
PLAYER	1	STRAT.	B	 (2,	-2)	 (-5,	-5)	Table	2.4	shows	payoffs	for	both	players.	As	Straffin	(1993)	explains,	 in	this	situation,	 it	would	be	the	most	profitable	 for	both	parties	together	to	choose	strategy	A,	resulting	in	a	payoff	for	both	parties.	However,	without	 a	 possibility	 to	 communicate,	 there	 is	 the	 chance	 that	 either	 player	 choose	strategy	B	instead,	resulting	in	a	payoff	of	either	-2	and	2	or	worse	for	both:	-5	and	-5.	This	shows	that	in	non-zero	sum	games	it	is	crucial	whether	the	player	can	communicate	or	not.		 The	most	well-known	aspect	of	the	game	theory	is	the	game	called	the	prisoner’s	dilemma.	The	prisoner’s	dilemma	is	based	on	a	situation	where	both	players	or	conflict	parties	 choose	 strategies	 simultaneously	 without	 having	 a	 chance	 to	 negotiate	 or	cooperate.		 4.2.1.	PRISONER’S	DILEMMA	AS	AN	EXAMPLE	OF	SIMULTANEOUS		STRATEGY	CHOOSING		In	the	prisoner’s	dilemma,	there	are	always	two	opposing	players	present,	both	striving	to	maximise	their	own	points	of	outcome.	The	game	is	based	on	the	notion	of	cooperation,	without	being	able	to	discuss	the	possibility	of	cooperation	before	choosing	a	strategy.	Kanniainen	and	Sintonen	(2003)	explain	that	both	players	will	have	to	choose	a	strategy	without	 conferring,	 after	which	 the	 strategies	 are	 presented	 and	 both	 players	 receive	points	(outcomes)	according	to	their	cooperation	or	lack	thereof.	The	main	problem	with	the	prisoner’s	dilemma	is	that	if	both	players	choose	not	to	cooperate,	they	end	up	with	
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the	worst	possible	outcome.	However,	if	only	one	player	chooses	to	cooperate,	the	other	player	receives	the	best	possible	outcome	(Kanniainen	&	Sintonen,	2003).	The	game	is	called	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 because	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 game,	 an	 example	 of	 two	prisoners	is	often	used.	The	example	goes	as	follows:	Two	criminals	are	facing	charges	for	a	 crime	 they	 committed	 together.	 The	 prisoners	 are	 interrogated	 in	 separate	 rooms	without	 a	 chance	 to	 confer	 with	 each	 other,	 however,	 there	 is	 not	 enough	 evidence	without	a	confession.	If	both	prisoners	confess	to	the	crime,	they	both	have	to	serve	eight	years	in	prison.	If	neither	confesses,	the	lack	of	evidence	results	in	only	six	years	in	prison.	If	only	one	confesses,	that	prisoner	will	be	released	immediately	as	a	show	of	appreciation	of	 their	 honesty,	 whereas	 the	 prisoner	 who	 did	 not	 confess	 has	 to	 face	 a	 maximum	sentence	of	ten	years	in	prison	(Kanniainen	&	Sintonen,	2003).		The	game	outcomes	are	demonstrated	as	follows:	
PRISONER’S	DILEMMA	
Player	2	
Agrees	to	cooperate	
(Does	not	confess)	
Player	2	
Refuses	to	cooperate	
(Confesses	to	crime)	
Player	1	
Agrees	to	cooperate	
(Does	not	confess)	
(6,	6)	 (10,	0)	
Player	1	
Refuses	to	cooperate	
(Confesses	to	crime)	
(0,	10)	 (8,	8)	
Table	2.5	shows	payoffs	of	both	players	in	the	prisoner’s	dilemma.	In	 this	 type	 of	 game	 agreeing	 to	 cooperate	means	 to	 cooperate	with	 the	 other	prisoner	by	not	confessing,	whereas	refusing	to	cooperate	means	confessing	to	the	crime.	As	Kanniainen	and	Sintonen	(2003)	explains,	the	situation	where	both	prisoners	confess	to	the	crime	is	more	detrimental	for	both	parties	than	the	strategy	where	neither	prisoner	confesses.	In	a	situation	where	only	one	prisoner	confesses	to	the	crime,	the	one	who	does	not	 confess	 faces	 the	maximum	 prison	 sentence,	 which	means,	 that	 no	matter	 which	strategy	 the	other	player	chooses,	 it	 is	 the	most	successful	outcome	to	choose	 to	deny	cooperation	and	confess	to	the	crime.	This	strategy	works	for	both	prisoners.	If	the	game	
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of	prisoner’s	dilemma	is	only	played	once,	the	only	possible	successful	outcome	for	both	parties	 is	 to	 deny	 cooperation.	 However,	 if	 the	 same	 players	 continue	 playing	 the	prisoner’s	dilemma,	thus	learning	the	strategy	previously	used	by	the	opposite	player,	it	is	possible	to	change	the	outcome.	Kanniainen	and	Sintonen	(2003)	describe	this	situation	as	a	learning	curve,	where	the	players	can	choose	the	strategy	for	the	next	round	based	on	the	previous	strategy.	Although	neither	player	knows	what	strategy	the	other	player	will	use	 in	 the	upcoming	round,	 it	 is	possible	 for	 instance	 to	penalize	 the	other	player	during	 the	 next	 round	 if	 they	 do	 not	 agree	 to	 cooperate.	 If	 the	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 is	continued,	it	would	be	more	beneficial	for	both	players	to	agree	to	cooperate	in	order	to	avoid	possible	backlash	and	penalties	by	the	other	player	later	on	in	the	game	rounds.		When	it	comes	to	international	politics	Nye	(2004)	argues	that	all	policies	should	be	based	on	avoiding	the	situation	of	 the	prisoner’s	dilemma.	 If	a	state	 finds	 itself	 in	a	prisoner’s	dilemma,	the	state	will	probably	have	to	sacrifice	its	national	interest	in	order	to	not	be	bound	to	the	worst	possible	outcome.	Although	states	might	find	themselves	in	this	predicament,	Nye	explains	that	as	long	as	the	mutual	interests	of	the	state	players	are	aligned,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 for	 compromising,	 since	 it	 would	 automatically	 lead	 to	 an	equilibrium	of	cooperation.	This	 is	why	 it	 is	crucial	even	 for	disputing	parties	 to	work	towards	peace	and	strive	away	from	conflict	escalation.	If	both	parties	are	determined	not	to	escalate	a	conflict	or	dispute,	the	worst	possible	outcome,	in	most	cases	war	or	other	forms	of	armed	conflict,	are	off	the	table.		In	most	real-life	conflict	situations,	 the	players	do	have	a	chance	to	wait	 for	the	other	party	to	make	a	move	before	choosing	a	strategy.	These	kinds	of	conflicts	can	be	modelled	using	game	trees.	In	game	trees	decisions	on	what	strategy	each	player	chooses	are	done	sequentially	instead	of	simultaneously	as	in	the	prisoner’s	dilemma.		Straffin	(1993)	uses	 the	Cuban	missile	crisis	between	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	in	1963	as	an	example	on	how	game	trees	can	model	conflicts.	Keep	in	mind	that	game	theory	does	drastically	simplify	conflicts.	The	Soviet	Union	starts	the	game	by	choosing	 between	 two	 strategies:	 to	 place	 or	 not	 to	 place	 intermediate	 range	 ballistic	missiles	in	Cuba.	The	first	two	branches	show	the	Soviet	Union’s	strategies.	The	strategy	of	not	placing	missiles	 leads	straight	 to	 the	 first	outcome:	without	placing	missiles	 the	conflict	 is	 avoided	 and	 the	 game	 ends.	 This	 outcome	 is	 labelled	 u.	 If	 the	 Soviet	Union	
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chooses	 the	 strategy	 to	 place	 missiles	 in	 Cuba,	 the	 United	 States	 in	 turn	 can	 choose	between	 three	 strategies:	 to	 do	 nothing	 about	 it,	 to	 create	 an	 aggressive	 action	 of	 a	blockade	or	to	destroy	the	missiles	by	air	strike.	These	are	the	next	three	branches	of	the	game	tree.	The	first	branch,	to	do	nothing,	 leads	to	the	second	possible	outcome:	if	the	United	States	do	not	engage	in	the	conflict,	there	is	no	conflict	and	the	game	ends.	This	outcome	is	labelled	v.	If	the	United	States	choose	either	one	of	the	aggressive	strategies	of	either	a	blockage	or	an	air	strike,	the	Soviet	Union	can	in	both	cases	choose	between	either	escalating	the	conflict	or	acquiesce.	These	four	outcomes	are	labelled	w,	x,	y	and	z.	
	Table	3.1	Game	tree	representing	the	Cuban	missile	crisis	Of	 course,	 the	 real-life	 situation	 can	 in	 no	way	 be	 simplified	 into	 a	 game	 tree,	however,	games	trees	can	help	create	a	clearer	notion	of	a	specific	conflict.	The	main	issue	with	game	trees	is	that	it	is	impossible	to	determine	all	probable	outcomes	and	how	game	parties	would	in	fact	react	when	a	real-life	situation	arises.	In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute	 a	 game	 tree	 seems	 even	 more	complicated	to	deduce.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	even	start	 fathoming	the	possible	outcomes,	since	there	are	so	many	options	for	both	states	before	any	possible	outcomes	could	even	be	considered.		
Soviet Union
Place 
missiles
United 
States
Do nothing v
Blockage Soviet Union
Aquiesce w
Escalate x
Air strike Soviet Union
Aquiesce y
Escalate z
Do not place 
missiles u
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	Table	3.2	Game	tree	representing	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	The	table	only	shows	two	outcomes	that	show	up	very	early	in	the	game	tree,	that	is,	if	either	party	decides	to	do	nothing	when	faced	with	the	choice	to	push	for	resolution	or	defend	their	claim.	Other	possible	outcomes	rely	heavily	on	a	number	of	choices,	mostly	boiling	down	to	either	a	reaction	of	aggression	or	a	reaction	of	diplomacy.	The	problem	with	showing	a	complicated	conflict	or	dispute	in	this	way	becomes	much	more	apparent	in	 table	3.0	compared	to	 table	2.3.	Although	game	trees	might	not	be	efficient	ways	to	show	this	specific	dispute	using	a	game	tree,	merely	because	game	trees	reflect	and	mimic	real	life	conflict	or	dispute	situations	much	more	intricately	than	the	Prisoner’s	dilemma	or	zero	sum	games.			 4.3.	PEACE	THEORY	SCENARIOS	OF	INTERDEPENDENCE		As	could	be	seen	in	examples	of	the	prisoner’s	dilemma,	zero	sum	games	and	intricate	game	trees,	the	level	of	cooperation	during	a	dispute	between	the	disputing	parties	can	play	a	crucial	part.	Galtung	(1967)	analyses	the	peace	theory	of	interaction	relations	and	interdependence	models,	which	can	be	used	to	show	exactly	how	dispute	situations	might	change	 depending	 on	 the	 level	 of	 interdependence	 and	 cooperation	 between	 dispute	parties.		
China
Push for 
resolution Japan
Do nothing Outcome b
Defend claim
Aggression China
Military 
aggression
Diplomatic 
negotiations
Diplomacy
Third-party 
intervention
Abritration
Mediation
China
Diplomatic 
negotiations
Military 
aggression
Do nothing Outcome a
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Galtung	(1967)	defines	two	different	positive	values	of	interdependence:	exchange	and	 cooperation.	 He	 emphasizes	 that	 although	 cooperation	 is	 a	 form	 of	 exchange,	exchange	 in	 turn	 is	 not	 necessarily	 cooperation.	 In	 cooperation,	 the	 states	 set	 up	 an	organization,	 a	 specific	 entity	 on	 its	 own,	 whereas	 in	 exchange	 no	 specific	 joint	organization	is	present	and	values	move	to	and	from	the	states	separately,	with	the	states	merely	 observing	 no	 loss	 happening	 from	 the	 exchange.	 Galtung	 lists	 examples	 of	exchange	 on	 a	 public	 level	 between	 two	 states:	 trade	 relations,	 exchange	 of	 political	information,	 diplomatic	 relations	 and	 exchange	 of	 state	 visits.	 Galtung’s	 examples	 of	public	 level	 cooperation	 includes	 coproduction,	 political	 cooperation,	 diplomatic	cooperation	and	top	level	cooperation.		Galtung	 (1967)	 goes	 on	 to	 explain	 the	 difference	 between	 two	 peace	 theories	based	 on	 interdependence:	 the	 minimum	 interdependence	 world	 and	 the	 maximum	interdependence	world.	Although	these	two	worlds	are	complete	opposites,	they	both	in	their	own	way	can	result	in	peace,	argues	Galtung.		In	a	minimum	interdependence	world,	there	is	little	to	no	interaction	between	the	two	states.	The	 low	or	absent	 levels	of	 interdependence	mean	 that	 if	one	of	 the	states	would	completely	disappear,	the	other	state	would	not	be	affected	whatsoever.	This	world	is	 seen	 as	 peace-productive	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	 if	 the	 states	 have	 little	 or	 no	interdependence,	 they	 will	 not	 have	 any	 mutual	 affairs	 to	 disagree	 on.	 No	interdependence	also	tends	to	mean	that	the	states	are	self-sufficient,	which	in	turn	leads	to	a	larger	interest	in	national	policies	with	little	or	no	regard	to	other	states	and	their	affairs.	As	Galtung	puts	it:	“the	less	interaction	there	is,	the	less	is	there	to	quarrel	about,	hence	 the	 more	 peaceful	 the	 relation”	 (Galtung,	 1967,	 p.	 97).	 If	 there	 is	 little	 or	 no	interdependence	 between	 two	 states,	 it	 mostly	 does	 result	 in	 peace,	 however,	 only	negative	peace,	since	positive	peace	would	require	a	high	level	of	interdependence,	which	according	to	this	peace	theory	would	in	turn	result	in	a	higher	level	of	possible	conflicts.	One	could	argue	that	in	today’s	globalized	world	it	is	increasingly	difficult	to	be	a	purely	self-sufficient	state	with	no	interdependent	relations	to	other	states.	It	can	also	be	said	that	low	interdependence	probably	also	results	in	little	or	no	empathy	for	the	other	states,	so	in	case	of	a	conflict	arising,	the	conflict	escalation	could	be	more	rapid	than	in	more	interdependent	 situations,	 since	 there	 is	no	 interest	 in	 the	wellbeing	of	 citizens	of	 the	other	countries.	
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The	 maximum	 interdependence	 world	 theory	 is	 naturally	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	minimum	 interdependence	 world.	 In	 this	 scenario,	 there	 is	 very	 high	 levels	 of	interdependence	between	the	states	and	if	one	would	disappear	completely,	it	would	have	devastating	repercussions	for	the	other	state	as	well.	It	could	be	explained	as	a	symbiotic	relationship	 between	 two	 states.	 The	 peace	 theory	 behind	 this	 model	 is	 that	 when	interdependence	is	at	maximum	level,	one	state	cannot	hit	the	other	state	without	hitting	itself	in	the	process,	as	Galtung	(1967)	puts	it.	The	level	of	empathy	for	the	other	state	is	also	at	a	high	 level,	which	would	also	work	as	an	 incentive	not	 to	attack.	The	counter-argument	for	this	theory	is	that	the	more	cooperation	and	exchange	there	is	between	two	states,	the	more	possible	disagreements	on	various	topics	are.		As	 these	 two	 peace	 theories	 show,	 cooperation	 and	 mutual	 relations	 between	states	can	be	much	more	complex	than	it	seems	on	the	surface.	Symbiotic	relations	can	turn	out	to	be	detrimental	just	as	isolated	states.	In	the	case	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	Japan	and	China	has	maintained	a	 level	of	 interdependence,	cooperation	and	exchange	throughout	the	dispute.	It	can	even	be	said	that	the	dispute	has	resulted	in	higher	levels	of	 cooperation	 and	 exchange.	 Can	 disputes	 in	 fact	 further	 develop	 lucrative	 relations	between	dispute	 parties?	Although	both	parties	might	 not	 benefit	 from	a	 dispute,	 can	disputes	still	be	used	as	a	tool	for	maintaining	or	further	develop	national	interest?			 						
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5.	ANALYSIS:	HOW	DOES	JAPAN	BENEFIT	FROM	THE	UNRESOLVED	DISPUTE?		East	Asia	is	a	unique	area	when	it	comes	to	conflicts,	both	in	history	and	the	future.	It	is	the	geographical	area	where	five	major	economic	powers	collide:	Russia,	China,	Japan	and	the	United	States.	These	also	include	the	three	strongest	military	powers	in	the	world:	the	United	 States,	 China	 and	 Russia.	 This	 is	 an	 elevated	 risk	 for	 conflicts,	 since	 even	 the	smallest	seed	of	conflict	can	escalate	quickly	into	a	major	power	play.	There	are	various	ongoing	territorial	disputes	in	in	East	Asia,	most	of	which	have	been	enduring	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War.	Koo	defines	four	major	characteristics	of	 East	 Asian	 territorial	 disputes:	 1.	 Most	 of	 the	 current	 disputes	 are	 remnants	 of	 a	colonialized	past	that	has	risen	from	the	arbitrary	territorial	divisions	by	colonial	powers,	but	also	exploited	by	post-colonial	nationalists;	2.	Very	few	East	Asian	territorial	disputes	have	 been	 formally	 resolved,	 since	 very	 few	 disputing	 parties	 in	 fact	 even	 formally	acknowledge	 any	 disputes;	 3.	 The	 disputes	 follow	 quite	 a	 clear	 circular	 pattern	 of	escalation	 and	 de-escalation	 following	 the	 initiation;	 4.	 Although	 there	 are	 numerous	ongoing	territorial	disputes	in	East	Asia,	none	have	escalated	beyond	control	(Koo,	2010).		There	are	four	major	areas	of	policies	and	diplomacy	where	Japan	can	be	said	to	have	benefited	 from	 the	 ongoing	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute.	 These	 are	 domestic	 politics	 and	nationalistic	agendas,	using	 the	dispute	as	diplomatic	bargaining	 leverage,	keeping	 the	United	States	as	a	key	ally	 in	 the	area,	and	controlling	the	outcome	of	other	 territorial	disputes	in	the	area.		 5.1.	DOMESTIC	POLITICS	AND	NATIONALISTIC	AGENDAS		
“96	percent	of	ongoing	disputes	are	over	homeland	territory	and	not	
colonial	or	dependent	territory.	This	very	high	number	may	be	due	to	
the	fact	that	most	colonial	claims	have	been	resolved.	Consistent	with	
previous	 studies,	 only	 30	 percent	 of	 unresolved	 disputes	 have	
permanent	populations,	which	indicates	that	the	majority	of	disputes	
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are	about	uninhabited	territories	such	as	offshore	islands	or	borders	
in	mainland	 territory,	not	 tracts	of	 inhabited	 territory.”	 (Wiegand,	
2011,	p.	30)	In	most	 East	 Asian	 territorial	 disputes	 symbolic	 attachment	 and	 nationalistic	 agendas	may	 even	 play	 the	 largest	 roles	 in	 dispute	 endurance:	 “China’s	 growing	 irredentist	tendency,	 combined	 with	 Japan’s	 habit	 of	 glossing	 over	 its	 war	 past,	 increases	 the	likelihood	of	territorial	conflicts	by	fuelling	nationalist	sentiments	in	its	neighbors”	(Koo,	2010,	p.	7).	Especially	in	Northeast	Asia	domestic	politics	are	the	main	reason	for	slow	development	 of	 security	 alliances	 in	 the	 area.	 Whether	 or	 not	 existing	 international	security	structures	are	adequate	depends	on	how	well	they	can	adapt	and	meet	new	types	of	threats.	Although	nationalism	can	be	seen	as	an	old	kind	of	threat	to	security,	it	is	more	diverse	and	has	changed	throughout	history.	“The	main	elements	of	normal	human	activity	–	trade,	communications,	culture,	finance	 –	 not	 to	 mention	 society’s	 scourges	 –	 drugs,	 crime,	 disease,	 terrorism	 –	increasingly	transcend	national	boundaries	and	national	sovereignty.	There	is	a	steady	globalisation	of	institutions	in	these	fields.	In	political	life,	however,	nationalism,	and	also	ethno-nationalism	has	re-emerged	as	a	strong	and	intransigent	force.	This	constitutes	a	major	 challenge	 to	 internationalism	and	multilateralism	which	 seemed	 to	be	 the	most	sensible	course	for	the	nations	to	pursue	after	the	Second	World	War”	(Urquhart,	1996).	Disputes	in	East	Asia	have	for	long	been	generally	ignored	as	long	as	they	do	not	escalate	 to	 full-blown	conflicts.	The	current	geopolitical	security	situation	 is	uncertain,	not	only	due	 to	 territorial	disputes	and	strong	areal	players,	but	also	because	ongoing	disputes	are	easy	to	harness	in	the	name	of	domestic	politics	or	nationalism.		Wiegand	(2011)	explains	that	most	of	the	earlier	research		in	ongoing	territorial	disputes	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 territorial	 disputes	 turning	 into	 armed	conflicts,	whereas	later	on	research	focus	has	shifted	to	other	issues	apart	from	armed	conflict,	such	as	“questions	about	the	role	of	territory	as	an	issue	distinct	from	other	types	of	 issues	 disputed	 between	 states,	 initiation	 of	 territorial	 disputes,	 likelihood	 of	resolution,	 effects	 of	 territorial	 changes	 and	 peaceful	 territorial	 transfers,	 the	 link	between	 territory	 and	 enduring	 rivalries,	 and	 degree	 of	 third-party	 intervention”	(Wiegand,	2011,	p.	18-19).	
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There	 have	 also	 been	 numerous	 studies	 on	 how	 peaceful	 resolutions	 and	settlements	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 sustainable	 peace	 between	 conflict	 parties,	especially	in	territorial	conflicts.	(Wiegand,	2011).	Kacowich	(Wiegand,	2011)	concluded	that	 “international	 norms	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 peaceful	 territorial	 change,	 but	diplomatic	 intervention	 and	 a	 past	 experience	 in	 armed	 conflict	 do	 not	 have	 such	influence.	Likewise,	regime	type,	power	distribution,	and	third-party	threats	do	not	seem	to	play	a	conclusive	role	in	the	likelihood	of	peaceful	territorial	change”	(Wiegand,	2011,	p.	20).	Previous	studies	have	also	shown	that	failed	settlement	attempts	in	the	past	raises	the	 chances	 of	 third-party	 intervention,	 whereas	 a	 history	 of	 successful	 bilateral	negotiations	 raises	 the	 chances	of	 dispute	parties	 settling	 the	dispute	without	 outside	intervention.	Wiegand	 (2011)	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 value	 of	 territory	 as	 well	 as	 domestic	accountability	and	mobility.	The	value	of	territory	as	well	as	domestic	accountability	and	mobility	have	been	previously	studied	in	the	context	of	territorial	disputes	and	play	an	important	role	in	understanding	the	core	of	these	kinds	of	disputes.	As	Wiegand	(2011)	points	out,	the	value	of	a	territory	is	not	as	much	in	the	territory	itself;	the	value	is	inferred	by	people	or	states.	Wiegand	explains	 that	 territories	can	have	tangible	and	 intangible	values.	Tangible	values	include	economic	value	as	well	as	strategic	value.	Economic	value	comes	from	the	gain	in	economy	the	disputed	territory	has	to	offer	in	terms	of	natural	resources.	 Also,	 rich	 fishing	 grounds	 are	 taken	 into	 consideration	 as	 having	 economic	value,	however,	only	natural	resources	that	are	so	significant	that	the	state	can	gain	export	income	from	it	is	considered	to	be	part	of	the	economic	value.	The	general	idea	is	that	the	resources	on	the	territory	must	increase	the	GDP	of	the	state	to	be	considered	significant	and	part	of	economic	value	(Wiegand,	2011).	Strategic	value	is	related	to	the	territory	itself:	the	proximity	of	important	trade	connections	or	military	bases	etc.	The	Senkaku	Islands	have	strategic	value	for	both	China	and	Japan	due	to	their	respective	EEZs.	Economic	gain	can	often	work	as	an	incentive	for	reaching	a	resolution	to	the	conflict,	since	natural	resources	can	often	not	be	used	before	both	 parties	 are	 in	 agreement	 to	 whom	 they	 belong	 (Wiegand	 2011).	 As	 mentioned	previously,	 Japan	 has	 actively	 pursued	 cooperation	 programmes	with	 the	 Republic	 of	Korea	and	Taiwan	on	research	of	natural	gas	reserves	in	the	disputed	area,	however,	no	active	cooperation	between	China	and	Japan	has	been	successfully	established.	
	46		
Wiegand	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 intangible	 value	 also	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	territory	disputes	since	not	all	value	have	to	be	tangible.	Symbolic,	ethnic,	nationalistic	and	psychological	values	are	examples	of	intangible	value.	They	can	pose	a	much	larger	problem	 in	 resolution	 attempts	 than	 tangible	 values,	 since	 these	 values	 are	 hard	 to	sacrifice	 or	 compromise	 on.	 They	 are	 closely	 associated	 with	 nationalistic	 views	 and	personal	opinion,	and	often	impossible	to	measure	in	importance.	One	reason	for	a	high	number	of	unresolved	disputes	could	be	that	the	territories	in	fact	lack	a	proper	value.	Many	disputes	may	have	high	levels	of	tangible	value,	but	not	high	enough	 to	 risk	escalation	 to	an	armed	conflict	 (Wiegand,	2011).	Previous	 studies	show	that	the	value	of	territory	is	not	enough	to	solely	influence	strategic	behaviour	of	conflict	 parties.	 An	 area’s	 economic	 and	 strategic	 value	 rarely	 significantly	 change,	whereas	 intangible	values	are	more	unpredictable	due	 to	 their	nationalist	or	symbolic	nature.	These	values	may	shift	drastically	and	even	under	a	very	short	period	of	 time.	Since	 value	 of	 territory	 is	 hardly	 the	driving	 force	 for	 dispute	 strategies	 of	 conflicting	states,	previous	studies	show	that	domestic	accountability	and	mobilization	also	play	an	important	role	in	strategies.	On	a	national	level,	it	would	be	important	for	political	leaders	and	the	people	of	the	country	to	agree	on	this	national	value	of	a	certain	disputed	territory.	This	is	a	very	selfish	strategy	used	by	many	politicians	in	gaining	votes.	It	is	in	the	politicians’	best	interest	to	back	up	the	popular	opinion	of	the	people	in	order	not	to	be	punished	for	an	unpopular	strategy.	Since	the	people	tend	to	focus	on	the	intangible	value	and	nationalist	emotions	instead	 of	 possible	 negative	 repercussions	 of	 a	 heated	 conflict,	 this	 strategy	 may	 be	harmful	for	the	resolution	process	as	a	whole.	It	also	decreases	consistency	if	the	conflict	has	been	going	on	for	a	longer	time,	since	politicians	from	different	parties	in	power	at	different	times	might	shift	conflict	resolution	strategies	to	fit	their	own	domestic	agenda.	Domestic	accountability,	also	seen	as	domestic	costs	of	settlement,	assumes	that	political	leaders	tend	to	choose	to	act	according	to	popular	opinion	instead	of	possible	unpopular	strategies	 to	 avoid	 domestic	 punishment	 by	 the	 people.	 The	 mobilisation	 argument	suggests	that	“leaders	can	use	enduring	territorial	disputes	to	mobilise	public	support	for	the	government”	(Wiegand,	2011,	p.	31).	For	mobilization	to	be	successful	the	territory	must	have	intangible	value,	which	may	also	be	strengthened	by	the	political	 leaders	to	achieve	successful	mobilization.	
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Japan	has	used	domestic	accountability	as	a	strategy	in	other	territorial	disputes	than	the	Senkaku	Islands.	On	the	issue	of	Chisima	Rettoo,	Japanese	political	leaders	have	held	a	strong	stance	against	any	compromises	with	Russia,	mainly	because	a	compromise	would	 not	 be	 taken	 well	 by	 the	 Japanese	 people.	 This	 has	 raised	 domestic	 support;	however,	it	has	deteriorated	the	relations	between	Russia	and	Japan	(Wiegand,	2011).	Domestic	punishment	could	be	much	more	detrimental	for	China	than	Japan.	This	is	because	in	a	nondemocratic	state	domestic	punishment	may	be	more	likely	to	result	in	coups,	 attempts	 of	 democratisation	 or	 general	 violence.	 In	 many	 nondemocratic	 and	unconventionally	democratic	states,	such	as	China,	the	ideal	of	that	state	is	built	on	being	superior	and	an	act	of	compromise	or	even	dropping	a	claim	to	a	territory	could	not	even	be	imagined	by	the	people.	This	can	lead	to	political	leaders	feeling	the	pressure	to	pursue	strategies	with	a	higher	risk	of	conflict	escalation	or	failure	rather	than	suffer	domestic	punishment	for	abandoning	the	nationalistic	agenda	they	themselves	have	built	up	for	the	people.	Wiegand	 (2011)	 explains	 that	 in	 previous	 studies	 on	 domestic	 punishment	findings	suggest	 that	 in	case	of	democratic	states,	during	and	close	 to	election	periods	political	 leaders	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 pursue	 negotiation	 on	 conflicts	 to	 avoid	 domestic	punishment.	The	more	insecure	the	authority	of	the	leader	is,	the	less	likely	the	leader	is	to	pursue	a	cause	that	will	jeopardise	the	public’s	support.	Domestic	mobilisation	is	an	easy	 tool	 to	 implement	 in	 regard	 to	 territorial	 disputes.	 The	 effect	 known	 as	 “rally-around-the-flag”	is	often	used	to	push	national	agendas	and	bringing	up	domestic	support	for	 causes.	 This	 is	 commonly	 used	 in	 international	 disputes	 and	 threats,	 and	when	 it	comes	to	gather	domestic	support	and	acceptance	for	a	cause	from	the	people.	The	effect	is	also	important	in	engaging	and	motivating	the	military	troops	to	defend	the	national	interest.	 The	 “rally-around-the-flag”	 effect	 is	 especially	 effective	 when	 the	 domestic	situation	 in	 a	 state	 is	 vulnerable.	 The	 effect	 can	 be	 used	 much	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	diversionary	war	theory,	where	state	leaders	can	shift	the	attention	from	domestic	issues	by	engaging	in	international	disputes	and	raise	national	morale	by	connecting	them	to	a	common	enemy	–	the	external	threat	(Wiegand,	2011).	Although	the	strategy	of	domestic	support	has	been	more	successfully	embraced	by	China	when	it	comes	to	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	Japan	has	also	managed	to	use	the	
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strategy,	 although	 in	 a	 more	 moderate	 fashion.	 Whereas	 in	 China	 politicians	 and	ultranationalists	 have	 used	 the	 strategy	 of	 domestic	 support	 for	 demonstrations	 and	boycotts,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 Japanese	 politicians	 have	 harnessed	domestic	support	in	more	moderate	ways	to	gain	votes	and	political	influence	on	a	more	personal	level.	The	Japanese	government	has	refrained	from	using	strong	“rally-around-the-flag”	strategies	against	China.	Domestic	support	strategies	are	not	only	used	by	politicians.	As	mentioned	before,	ultranationalist	groups	from	both	China	and	Japan	have	managed	to	escalate	the	dispute	by	pushing	their	nationalistic	agendas	onto	domestic	politicians.		It	 is	 also	 important	 to	note	 that	 since	 the	Senkaku	 Islands	are	uninhabited	and	therefore	does	not	directly	affect	any	citizens’	lives,	the	cost	and	importance	of	the	dispute	are	much	lower	than	in	the	case	of	inhabited	disputed	territory.	This	gives	a	cost-effective	opportunity	for	the	states	involved	to	use	the	dispute	as	bargaining	leverage	or	to	gain	domestic	support.	Samuel	Huntington,	an	American	political	scientist,	 introduced	his	theory	of	 the	“clash	of	civilization”	in	the	1990s.	According	to	this	controversial	theory	the	underlying	causes	 for	 all	 conflicts	 is	 tension	 between	 different	 cultures.	 To	 this	 day	 his	 theory	remains	controversial	and	has	been	criticised	as	simplifying	the	complexity	of	conflicts	by	not	paying	enough	attention	to	economic	pressure	and	intra-cultural	tensions.	Disputes	between	 China	 and	 Japan,	 however,	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 situation	 where	 this	 “clash	 of	civilizations”	could	actually	bring	some	answers	and	some	researchers	argue	that	there	might	be	something	there,	“that	cultural	conflicts	that	transcend	the	conflicts	brewed	so	often	in	history	by	bellicose	nationalism”,	as	John	Andrews	(2015,	p.	5)	put	it.	History	plays	a	large	role	in	maintaining	conflicts	and	disputes	in	East	Asia,	more	so	than	in	any	other	region	in	the	world.	After	the	Second	World	War	Japan	managed	to	keep	a	lid	on	simmering	negative	relations	with	neighbouring	countries.	 	It	can	be	said	that	 the	 historic	 disagreements	 between	 China	 and	 Japan	 started	 again	 from	 the	controversial	textbook	reform	in	1982.	These	issues	were	simmering	under	the	surface,	but	were	not	brought	up	as	the	clear	reason	for	disagreements.	In	June	1982,	the	Japanese	Ministry	of	Education	reformed	school	textbooks,	which	adjusting	the	language	led	to	a	controversy	due	to	the	minimizing	Japan’s	role	in	its	role	
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of	Japan’s	wartime	past,	such	as	the	massacre	of	Nanjing	and	atrocities	in	Okinawa	as	well	as	 South	 Korea	 and	 other	 Asian	 countries.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 announced	 the	results	of	its	1981-1982	textbook	screening	in	June	of	1982	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Japan,	1982).	When	major	Japanese	newspapers	reported	that	descriptions	of	Japanese	wartime	atrocities	in	Asian	countries	and	Okinawa	had	been	watered	down,	the	story	was	quickly	picked	up	elsewhere	(Selden,	Nozaki,	2009).	Widespread	international	backlash	of	 Japanese	 revisionism	 centred	 on	 nations	 that	 had	 been	 most	 affected	 by	 Japanese	colonialism	and	invasion.	In	July	1982	both	the	Republic	of	Korea	(South	Korea)	and	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	 lodged	official	protests	with	 the	 Japanese	government,	 and	labour	 unions	 and	 social	 action	 groups	 in	Hong	Kong	 sent	 letters	 of	 complaint	 to	 the	Japanese	Consulate.	The	official	party	newspaper	of	the	Democratic	People’s	Republic	of	Korea	(North	Korea)	criticized	the	Japanese	government	and	the	Vietnamese	government	asked	the	Japanese	ambassador	for	corrections	concerning	mentions	of	Vietnam	(Selden	&	Nozaki,	2009).	The	Japanese	government	sought	to	limit	the	diplomatic	damage.	In	August	1982,	Chief	 Cabinet	 Secretary	 Miyazawa	 Kiichi	 stated	 that	 Japan	 would	 consider	 fully	 the	criticisms	of	its	Asian	neighbours	in	order	to	promote	friendship	and	referred	to	“making	a	correction	on	government	responsibility”	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Japan,	1982).	The	Miyazawa	statement	did	not	specify	what	measures	the	government	would	take,	but	the	South	Korean	government	nevertheless	accepted	it.	The	Chinese	government	initially	insisted	 that	 it	 was	 insufficient	 guarantee	 against	 future	 revisionism	 in	 textbook	screening,	 but	 eventually	 it	 too	 accepted	 Japanese	 pledges	 to	 make	 appropriate	corrections.	 In	October,	 the	Ministry	of	Education	added	a	clause	 (the	so-called	Kinrin	
shokoku	 joko,	Neighbouring	Countries	Clause)	to	the	screening	criteria,	requiring	that	textbooks	give	“necessary	consideration,	 in	the	 interest	of	 international	 friendship	and	cooperation,”	to	the	modern	and	contemporary	history	of	relations	between	Japan	and	its	Asian	neighbours.	The	Ministry	of	Education	also	noted	that	it	would	no	longer	require	authors	 to	 replace	 the	 term	“aggression”	with	 “advance”	 in	 referring	 to	 Japan’s	war	 in	China,	or	to	add	phrasing	suggesting	that	the	Nanjing	Massacre	occurred	as	a	result	of	momentary	chaos	–	issues	that	had	aroused	particular	outrage	in	China.	With	respect	to	references	to	the	number	of	victims	of	the	Nanjing	Massacre,	the	Ministry	of	Education	announced	 it	 would	 only	 ask	 authors	 to	 provide	 citations	 indicating	 the	 source	 of	
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estimates.	At	this	juncture,	the	Education	Minister	held	a	press	conference	to	“[officially]	close	 the	 textbook	 controversy”	 (Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 of	 Japan,	 1982).	 The	settlement	left	the	administrative	structure	of	the	Ministry	of	Education	and	its	nationalist	orientation	untouched.	Andrews	 (2015)	 argues	 that	 four	 main	 freedoms	 that	 define	 democracy,	 free	speech,	 free	 assembly,	 free	 elections	 and	 an	 independent	 judiciary,	 might	 not	 be	 as	effective	 at	 deterring	 violence	 as	 it	 might	 seem.	 In	 theory,	 the	 democratic	 pillars	 of	freedom	 seem	 adequate	 for	 not	 only	 bringing	 peace	 but	 also	 keeping	 the	 peace.	 In	practice,	Andrews	argues,	these	pillars	of	freedom	often	fail,	possibly	leading	to	even	more	violence	and	conflicts	than	they	previously	deterred.	Even	the	United	States,	claiming	to	be	the	world's	oldest	continuous	democracy,	has	often	had	to	fend	off	nationalists	that	turn	 to	 terrorism	 and	 violence	 instead	 of	 democratic	 means	 to	 solve	 disputes	 and	differences.	 This	 is	 also	 true	 in	 Japan.	 In	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	 a	 Japanese	 communist	militant	 group,	 the	 Japanese	 Red	 Army,	 carried	 out	 numerous	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 both	nationally	and	internationally.	The	most	notorious	terrorist	attack	in	Japan	was	carried	out	in	1995	by	Aum	Shinrikyo,	a	nationalistic	cult	that	attacked	the	Tokyo	subway	with	sarin	gas,	leaving	12	dead	and	over	4000	injured	(Council	of	Foreign	Relations,	2012).		It	can	be	argued	that	although	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	has	been	and	could	even	more	 effectively	 be	 used	 by	 actors	 in	 domestic	 politics	 as	 a	 “rally-around-the-flag”	strategy,	it	has	this	far	in	history	been	used	more	effectively	by	ultranationalist	groups	to	further	their	own	agenda	and	push	politicians	to	even	escalate	the	dispute.	Although	Japan	can	be	said	to	have	benefited	in	domestic	politics	from	an	unresolved	dispute,	the	risks	of	escalation	and	previous	attempts	of	escalations	by	ultranationalist	groups	have	dimmed	the	benefits	greatly.		 5.2.	TERRITORIAL	DISPUTES	AS	BARGAINING	LEVERAGE		When	territorial	issues	first	arise,	the	challenger	state	or	group	needs	to	make	a	claim	in	order	to	change	the	current	status	quo.	In	the	case	of	the	Senkaku	Islands,	China	is	the	challenger	 state,	 since	 Japan	 has	 official	 authority	 over	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 at	 the	moment.	However,	the	wish	to	change	the	status	quo	is	in	fact	not	always	the	main	agenda	
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of	a	territorial	claim.	In	territorial	disputes	settled	peacefully	between	1815	and	1981,	the	majority	of	cases	were	settled	in	exchange	for	things	other	than	the	disputed	territory,	for	example	ODA,	political	support,	alliances	in	both	security	and	military	aid,	diplomacy	and	trade	relations	(Wiegand,	2011).	It	can	be	argued	that	states	do	not	in	fact	argue	over	the	territory	in	question,	but	use	it	in	order	to	gain	leverage	on	other	mutual	issues.	This	is	also	 something	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	when	 studying	 the	 settlement	 of	 territorial	disputes.	The	repercussions	of	giving	in	to	territorial	claims	may	be	much	more	complex	than	 just	 losing	 the	 territory	 disputed;	 there	might	 be	 domestic	 backlash	 and	 loss	 of	authority,	other	states	may	see	settlements	as	leniency	in	disputes,	making	it	harder	for	the	settling	state	to	stay	firm	in	future	disputes.	The	theory	of	bargaining	leverage	suggests	that	the	challenging	state	can	use	one	territorial	 dispute	 to	 sway	 or	 compensate	 in	 other	 disputes,	 not	 only	 territorial.	 This	theory	also	explains	the	longevity	of	territorial	disputes,	since	other	disputes	influence	the	strategy	of	territorial	disputes	and	therefore	a	lack	of	settlement	in	one	can	often	be	the	 reason	 for	 territorial	 disputes	 not	 being	 settled	 quicker.	 In	 a	 study	 on	 peaceful	territorial	changes	“one	could	argue	that	some	disputes	are	actually	about	nonterritorial	issues,	but	are	politically	manipulated	to	appear	that	way”	(Wiegand,	2011,	p.	43).	It	can	be	argued	that	states	caught	up	 in	territorial	disputes	may	 in	 fact	benefit	from	not	pursuing	an	active	solution,	but	rather	benefit	from	the	endurance	of	the	dispute.	The	states	involved	might	use	the	territory	dispute	over	time	as	leverage	and	therefore	actually	gain	more	from	keeping	a	dispute	active.	As	can	be	seen	in	the	chapter	on	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	history,	Japan	has	managed	to	 use	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 with	 China	 both	 in	 trade	negotiations	and	diplomatic	negotiations.	In	situations	where	China	has	risen	its	voice	on	the	 claim	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands,	 Japan	 has	 successfully	 managed	 to	 dampen	 the	escalation	or	active	claims	by	China	by	pursuing	diplomatic	or	trade	negotiations	on	other	issues,	 swerving	 the	mentions	 of	 the	 dispute.	 Although	 Japan	 could	 be	 said	 to	 be	 in	 a	disadvantage	when	it	comes	to	using	the	Senkaku	Islands	as	bargaining	leverage	because	they	do	in	fact	not	consider	the	Senkaku	Islands	disputed	at	all,	Japan	has	still	managed	to	turn	tables	on	negotiations	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	on	other	topics.	The	PFT	negotiations	between	 China	 and	 Japan	 are	 a	 great	 example	 of	 how	 diplomatic	 negotiations	 can	 be	
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swayed	 by	 using	 the	 territorial	 disputes	 as	 bargaining	 leverage.	 Japan	 managed	 to	negotiate	leaving	the	entire	dispute	out	of	the	PFT	negotiations	and	using	not	negotiating	on	the	dispute	as	bargaining	leverage	against	China	instead	of	the	conventional	way	of	bargaining	for	peace	or	the	acclamation	of	territory.		 5.3.	KEEPING	THE	UNITED	STATES	AS	A	CLOSE	ALLY		The	United	States	have	a	number	of	allies	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia.	Many	Asian	nations	have	continuously	increased	their	defence	budgets	and	defence	alliances,	mainly	due	to	a	very	quick-tempered	China,	that	already	before	increases	in	their	defence	was	one	of	the	world's	 largest	military	 powers.	 Due	 to	 this,	 countries	 such	 as	 Japan,	 the	 Philippines,	Taiwan,	 Indonesia	and	Singapore	see	their	alliance	with	the	United	States	as	a	 form	of	security	 guarantee	 against	 a	 possible	 threat	 from	 China.	 There	 are	 very	 few,	 if	 any,	regional	defence	alliances	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia,	mainly	due	to	a	very	divided	history	between	the	nations	(Andrews,	2015).	During	the	Obama	administration,	the	United	States	has	actively	shifted	its	foreign	policy	 towards	Asia.	The	United	States	has	had	a	strong	role	 in	East	Asia	and	 the	Asia	Pacific	 ever	 since	 the	 end	of	World	War	 II.	 As	 a	 strong	 security	partner	with	 regional	powers	such	as	Japan	and	South	Korea,	the	US	interest	in	the	area	is	keeping	China	on	its	toes.	The	United	States	has	made	 it	a	priority	 to	strengthen	 its	political,	economic	and	security	role	in	the	area,	which	makes	China’s	role	in	the	area	even	more	insecure.	The	heightened	US	role	and	close	cooperation	with	especially	Japan	has	made	it	harder	for	the	United	States	and	China	to	keep	their	bilateral	relations	without	strain.	There	is	a	saying	in	China	that	the	United	States	has	their	Pearl	Harbour	and	9/11,	but	China	has	their	1999.	This	saying	stems	from	the	widely	popular	view	in	China	that	a	bombing	by	the	United	States	of	the	Embassy	of	China	in	Belgrade	in	1999	as	a	part	of	NATO’s	air	raid	over	Serbia	was	intentional	and	was	done	to	send	a	message	to	China	that	the	 United	 States	 will	 continue	 dominating	 the	 security	 aspects	 in	 East	 Asia	 (Ratner,	2013).	
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China	has	at	numerous	occasions	blamed	the	United	States	for	fanning	the	flames	of	conflicts	in	East	Asia.	In	2012	China’s	Vice	Foreign	Minister	Fu	Ying	expressed	China’s	concerns	as	well	as	mentioned	that	the	presence	of	the	United	States	in	East	Asia	and	the	Asia-Pacific	has	also	had	a	positive	effect:	“As	 a	 country	 known	 for	 strategic	 vision,	 it’s	 only	natural	 that	 the	US	wants	 to	engage	more	with	the	region.	[…]	The	US	has	always	had	a	continuous	presence	in	the	region.	One	can	hardly	recall	an	important	period	in	the	past	decades	when	the	US	was	absent	from	the	region.	China	has	no	problem	accepting	the	US	presence	and	its	positive	influence	 […]	 An	 important	 part	 of	 China’s	 effort	 to	 build	 a	 peaceful	 and	 cooperative	external	environment	is	to	maintain	overall	cooperation	with	the	US.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	growing	concern	coming	from	media	and	academics	in	China	over	the	US	heavy	emphasis	on	security	agenda	in	the	region.	I	notice	that	the	same	concern	is	also	heard	in	other	Asian	countries	as	well”	(Suthichai,	2012).			The	enforced	US	military	presence	in	the	area,	the	plan	for	new	potential	operating	locations	as	well	as	new	security	relations	with	possible	additional	partners	in	the	area	made	China	view	the	US	security	policy	in	the	area	as	excluding	China	and	creating	a	rift	between	China	and	the	rest	of	East	and	Southeast	Asia.	During	a	visit	to	Tokyo	in	2012,	Panetta	 also	 urged	 China’s	 neighbouring	 countries	 to	 stay	 calm	 and	 not	 “engage	 in	‘provocative	behavior’	over	dispute	 islands	and	maritime	claims,	warning	 that	 it	 could	escalate	into	a	regional	conflict	that	might	draw	in	the	U.S.”	(Lai,	2013,	p.		49).	The	United	States’	rebalancing	of	Asia	has	continued	to	create	friction	between	the	two	superpowers.	China	has	at	different	occasions	brought	up	the	interest	for	renewed	relations	between	China	and	the	United	States	and	the	importance	to	review	the	type	of	relations	 that	 are	 currently	 present.	 The	 current	 main	 topic	 of	 US-China	 relations	 is	heavily	focused	on	security	and	military	aspects.	The	key	to	lasting	and	stable	relations	might	 in	 fact	 lie	 in	economic	or	political	 relations	at	 first,	 to	 secure	a	 stronger	mutual	cooperation	in	those	areas	would	also	benefit	in	security	and	military	issues	between	the	two	countries.	The	strained	relations	between	China	and	the	United	States	have	in	fact	benefited	Japan	in	various	ways.	Through	their	mutual	Security	Treaty	(See	appendix	VI)	Japan	is	the	United	States’	strongest	ally	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	Changing	geopolitical	situations	
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in	 the	world	bring	 insecurity	 to	 the	 region,	 especially	 through	political	 changes	 in	 the	United	States.	During	the	presidential	elections	 in	the	United	States	 in	2016,	President	Donald	Trump	made	comments	about	weakening	the	security	agreement,	alarming	Japan	(Johnson,	2016).	An	active	dispute	 in	 the	area	would	 force	 the	United	States	 to	have	a	strong	presence	in	Japan,	thus	ensuring	Japan’s	security.	Since	China	is	still	viewed	as	a	potential	 threat	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute	 is	 not	resolved,	the	United	States	is	forced	to	maintain	a	strong	military	presence	in	the	area	to	secure	Japan.	As	Koo	puts	it,	“through	its	alliance	and	commitment	to	defend	Japan,	the	U.S.	 has	 allowed	 Japan	 to	 avoid	 direct	 confrontation	with	 China,	 thus	 ensuing	 certain	confines”	(Koo,	2010,	p.8).	Since	most	East	Asian	territorial	disputes	have	developed	due	to	the	San	Francisco	Peace	Treaty	(See	Appendix	IV),	it	is	clear	that	they	all	also	involve	
the	United	States	to	varying	degrees.		United	States’	National	Security	Strategy	(NSS)	maintains	that	 the	United	States	would	 continue	 to	 advance	 its	 rebalance	 to	 Asia	 and	 the	 Pacific.	 As	 indicated	 by	 the	Defence	Strategic	Guidance,	the	US	Quadrennial	Defence	Review	(QDR)	and	the	NSS,	the	United	 States	 emphasises	 its	 foreign	 policy	 on	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region	 and	 the	 United	States’	stronger	presence.		
	55	 	
Table	4.1.	United	States	military	forces	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia	(Defence	White	Paper,	2015)	 In	 November	 2011	 President	 Obama	 stated	 in	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 Australian	Parliament,	 that	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region	 was	 the	 United	 States’	 top	 priority	 regarding	foreign	policy	and	security.	The	United	States	would	continue	as	a	strong	presence	in	both	the	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 (South	 Korea)	 as	 well	 as	 Japan,	 and	 focus	 on	 updating	 and	enhancing	previous	security	agreements	and	policies	with	allied	countries	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	region.	The	US	Defence	forces	in	East	Asia	would	be	redistributed	within	the	allied	countries	in	order	to	build	“a	more	geographically	distributed,	operationally	resilient	and	politically	sustainable	military	presence”	(Ministry	of	Defence,	2015,	p.	9).	As	 long	as	China	can	be	counted	as	an	unstable	power	 in	the	region,	 the	United	States	cannot	actively	weaken	their	role	in	the	region.	The	possible	nuclear	threat	from	the	 People’s	Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 (North	Korea)	 in	 2017	 has	 also	 raised	 the	stakes	of	the	United	States	in	the	area.	Japan	clearly	benefits	from	the	close	ally	and	as	long	as	there	is	an	unresolved	dispute	between	Japan	and	China,	the	United	States	will	stay	a	strong	ally	and	presence	in	the	region.			 5.3.1.	THE	THREAT	OF	CHINA		China	 is	 the	most	populous	state	 in	the	world,	as	well	as	the	world's	biggest	economy,	when	based	on	purchasing-power	parity.	In	a	military	sense,	China	is	also	a	force	to	be	reckoned	with.	According	to	the	FBI	China	is	well	equipped	in	the	skill	of	cyber-warfare	as	well	as	having	a	strong	military.	The	People's	Liberation	Army	(PLA),	has	almost	2.5	million	frontline	personnel,	with	an	additional	2.3	million	strong	active	reserve.	China	is	also	a	nation	with	nuclear	weapons,	as	well	as	a	permanent	seat	on	the	United	Nations'	Security	 Council,	 giving	 China	 tremendous	 power	 in	 the	 international	 community	(Andrews,	 2015).	 China	 has	 always	 had	 a	 view	 on	 foreign	 policy	 that	 no	 state	 should	meddle	and	interfere	in	another	state's	internal	affairs.	China	has	a	long	and	in	many	ways	traumatic	history,	filled	with	violence,	wars	and	oppression.	 China	 is	 one	 of	 the	 last	 standing	 socialist	 states	 in	 the	 world,	 ruled	 by	 a	
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president	chosen	by	what	the	Chinese	themselves	call	 “the	dictatorship	of	 the	people”.	China	uses	a	one-party	system	where	the	socialist	party,	the	Communist	Party	of	China	(CPC),	is	the	only	political	party.	The	Party	and	the	country	is	ruled	by	the	working	class	and	 is	 based	 on	 the	 union	 of	 the	 Chinese	 people,	 regardless	 of	 class	 or	 background.	(Mykkänen,	2007)	The	Chinese	government	is	constantly	challenged	by	globalization	and	the	 economic	 development	 within	 the	 country	 to	 keep	 the	 system	 of	 “socialism	with	Chinese	characteristics”	alive,	 resulting	 in	what	 seems	 to	be	a	 slow	but	 steady	shift	 to	“Chinese	tradition	with	socialist	characteristics”	instead.	(Kallio,	2011)	China	 faces	 a	 complicated	 geopolitical	 situation	 by	 nature.	 At	Wanshou	 Forum	2017,	 the	Deputy	 Principal	 of	 the	University	 of	 International	 Relations	 of	 Beijing,	 Sun	Zhiming	 explained	 that	 the	 Chinese	 culture	 teaches	 that	 “harmony	 is	 most	 precious”,	which	 China	 also	 tries	 to	 bring	 forth	 in	 their	 own	 security	 agenda.	 This	 is	 the	 active	attitude	of	China	on	how	to	meet	conflicts	and	security	contradictions	through	policies.	China	agrees	that	in	this	globalized	world	internal	and	external	security	policies	cannot	be	held	apart	anymore,	but	needs	to	mutually	compliment	the	security	work	both	within	and	outside	the	state.	In	China,	national	interests	and	national	security	also	influence	the	security	of	the	international	community.	China	also	notes	that	one	of	the	issues	is	different	concepts	of	security.	China	stands	by	the	notion	that	preserving	and	maintaining	national	security	of	any	state	needs	to	be	admitted	and	respected,	of	course	not	without	reason,	however	 pursuit	 of	 self-security	 should	 be	 of	 utmost	 importance	 (Sun,	 personal	communication,	March	1,	2017).	 	China	still	struggles	to	rid	itself	of	the	negative	stamp	of	a	“strong	China”	equalling	an	 unstable	 threat	 to	 international	 security,	 falling	 into	 Cold	 War	 stereotypes	 and	hegemonic	politics.	Unfortunately,	 Chinese	actions	of	 security	policy	does	not	 seem	 to	support	 the	 aims	 and	 nature	 of	 China’s	 international	 security	 policies	 on	 paper	 (Sun,	personal	communication,	March	1,	2017).	The	current	Chinese	President	Xi	Jinping	has	taken	a	more	proactive	approach	to	foreign	policy	and	security	policy.	China	focuses	strongly	on	the	philosophy	of	harmony,	to	 create	 a	world	 shared	 by	 all	 based	 on	 peace,	 cooperation	 and	 common	 prosperity.	(Kallio,	 2016)	 According	 to	 the	 Chinese	 Foreign	 minister	 Wang	 Yi:	 “a	 new	 type	 of	
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international	 relations	 is	 aimed	 at	 replacing	 confrontation	 with	 cooperation,	 and	exclusiveness	with	win-win	cooperation.”	(Kallio,	2016,	p.	4)	In	 2015,	 Xi	 announced	 in	 various	 UN	 summits	 that	 China	 initiates	 that	 the	international	community	should	build	“the	commonwealth	of	the	destiny	of	humankind”	(Kallio,	 2016,	 p.	 5).	 China	 called	 for	 establishing	 new	 partnerships	 based	 on	 mutual	understanding,	 since	 according	 to	 China,	 current	 global	 governments	 face	 challenges	where	what	China	calls	“old	governments”	cannot	fit	and	adapt	to	“new	governments”	and	the	changing	global	situation.	This	struggle	leads	to	the	need	to	build	on	a	community	of	shared	mind,	kind	and	destiny	(Sun,	personal	communication,	March	1,	2017).	In	 2017	 Xi	 has	 actively	 asked	 for	 systematic	 elaboration	 of	 Chinese	 security	policies	for	the	international	community	to	show	how	states	could	jointly	build	a	shared	world	of	security	and	unity.	Xi	also	noted	that	there	 is	no	Shangri	 la	 in	the	world	with	perfect	security,	since	in	the	globalized	world	threats	to	any	state	threaten	other	states	as	well,	which	China	has	brought	up	by	asking	for	a	stronger	“help	thy	neighbour”-mentality.	China	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 talking	 the	 talk	 and	 not	 walking	 the	 walk.	 The	 clear	contradiction	between	the	official	policies	and	the	actions	taken	by	China,	especially	in	regard	 to	 territorial	 disputes	 in	 South	 China	 Sea,	 has	 been	 criticized	 by	 neighbouring	countries	as	well	as	international	players	(Sun,	personal	communication,	March	1,	2017).	China’s	policies	are	mainly	based	on	nationalism.	In	national	politics	China	often	portrays	itself	as	a	challenger	to	the	“US	hegemony”	in	the	world.	President	Xi’s	new	era	of	foreign	policy	is	also	grandiloquently	and	ostentatiously	portrayed	as	a	purely	Chinese	politico-philosophical	tradition,	a	completely	new	type	of	foreign	policy.	However,	“the	Chinese-ness	is	often	no	more	than	an	edifice	that	it	has	been	necessary	to	erect	in	order	to	make	the	ideas	behind	it	look	homegrown”	(Kallio,	2016,	p.	7).	This	clearly	shows	how	national	politics	are	still	the	main	driving	force	behind	China’s	foreign	policy.				During	 Wanshou	 Forum	 2017,	 Gao	 Zugui	 delivered	 a	 speech	 on	 the	 current	security	 situation	 in	 the	 world	 and	 its	 implications.	 During	 his	 speech,	 Gao	 clarified	China’s	thoughts	and	policies	on	security	now	as	well	as	 in	the	future.	China	views	the	world	 as	 a	 peaceful	 place,	 since	 no	major	wars	 between	 states	 are	 taking	 place	 (Gao,	personal	communication,	March	2,	2017).	However,	this	is	a	very	narrow	view	on	security,	since	 in	 today’s	world	most	conflicts	are	 in	 fact	 intra-state	conflicts	or	expand	beyond	
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state	 borders.	 Gao	 explained	 that	 a	 decade	 ago	 developed	 countries	 were	 seen	 as	prosperous	and	secure,	but	now	advanced	Western	countries	are	 faced	with	problems	and	insecurities.		The	 United	 States	 face	 insecurities	 and	 vast	 changes	 due	 to	 the	 election	 of	President	Donald	Trump,	whereas	the	European	Union	struggles	with	the	aftermath	of	the	Brexit	vote,	upcoming	elections	in	major	countries	as	well	as	the	rise	of	populism	and	nationalism.	 According	 to	 Gao,	 China	 views	 the	 world	 security	 uncertainty	 as	 due	 to	Western	 trade	 protectionism,	 exclusion	 of	 immigrants	 and	 increase	 in	 military	 and	defence	expenditure.	China	views	that	there	is	not	enough	global	governance	at	this	time,	due	to	the	insecurity	of	Western	powers.	China	has	often	expressed	their	willingness	to	help	and	step	up	in	global	governance,	at	least	until	Western	powers	solve	their	internal	problems.	China	has	raised	the	issue	of	increased	military	and	defence	expenditure:	when	more	 resources	 are	 allocated	 to	 the	 military,	 how	 will	 the	 Western	 powers	 afford	combating	 environmental	 issues	 and	 the	 refugee	 crisis?	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 arguments	China	uses	to	claim	a	larger	part	of	global	governance.	China	sees	itself	as	an	underused	player	 in	 the	 international	 community,	 with	 great	 interest	 in	 larger	 roles	 in	 conflict	prevention	and	international	cooperation.	However,	this	is	not	always	greeted	warmly,	especially	by	neighbouring	countries.	The	territorial	dispute	in	the	South	China	Sea	is	one	of	the	largest	security	struggles	in	Asia	today.		The	Chinese	economic	rise	combined	with	their	often	aggressive	and	self-centred	foreign	 policy	 has	 led	 to	 the	 term	 “China	 Threat”.	 American	 authors,	 such	 as	 Richard	Bernstein,	Ross	Munro	and	Samuel	Huntington	among	others,	have	painted	a	threatening	picture	of	China’s	rise	to	superpower	status.	Huntington,	for	instance,	has	brought	up	the	idea	of	 the	 two	main	 threats	of	 the	United	States,	China	and	the	 Islamic	world,	 joining	forces	 to	 take	 down	 the	 Western	 world.	 Huntington’s	 theories	 have	 been	 greatly	criticized,	 and	China	 itself	 has	 stated	 that	 any	development	 is	 at	 its	 core	peaceful	 and	unifying	(Mykkänen,	2007).	China	is	actively	trying	to	advocate	for	an	attitude	change	of	Chinese	foreign	policy	and	security	policy.	Gao	stated	at	Wanshou	Forum	2017,	that	China	loudly	claims	that	the	Chinese	security	policy	has	always	been	focused	on	human	security,	it	is	just	disregarded	by	Western	countries	due	to	differences	in	how	the	terminology	is	understood.	China’s	
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actions	can	be	said	to	often	be	quite	the	opposite	of	what	their	official	policies	mention,	which	 creates	 a	 rift	 between	 neighbouring	 countries	 and	 brings	 out	 uncertainty	 and	distrust	 in	 the	 international	 community	 against	 China.	 Whether	 the	 Chinese	 security	agenda	is	contradictory	to	China’s	actions	can	be	debated,	however,	as	long	as	there	are	unresolved	disputes,	issues	based	on	history	as	well	as	sabre-rattling	power	plays	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia	on	China’s	behalf,	China	will	continue	to	be	viewed	as	a	threat	by	the	international	community	and	neighbouring	countries.		It	is	argued	that	as	long	as	China	is	committed	to	reform	and	focus	on	economic	development,	they	should	be	more	actively	welcomed	into	the	international	community,	since	economic	changes	would	in	turn	lead	to	gradual	transformation	of	a	more	open	and	liberal	state.	“As	China	becomes	more	prosperous	it	is	argued	its	emerging	middle	class	will	demand	more	political	freedom	and	a	greater	degree	of	participation	in	the	decision	making	process.”	(Heijmans,	Simmonds,	&	van	de	Veen,	2004,	p.	185)	This	in	turn	would	lead	to	growing	security	not	just	in	the	area	but	the	entire	world.	According	to	Li	Qin,	Deputy	Director-General	of	Chongqing	Foreign	and	Overseas	Chinese	 Affairs	 Office,	 China	 still	 struggles	 against	 discrimination	 in	 the	 international	order	and	is	largely	misunderstood.	According	to	many	East	and	Southeast	Asian	scholars,	colonial	 powers	 have	 created	 problems	 in	 the	 past	 and	 are	 still	 leading	 reasons	 for	regional	conflicts	in	the	area,	which	is	why	colonial	powers	should	make	a	larger	effort	to	contribute	 more	 to	 current	 conflicts,	 not	 just	 reap	 benefits	 and	 turn	 a	 blind	 eye	 (Li,	personal	communication,	March	6,	2017).	Li	proclaims	that	most	colonial	powers	still	rely	on	blatant	intervention	in	other	countries	internal	affairs,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	Middle	East,	under	pretext	of	humanitarianism.	The	truth	is,	according	to	Li,	that	colonial	powers	have	failed	in	their	attempts	to	meddle	with	others’	internal	affairs.	Li’s	ideas	are	quite	contradictory.	 It	has	been	criticised	 that	many	post-colonial	 states	are	expecting	more	from	 the	 colonial	 powers	 on	 conflicts	 in	 and	 between	 other	 states,	 however,	 when	 it	comes	to	intervention	in	their	own	internal	policies,	the	post-colonial	states	refuse	any	help	from	colonial	powers.		According	to	researcher	Rex	Li	(Heijmans	et	al.,	2004)	a	great	power’s	behaviour	is	largely	determined	by	its	capabilities	and	not	so	much	on	its’	intentions.	The	stronger	a	state	grows,	the	more	power	it	gains	in	the	international	community.	Many	international	
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relations	 scholars	have	 stated,	 that	 the	 rise	of	 a	new	superpower	 is	 always	 a	possible	threat	of	instability	and	conflicts,	merely	because	it	is	very	rare	for	a	superpower	to	grow	into	a	vacuum	where	a	new	superpower	is	needed,	so	any	new	superpower	always	brings	along	some	degree	of	power	play.		China’s	rise	to	supepowerdom	is	no	exception.	As	Li	explains,	“big	countries	are	more	likely	to	be	difficult	to	 live	with	if	 they	have	a	strong	sense	of	cultural	superiority	or	historical	grievances	about	their	treatment	by	the	rest	of	the	world.	China	is	widely	known	as	a	dissatisfied	and	non-status	quo	power	seeking	to	right	the	wrongs	of	its	humiliating	history	and	alter	the	existing	rules	of	the	international	system	–	rules	in	its	view	created	and	dictated	by	the	west”	(Heijmans	et	al.,	2004,	p.	184).	Wu	 Chunsi,	 Associate	 Researcher	 Director	 of	 the	 Institute	 for	 International	Strategic	Studies	informs	that	more	and	more	countries	increase	their	military	spending,	mostly	due	to	cooperation	not	being	at	a	stable	base	in	interstate	relations,	as	well	as	due	to	general	suspicion.	(Wu,	personal	communication,	March	6,	2017).	China’s	official	policy	is	not	to	engage	in	an	arms	race	based	on	what	other	states	do,	but	base	their	military	spending	trends	purely	on	national	 interests.	During	an	annual	session	of	 the	National	People’s	Congress	in	Beijing	in	March	2017,	China	announced	a	growth	of	7	percent	in	their	defence	spending.	“The	majority	of	the	defence	budget	will	be	spent	on	deepening	national	defence	and	military	reforms,	bolstering	military	and	civilian	 integration,	and	improving	the	living,	training	and	working	conditions	for	service	personnel	at	grass-root	levels”,	 an	 official	 told	 the	 Shanghai	 Daily	 (Xinhua,	 2017).	 This	 growth	 in	 defence	expenditure	is	the	slowest	in	China	in	over	a	decade,	accounting	only	for	1.3	percent	of	China’s	GDP,	in	contrast	to	NATO	members’	pledge	of	2	percent	of	their	respective	GDP	for	defence	expenditure.		In	 general,	 China	 has	 always	 strongly	 stuck	 to	 the	 philosophy	 that	 any	 policy,	whether	on	foreign	policy	or	national	issues,	should	not	be	meddled	in	argues	Pei	Zhang,	the	 Deputy	 Director	 of	 the	 Institute	 for	 Global	 Governance	 Studies	 (Pei,	 personal	communication,	 March	 6,	 2017).	 This	 thought,	 however,	 is	 also	 the	 basis	 of	 many	 of	China’s	territorial	disputes.	In	territorial	disputes	like	for	example	Taiwan	and	Tibet,	the	reason	 China	 is	 not	 engaging	 in	 active	 resolution	 practices	 by	 the	 international	community	is	because	China	views	these	disputes	as	internal	national	disputes	and	finds	any	 interference	 by	 outside	 forces	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 a	 state’s	 own	 sovereignty	 and	legitimacy	(Pei,	personal	communication,	March	6,	2017).	
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China	 has	 in	 recent	 years	 actively	 pursued	 larger	 cooperation	 with	 European	countries	and	 the	European	Union,	 to	 lower	 the	 tension	between	superpowers	 in	East	Asia.	China’s	relationship	to	both	neighbouring	countries	as	well	as	the	United	States	are	thought	to	become	rockier	due	largely	to	territorial	disputes,	especially	 in	South	China	Sea.	China	and	Europe	has	never	had	any	territorial	disputes,	which	China	sees	as	a	solid	foundation	 for	 cooperation.	With	 the	current	uncertainties	 regarding	Russia’s	possible	threat	to	Europe	as	well	as	the	war	in	Ukraine,	China	has	actively	pursued	an	image	of	a	strong	ally	against	Russia	for	European	states,	argues	Long	Jing,	Deputy	Director	for	the	Center	for	European	Studies	in	Shanghai	(Long,	personal	communication,	March	6,	2017).	China’s	growth	into	a	superpower	poses	a	challenge	for	the	United	States	and	Japan,	especially	to	their	defence	alliance.	According	to	Li	(Heijmans	et	al.,	2004)	a	weaker	China	would	 lead	 to	a	 chaotic	China,	which	 in	 turn	would	pose	a	 threat	 to	 regional	 security.	Economists	 are	 also	 worried	 about	 a	 possible	 economic	 disaster	 that	 could	 lead	 to	political	unrest	within	the	country.	“Should	the	communist	regime	vail	 to	maintain	the	political	cohesion	of	China,	internal	strife	or	even	civil	war	may	ensure,	which	could	lead	to	a	massive	refugee	crisis	and	great	power	competition	for	control	over	the	fragmented	[state]”	(Heijmans	et	al.,	2004,	p.	185).	Although	 President	 Xi	 has	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 cooperation	 and	harmony	in	China’s	new	foreign	policy	approach,	 it	 is	also	clear	that	China	has	taken	a	more	 engaging	 and	 stronger	 position	 in	 territorial	 disputes,	 especially	 concerning	maritime	 territorial	 disputes.	 This	 position	 has	 created	 mistrust	 in	 neighbouring	countries,	namely	 strengthening	 the	 cooperation	between	 Japan	and	 the	United	States	(Sinkkonen,	 2016).	 Unlike	 other	 regional	 states,	 China	 has	 no	 military	 alliances.	 The	United	States	have	numerous	military	bases	in	Japan,	South	Korea	and	the	Philippines,	making	any	altercations	in	East	Asia	of	higher	stakes,	since	any	escalation	would	pin	China	directly	against	the	United	States.	The	US-Japan	security	alliance	is	a	double-edged	sword	for	China.	On	one	hand	China	sees	the	US-Japan	alliance	as	an	attempt	on	power	play	in	the	area	to	increase	US	influence	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia,	but	on	the	other	hand	China	also	views	the	United	States	as	a	balancing	force	that	keeps	Japan	in	check	to	prevent	any	independent	military	defence	system	developments	by	Japan	(Sinkkonen,	2016).	China	still	views	the	US-Japan	security	alliance	as	a	crucial	factor	in	regional	security	as	well	as	China’s	national	security	(Ross,	1996).	
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Li	(Heijmans	et	al.,	2004)	explains	that	from	Japan’s	perspective	China’s	strength	or	weakness	is	something	that	immensely	affects	Japan.	A	rich	China	with	a	strong	military	might	pose	a	threat	to	regional	security	and	Japan’s	security,	however,	an	economically	and	politically	weak	China	would	also	threaten	regional	security	and	create	instability.	At	 least	 China	 has	 made	 it	 clear	 in	 their	 rhetoric	 that	 although	 their	 military	powers	keep	developing,	neighbouring	countries	will	only	benefit	 from	this	growth.	 In	2014,	 President	Xi	 announced	 that	 China	will	 settle	 all	 territorial	 disputes	 in	 peaceful	manners:	“China	stays	committed	to	seeking	peaceful	settlement	of	disputes	with	other	countries	over	territorial	sovereignty	and	maritime	rights	and	interests.”	(Andrews,	2015,	p.	235).	Xi’s	rhetoric	is	meant	to	confirm	to	the	international	community	and	neighbouring	countries	that	China	is	committed	to	their	philosophy	that	no	country	should	interfere	in	another	country’s	 internal	affairs.	However,	as	mentioned	earlier,	 since	China	 tends	 to	view	many	of	their	territorial	disputes	as	China’s	internal	affairs,	these	disputes	are	not	part	of	the	one’s	Xi	vows	to	settle	peacefully	and	requests	no	international	interference	in	these	disputes.		Out	of	the	four	benefits	Japan	has	gained	from	an	ongoing	territorial	dispute	with	China,	the	strengthening	of	the	United	States’	presence	in	the	region	is	by	far	the	most	important	 to	 Japan.	Since	 the	United	States	and	China	are	still	 in	many	ways	opposing	superpowers,	even	though	mutual	cooperation	has	gained	interest	in	recent	times,	it	is	crucial	for	the	United	States	to	keep	strong	allies	in	the	area.	Ever	since	the	Cold	War	Japan	has	been	the	strongest	US	ally	to	keep	China	in	check	and	this	is	something	that	will	not	change.	As	long	as	there	is	an	enduring	dispute	between	China	and	Japan,	Japan	can	rest	assure	that	the	United	States	will	stay	an	active	and	dependable	ally	in	the	future.		 5.4.	RELATIONS	TO	OTHER	DISPUTES		Both	 Japan	 and	China	 are	 at	 the	moment	 in	 the	middle	 of	 numerous	 territorial	 island	disputes	with	a	number	of	other	states.	This	has	a	very	strong	effect	on	how	both	states	deal	with	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute.	Leniency	 in	one	dispute	might	negatively	affect	
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other	ongoing	disputes,	which	means	that	from	a	foreign	policy	stance	all	island	disputes	are	interconnected,	regardless	of	how	weak	or	strong	the	individual	claims	are.	Most	island	disputes	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia	appertain	to	the	UN	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	which	allows	states	to	proclaim	EEZ's	(Exclusive	Economic	Zones)	of	200	nautical	miles	around	the	states'	coastlines.	The	EEZ	gives	states	the	right	to	utilize	natural	resources	from	the	claimed	zones.	Overlapping	EEZ's	are	in	fact	not	the	core	of	the	issue,	but	rather	questionable	sovereignty	claims	on	smaller	islands.	According	to	UNCLOS	continental	states	are	not	allowed	to	extend	their	EEZ	to	cover	islands,	not	to	mention	archipelagos	or	strips	of	sea	between	mainland	and	islands.	This	is	most	of	the	time	disregarded	by	states	when	it	comes	to	island	disputes,	especially	China,	that	since	1992	 has	 intensified	 its	 campaign	 of	 claiming	 territorial	waters	 surrounding	 disputed	islands	in	contradiction	with	UNCLOS	(van	der	Velde,	1998).		Other	 ongoing	 territorial	 disputes	 are	 the	 trickiest	when	 it	 comes	 to	 benefits	 for	Japan	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute.	Out	of	the	four	benefits	analysed,	the	effect	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	on	other	territorial	disputes	 is	a	double-ended	sword.	On	one	hand,	staying	firm	on	the	issue	of	the	Senkaku	Islands,	gives	a	strong	claim	and	send	a	firm	message	for	issues	with	other	territories.	On	the	other	hand,	this	can	create	a	lockdown	situation	 on	 all	 territorial	 disputes,	 since	 a	 change	 or	 compromise	 on	 one	 will	automatically	affect	the	others.	The	other	territorial	disputes	can	therefore	be	seen	as	a	strength	or	weakness	to	Japan,	depending	on	the	situations	and	ongoing	changes	in	status	quos	and	sovereignties.		It	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	security	of	 the	 region	 to	keep	 the	disputes	 in	check	and	avoid	escalation	at	all	cost.	Although	the	disputes	might	slow	down	regional	cooperation,	it	does	not	mean	the	disputes	are	necessarily	halting	the	build-up	of	security	in	the	area.	Both	China	and	Japan	are	striving	to	be	considered	as	more	serious	regional	and	world	powers,	and	 in	 order	 to	 do	 so	 both	 countries	 are	 actively	 pursuing	 closer	 cooperation	 with	neighbouring	 countries.	 This	 in	 turn	 contribute	 to	 the	 overall	 security	 and	interdependence	of	the	region	(Luova	&	Antikainen-Kokko,	2006).		Moreover,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that	regional	power	relationships	play	a	large	role	in	escalation	and	de-escalation	of	conflicts	and	disputes.	“It	is	important	to	highlight	the	fact	that	making	or	building	peace	is	 intimately	related	to	power	and	politics	–	the	
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reality	of	states	and	the	power	wielded	by	those	who	make	decision	in	the	political	and	economic	 spheres.	 […]	Political	 leadership	 in	 those	 states	 come	 to	accept	 the	 fact	 that	coercive	 means	 and	 the	 use	 of	 force	 or	 state	 power	 have	 their	 limits	 and	 that	 less	adversarial	 approaches	 to	 “conflict	 sensitive	 politics”	 may	 hold	 more	 promise	 for	successful	conflict	resolution”	(Heijmans,	2004,	p.	27).		 5.4.1.	JAPAN’S	ONGOING	TERRITORIAL	DISPUTES		 In	addition	to	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	Japan	has	two	other	ongoing	territorial	disputes	with	neighbouring	countries.		5.4.1.1.	TAKESHIMA	/	DOKDO	Japan	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	(South	Korea)	have	an	ongoing	territorial	dispute	over	the	Liancourt	Rocks,	known	as	Takeshima	in	Japan	and	Dokdo	in	the	Republic	of	Korea.	Takeshima	is	a	group	of	rocks	situated	200	km	east	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	and	200	km	north	 of	 the	 Japanese	 island	 of	 Honshu	 in	 the	 Sea	 of	 Japan.	 	 The	 total	 land	 area	 of	Takeshima	is	23	hectares	and	it	is	impossible	to	reach	the	islets	with	anything	else	than	a	small	 boat	 in	 calm	 weather	 conditions	 (Swanström,	 2005).	 The	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 is	currently	holding	 sovereignty	of	 the	disputed	 islands;	however,	 Japan	 regards	 it	 as	 an	illegal	occupation	with	no	basis	in	international	law.	Japan	has	made	it	clear	there	is	no	intention	 of	 letting	 go	 of	 the	 dispute,	 however,	 Japan	will	 not	 take	 any	 hostile	 action	against	the	Republic	of	Korea	regarding	any	actions	of	Takeshima	(Wiegand,	2011).	The	Republic	of	Korea	does	not	agree	a	territorial	dispute	exists	and	has	made	it	clear	that	Japan’s	claim	on	Takeshima	is	a	clear	barrier	to	developing	closer	bilateral	relations	in	both	trade	and	diplomacy	(Koo,	2010).		The	Republic	of	Korea	argues	that	Takeshima	is	part	of	the	territories	“Japan	has	taken	by	violence	and	greed”	referred	to	in	the	Cairo	Declaration	(See	Appendix	II).		Japan	claims	 that	 sovereignty	 over	 Takeshima	 was	 already	 established	 in	 the	 17th	 century,	officially	reaffirmed	in	1905,	much	in	the	same	way	as	with	the	Senkaku	Islands,	with	no	objections	 from	 the	Republic	 of	 Korea,	 therefore	Takeshima	 should	 not	 fall	 under	 the	territories	mentioned	in	the	Cairo	Declaration.	Japan	claims	that	Takeshima	has	been	part	
	65	 	
of	 Japan	 since	 the	 Russo-Japanese	War	 in	 1905,	 five	 years	 before	 Japan	 annexed	 the	Korean	Empire.	Japan	has	in	fact	been	pushing	for	judicial	settlement	of	the	Takeshima	dispute.		(Koo,	2010).	There	are	no	official	inhabitants	of	Takeshima,	however,	both	the	Republic	of	Korea	and	Japan	regularly	send	coast	guards	to	the	islets	and	the	surrounding	areas	 as	diplomatic	protests.	 It	 has	been	 speculated	 that	 one	 reason	why	 Japan	 is	 not	aggressively	 pursuing	 an	 end	 to	 the	 Takeshima	 dispute	 is	 based	 in	 a	 feeling	 of	 guilt	because	 of	 Japan’s	 annexation	 of	 the	 Korean	 peninsula	 and	war	 crimes	 following	 the	annexation	(Swanström,	2005).	Since	the	Takeshima	dispute	is	in	many	ways	very	similar	to	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	 it	 would	 be	 detrimental	 to	 Japan's	 claim	 if	 any	 compromise	 on	 claims	 of	 the	Senkaku	Islands	were	made.	The	reasoning	is	the	same	behind	most	claims,	focusing	on	the	Cairo	Declaration	and	San	Francisco	Peace	Treaty.		There	have	been	some	minor	escalations	throughout	the	years,	mainly	resulting	from	resource	competition,	geopolitical	changes	and	nationalistic	agendas.	On	the	other	hand,	 Japan’s	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea’s	 strong	 economic	 interdependence	 and	diplomatic	ties	has	kept	the	dispute	under	control	(Koo,	2010).		 5.4.1.2.	CHISIMA	RETTOO	/	KURILE	ISLANDS		Japan	 and	 Russia	 have	 an	 ongoing	 territorial	 dispute	 concerning	 four	 islands	 at	 the	southern	 tip	 of	Russia’s	Kurile	 Island	 chain,	 only	 a	 few	kilometres	 north	 of	Hokkaido,	Japan	(Lai,	2013).		To	this	day,	Japan	and	Russia	have	not	managed	to	resolve	their	territorial	dispute	concerning	Chisima	Rettoo.	The	area	disputed,	Chisima	Rettoo	(the	Northern	Territories)	as	referred	to	by	Japan,	and	the	South	Kuriles	as	referred	by	Russia	includes	the	Habomai	group	of	islets,	as	well	as	the	islands	of	Shikotan,	Kunashiri	and	Etorofu.	The	islands	were	claimed	by	the	Soviet	Union	after	the	Second	World	War	as	part	of	the	San	Francisco	Peace	Treaty	(See	Appendix	IV),	and	since	then	the	Japanese	government	has	made	it	clear	any	official	peace	treaty	with	Russia	will	not	be	concluded	before	the	islands	are	returned	to	Japan.	This	territorial	dispute	regarding	Chisima	Rettoo	has	been	officially	recognized	as	
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a	 dispute	 by	 both	 Russia	 and	 Japan	 (Swanström,	 2005).	 Although	 the	 United	 States	support	Japan’s	claim	on	the	islands,	the	US	has	made	it	clear	that	their	mutual	Security	Treaty	(See	Appendix	VI)	does	in	fact	not	cover	Chisima	Rettoo.	Russia	has	offered	to	split	the	four	islands	and	grant	Japan	sovereignty	over	two	of	them,	however,	Japan	has	made	it	clear	they	only	accept	all	four	islands.	Japan	does	unfortunately	not	have	a	very	strong	point	of	bargaining	leverage	over	Russia	(Lai,	2013).		Compared	to	the	Senkaku	islands	dispute,	Japan	is	at	a	disadvantage	in	the	Chisima	Rettoo	dispute,	because	Russia	does	 in	 fact	have	current	control	of	 the	area.	As	stated	earlier	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 Senkaku	 islands,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 a	 final	 claim	on	a	disputed	territory,	the	longer	a	state	has	sovereignty	over	the	disputed	territory,	the	stronger	the	state’s	claim	becomes.	Therefore,	Japan	keeps	bringing	up	the	Chisima	Rettoo	dispute	in	any	diplomatic	setting	with	Russia	(Swanström,	2005).			There	have	been	numerous	failed	settlement	attempts	throughout	the	years.	What	makes	the	Chisima	Rettoo	dispute	different	from	other	territorial	disputes	in	the	area	is	that	the	islands	are	actually	inhabited.	This	is	the	only	territorial	dispute	in	the	area	that	involves	citizens	of	the	disputing	states.	(Wiegand,	2011)	Japan	has	a	much	more	aggressive	stance	on	the	Chisima	Rettoo	dispute	compared	to	for	example	the	Takeshima	issue,	mainly	because	of	history.	Russia	seized	and	occupied	the	 Japanese	 Northern	 Territories	 in	 1945,	 which	 violated	 the	 Japan-USSR	 Neutrality	Treaty,	resulting	in	over	600	000	Japanese	prisoners	of	war	being	sent	to	Siberia	after	the	Second	World	War.	There	is	not	the	same	feeling	of	guilt	against	Russia	as	Japan	might	portray	towards	the	Republic	of	Korea.		 5.4.2.	CHINA’S	ONGOING	TERRITORIAL	DISPUTES		China	has	two	ongoing	territorial	disputes	in	East	Asia	and	Asia	Pacific.	On	top	of	these	two	there	are	territorial	disputes	with	other	states	and	inland,	such	as	for	example	Tibet.	“China	is	also	involved	in	a	dispute	with	India	over	the	Aksai	Chin	border	region	in	the	Himalayas,	claims	most	of	the	Indian	state	of	Arunachal	Pradesh	and	has	an	ill-defined	border	with	Bhutan”	(Andrews,	2015,	p.	233).	The	other	two	maritime	territorial	disputes	
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China	is	involved	in	are	of	a	completely	different	calibre	than	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute.	One	 of	 the	 disputes	 is	 the	 independence	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 Taiwan,	 also	 known	 as	 the	Republic	of	China,	compared	to	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(mainland	China).	On	top	of	 the	Taiwan	 territorial	dispute	China	 is	also	 involved	 in	a	major	maritime	 territorial	dispute	in	South	China	Sea.		 5.4.2.1.	SOUTH	CHINA	SEA		China’s	most	major	dispute	 in	East	 and	Southeast	Asia	 is	 the	 territorial	dispute	 in	 the	South	China	Sea.	The	South	China	Sea	 stretches	 from	 the	Karimata	Strait	between	 the	Islands	of	Sumatra	and	Borneo	in	Indonesia	to	the	Strait	of	Taiwan.	There	are	hundreds	of	 small	 islands	 and	 reefs	 in	 the	 area,	 mostly	 located	 in	 the	 Paracel	 and	 Spratly	archipelagos.	The	territorial	dispute	came	about	in	the	same	way	as	other	disputes	in	the	region;	 colonial	 powers	 and	 occupying	 forces	 after	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 failed	 to	distinguish	in	detail	to	whom	the	occupied	territories	were	to	be	reverted	and	from	whom	(Lai,	2013).	At	the	moment,	the	islands	in	the	South	China	Sea	are	divided	as	follows:	The	Pratas	Islands	are	completely	occupied	by	Taiwan,	but	claimed	by	China.	The	Paracel	Islands	are	mostly	occupied	by	China,	but	claimed	by	Vietnam.	The	Macclesfield	Bank	and	the	Scarborough	Shoal	are	disputed	among	China,	Taiwan	and	the	Philippines,	The	Spratly	Islands	are	disputed	among	China,	Taiwan,	the	Philippines,	Vietnam,	Malaysia	and	Brunei	(Lai,	2013).	China	has	claimed	that	the	United	States	encourages	other	dispute	parties	to	more	actively	 and	 aggressively	 challenge	 China	 and	 strengthen	 their	 claim	 of	 the	 disputed	islands,	which	has	led	to	China	actively	trying	to	keep	the	United	States	outside	the	scope	of	the	dispute	(Ratner,	2013).	There	is	one	major	difference	between	the	dispute	in	the	South	China	Sea	and	other	territorial	disputes	 in	 the	 region:	 the	Philippines	 took	 the	dispute	 to	a	 tribunal	by	 the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	(PCA)	in	the	Hague	in	2016.	The	tribunal	did	in	fact	not	adjudicate	on	sovereignty,	as	 is	most	often	 the	case,	 since	adjudication	on	sovereignty	requires	 the	 agreement	 of	 both	 parties	 and	 China	 did	 not	 grant	 their	 agreement.	 The	
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Philippines	won	the	tribunal	which	found	China’s	claims	on	historic	grounds	to	be	without	legal	 basis.	 Whether	 this	 has	 any	 real-life	 implications	 to	 China	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	(Graham,	2016).		China	has	always	had	a	very	assertive	and	determined	stance	when	 it	comes	to	territorial	disputes	and	protecting	China’s	claimed	sovereignty.	Therefore,	it	is	extremely	important	for	Japan	not	to	compromise	on	territorial	disputes	in	order	to	keep	the	upper	hand	when	it	comes	to	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute.	The	loss	in	PCA	to	the	Philippines	was	a	major	blow	for	China,	since	it	also	took	away	legitimacy	of	China’s	territorial	dispute	with	Japan.	This	way	Japan	gained	not	only	legitimacy	but	also	strength	and	control	over	the	 claims	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands,	 further	 weakening	 China’s	 claim.	 This	 way	 other	territorial	disputes	can	affect	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	in	Japan’s	presence,	even	when	Japan	is	not	involved	in	the	South	China	Sea	dispute.														
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6.	CONCLUSION		The	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	has	been	enduring	for	decades	with	no	end	in	sight.	During	the	 dispute,	 there	 has	 never	 even	 been	 an	 attempt	 at	 resolution	 between	 the	 dispute	parties,	let	alone	even	an	official	acknowledgement	whether	or	not	the	Senkaku	Islands	even	are	disputed.	The	benefit	from	the	actual	islands	is	still	undetermined,	but	there	has	been	 research	 into	 possible	 oil	 and	 natural	 gas	 reservoirs	 in	 the	 area	 of	 the	 disputed	islands.	The	economic	gain	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	is	one	of	the	major	reasons	why	China	claims	the	islands.	Other	than	the	economic	gain	the	territorial	value	is	nationalistic	and	symbolic,	as	are	most	disputed	territories	in	East	and	Southeast	Asia.	Due	to	a	long	lasting	resentment	from	neighbouring	countries	about	Japan’s	wartime	past	and	poorly	handled	retribution,	any	territorial	dispute	and	dispute	escalation	in	the	area	can	easily	be	blown	out	of	proportion.		Since	 Japan	 holds	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands,	 there	 is	 no	 rush	 or	interest	from	Japan’s	side	to	focus	on	the	issue	any	further.	Although	Japan	does	not	seem	to	be	interested	in	actively	pursuing	a	resolution	to	the	dispute,	 Japan	has	managed	to	benefit	from	the	dispute	nonetheless.		There	are	four	major	ways	in	which	Japan	has	turned	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	into	 a	 beneficial	 situation	 for	 diplomacy.	 According	 to	 theories	 on	 domestic	 policies,	territorial	disputes	can	actively	be	harnessed	into	“rally-around-the-flag”	strategies	and	to	 gain	 domestic	 accountability	 in	 national	 politics.	 Apart	 from	 politicians	 also	ultranationalist	groups	have	managed	to	gain	influence	through	the	dispute.	Since	the	cost	of	the	dispute	in	quite	low,	it	 is	easy	for	domestic	politicians	to	use	the	dispute	to	gain	national	pride,	domestic	interest	and	nationalistic	political	agendas.		The	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	can	also	be	used	as	bargaining	leverage,	which	Japan	has	managed	to	do,	even	 if	 it	 is	much	harder	 for	 the	non-claimant	 to	use	a	dispute	 for	bargaining	leverage.	The	best	example	of	this	is	the	PFT	negotiations	between	China	and	Japan,	where	Japan	managed	to	use	the	escalated	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	as	bargaining	leverage,	even	if	Japan	has	to	this	day	not	even	acknowledged	that	the	Senkaku	Islands	even	would	be	a	dispute.	In	Japan’s	eyes,	there	is	no	dispute	whatsoever.	
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The	United	States	is	Japans	most	important	ally	and	also	an	important	stabilizing	power	 in	the	East	Asian	region.	With	changing	geopolitics	and	US	national	politics,	 the	strong	 presence	 of	 the	 United	 States	 in	 East	 and	 Southeast	 Asia	 has	 sometimes	 been	questioned.	This	is	the	main	importance	Japan	has	gained	from	the	enduring	territorial	dispute	with	China:	as	long	as	China	stays	a	volatile,	unpredictable	military	superpower	in	the	region,	Japan	can	count	on	the	United	States	to	stay	a	strong	and	present	ally	to	balance	out	China’s	power	politics.	Japan	can	rest	easy	knowing	that	as	long	as	there	is	even	the	smallest	threat	of	military	escalation	in	the	region,	the	United	States	will	stay	their	strong	ally	regardless	of	their	national	political	changes.		The	last	and	most	complicated	benefit	for	Japan	from	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	is	the	effect	of	the	dispute	on	other	territorial	disputes	in	the	region.	As	long	as	the	status	quo	stays	unchanged	and	Japan	does	not	compromise	on	their	claim	and	sovereignty	of	the	 Senkaku	 Islands,	 they	 will	 also	 keep	 a	 strong	 image	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 other	territorial	 disputes.	 By	 keeping	 the	 status	 quo	 of	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 and	 not	 even	officially	 acknowledge	 it	 as	 a	 dispute,	 Japan	 sends	 a	 strong	message	on	how	 the	 state	handles	territorial	disputes,	strengthening	their	claim	in	other	disputes.	However,	this	can	also	backfire.	Although	Japan	has	managed	to	benefit	from	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	this	 far,	 even	 the	 slightest	 change	 in	 the	 dispute	 can	weaken	 Japan’s	 stance	 on	 other	territorial	issues.	In	the	same	way,	any	changes	in	other	territorial	disputes	might	weaken	Japan’s	claim	on	the	Senkaku	Islands,	since	most	of	the	territorial	disputes	in	the	area	are	interlinked	or	have	very	similar	claims.		All	in	all,	Japan	has	managed	to	turn	a	dispute	into	a	lucrative	asset	in	diplomacy.	As	discussed	in	the	peace	theory	section,	striving	for	peace	is	most	of	the	time	seen	as	the	ultimate	goal.	However,	when	it	comes	to	 low-cost	territorial	disputes	with	 little	or	no	reason	for	actual	military	escalation,	a	final	resolution	and	dispute	settlement	might	in	fact	be	less	lucrative	for	a	specific	dispute	party.	Through	my	research,	I	have	found	this	to	 be	 true	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 Japan	 and	 the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 dispute.	 Although	 this	particular	territorial	dispute,	with	these	particular	dispute	parties	can	be	seen	to	be	more	beneficial	to	Japan	than	pursuing	an	ultimate	end	to	the	dispute,	it	is	not	something	that	can	be	universally	applied	to	any	territorial	dispute.	In	conclusion,	whether	or	not	peace	is	 always	 the	 best	 answer	 depends	much	 on	what	 dispute	 parties	 are	 looking	 for.	 In	specific	cases	with	low	risk	factors	and	semi-mutual	goals	of	no	conflict	escalation,	one	
	71	 	
could	 say	 peace	 is	 not	 the	 best	 option	 and	 that	 unresolved	 disputes	 might	 be	 more	beneficial	for	states	in	the	end.	Peace	as	an	ultimate	goal	is	complex,	it	is	vague	enough	to	be	easily	interpreted	in	new	ways	when	needed,	but	still	clear	enough	to	be	able	to	work	as	a	clear	goal.	Benefits	from	disputes	can	be	lucrative	for	a	state,	however,	in	the	case	of	the	 Senkaku	 Islands	 the	 same	 benefits	 could	 be	 achieved	 by	 using	 other	 territorial	disputes	or	other	means.		The	Senkaku	Islands	dispute	is	a	very	typical	East	Asian	territorial	dispute:	it	has	grown	 from	 a	 post-colonial	 world	 order	 after	 the	 Second	World	War,	 grown	 through	changes	in	the	regions	power	dynamics	and	stayed	unresolved	mainly	because	the	lack	of	importance	for	a	final	resolution.	The	enduring	territorial	dispute	of	the	Senkaku	Islands	has	granted	Japan	four	major	areas	of	benefits:	a	tool	for	gaining	domestic	popularity	in	politics	 and	 further	 nationalistic	 agendas;	 bargaining	 leverage	 in	 diplomatic	 and	economic	 relations;	 a	 stronger	 security	 alliance	with	 the	 United	 States	 to	 balance	 the	overall	 security	 situation	 in	 East	 Asia;	 and	 a	 comparison	 point	 for	 other	 territorial	disputes	in	the	East	Asian	region.		Although	Japan	can	be	said	to	gain	benefits	from	an	enduring	territorial	dispute	such	as	the	Senkaku	Islands	dispute,	the	benefits	are	not	great	enough	to	diminish	the	idea	of	a	 final	dispute	resolution.	 Japan	 is	currently	benefiting	more	 from	an	active	dispute	than	from	pushing	for	a	final	peaceful	resolution,	especially	since	from	Japan’s	point	of	view	there	is	no	dispute	and	the	current	status	quo	and	sovereignty	favours	Japan.	That	said,	the	benefits	do	not	negate	a	possibility	for	a	dispute	resolution.	Although	Japan	has	managed	to	benefit	from	the	dispute,	the	benefits	are	not	important	enough	to	keep	the	dispute	going	just	because	of	the	gains.	It	seems	Japan	has	focused	on	gaining	as	much	positive	outcomes	from	an	unresolved	dispute	as	possible,	but	the	gains	are	not	enough	to	actively	pursue	keeping	the	dispute	unresolved.					 	
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8.	APPENDICES		8.1.	APPENDIX	I		
Treaty	of	Shimonoseki	Signed	at	Shimonoseki	April	17,	1895	Entered	into	force	May	8,	1895	by	the	exchange	of	the	instruments	of	ratification	at	Chefoo.	His	Majesty	the	Emperor	of	Japan	and	His	Majesty	the	Emperor	of	China,	desiring	to	restore	the	blessings	of	peace	to	their	countries	and	subjects	and	to	remove	all	cause	for	 future	 complications,	 have	 named	 as	 their	 Plenipotentiaries	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	concluding	a	Treaty	of	Peace,	that	is	to	say:	His	Majesty	the	Emperor	of	Japan,	Count	ITO	Hirobumi,	Junii,	Grand	Cross	of	the	Imperial	 Order	 of	 Paullownia,	 Minister	 President	 of	 State;	 and	 Viscount	MUTSU	Munemitsu,	 Junii,	 First	 Class	 of	 the	 Imperial	 Order	 of	 the	 Sacred	 Treasure,	Minister	of	State	for	Foreign	Affairs.	And	His	Majesty	 the	Emperor	of	China,	LI	Hung-chang,	Senior	Tutor	 to	 the	Heir	Apparent,	 Senior	 Grand	 Secretary	 of	 State,	 Minister	 Superintendent	 of	 Trade	 for	 the	Northern	Ports	of	China,	Viceroy	of	the	province	of	Chili,	and	Earl	of	the	First	Rank;	and	LI	Ching-fong,	Ex-Minister	of	the	Diplomatic	Service,	of	the	Second	Official	Rank:	Who,	after	having	exchanged	their	full	powers,	which	were	found	to	be	in	good	and	proper	form,	have	agreed	to	the	following	Articles:			Article	I	China	recognises	definitively	the	full	and	complete	independence	and	autonomy	of	Korea,	and,	in	consequence,	the	payment	of	tribute	and	the	performance	of	ceremonies	and	 formalities	by	Korea	 to	China,	 in	derogation	of	 such	 independence	and	autonomy,	shall	wholly	cease	for	the	future.			Article	II	China	 cedes	 to	 Japan	 in	 perpetuity	 and	 full	 sovereignty	 the	 following	 territories,	together	with	all	fortifications,	arsenals,	and	public	property	thereon:	(a) The	southern	portion	of	the	province	of	Fengtien	within	the	following	boundaries:	The	 line	 of	 demarcation	 begins	 at	 the	mouth	 of	 the	River	 Yalu	 and	 ascends	 that	stream	to	the	mouth	of	the	River	An-ping,	from	thence	the	line	runs	to	Feng-huang,	from	thence	to	Hai-cheng,	from	thence	to	Ying-kow,	forming	a	line	which	describes	the	southern	portion	of	the	territory.	The	places	above-named	are	included	in	the	ceded	 territory.	When	 the	 line	 reaches	 the	River	Liao	at	Ying-kow,	 it	 follows	 the	course	of	the	stream	to	its	mouth,	where	it	terminates.	The	mid-channel	of	the	River	Liao	shall	be	taken	as	the	line	of	demarcation.		
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This	cession	also	includes	all	islands	appertaining	or	belonging	to	the	province	of	Fengtien	situated	in	the	eastern	portion	of	the	Bay	of	Liao-tung	and	the	northern	portion	of	the	Yellow	Sea.	b) The	island	of	Formosa,	together	with	all	islands	appertaining	or	belonging	to	the	said	island	of	Formosa.	c) The	Pescadores	Group,	that	is	to	say,	all	islands	lying	between	the	119th	and	120th	degrees	of	 longitude	east	of	Greenwich	and	the	23rd	and	24th	degrees	of	north	latitude.		Article	III	The	alignment	of	the	frontiers	described	in	the	preceding	Article,	and	shown	on	the	annexed	map,	shall	be	subject	to	verification	and	demarcation	on	the	spot	by	a	Joint	Commission	of	Delimitation,	consisting	of	two	or	more	Japanese	and	two	or	more	Chinese	delegates,	to	be	appointed	immediately	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	this	Act.	In	case	the	boundaries	laid	down	in	this	Act	are	found	to	be	defective	at	any	point,	either	on	account	of	topography	or	in	consideration	of	good	administration,	it	shall	also	be	the	duty	of	the	Delimitation	Commission	to	rectify	the	same.	The	Delimitation	Commission	will	enter	upon	its	duties	as	soon	as	possible,	and	will	bring	its	labours	to	a	conclusion	within	the	period	of	one	year	after	appointment.		The	 alignments	 laid	 down	 in	 this	 Act	 shall,	 however,	 be	 maintained	 until	 the	rectifications	of	 the	Delimitation	Commission,	 if	 any	are	made,	 shall	have	received	 the	approval	of	the	Governments	of	Japan	and	China.		Article	IV	China	agrees	to	pay	to	Japan	as	a	war	indemnity	the	sum	of	200,000,000	Kuping	taels;	the	said	sum	to	be	paid	in	eight	instalments.	The	first	instalment	of	50,000,000	taels	to	be	paid	within	six	months,	and	the	second	instalment	of	50,000,000	to	be	paid	within	twelve	months,	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	this	Act.	The	remaining	sum	to	be	paid	in	six	equal	instalments	as	follows:	the	first	of	such	equal	annual	instalments	to	be	paid	within	 two	 years,	 the	 second	within	 three	 years,	 the	 third	within	 four	 years,	 the	fourth	within	five	years,	the	fifth	within	six	years,	and	the	sixth	within	seven	years,	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	this	Act.	Interest	at	the	rate	of	5	per	centum	per	annum	shall	begin	 to	 run	on	all	unpaid	portions	of	 the	 said	 indemnity	 from	 the	date	 the	 first	instalment	falls	due.	China	shall,	however,	have	the	right	to	pay	by	anticipation	at	any	time	any	or	all	of	the	said	instalments.	In	case	the	whole	amount	of	the	said	indemnity	is	paid	within	three	years	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	 the	present	Act	all	 interest	shall	be	waived,	and	the	 interest	 for	two	years	and	a	half	or	 for	any	 less	period,	 if	any	already	paid,	shall	be	included	as	part	of	the	principal	amount	of	the	indemnity.	
	
	Article	V	The	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 territories	 ceded	 to	 Japan	 who	 wish	 to	 take	 up	 their	residence	outside	 the	 ceded	districts	 shall	 be	 at	 liberty	 to	 sell	 their	 real	 property	 and	retire.	For	this	purpose	a	period	of	two	years	from	the	date	of	the	exchange	of	ratifications	
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of	the	present	Act	shall	be	granted.	At	the	expiration	of	that	period	those	of	the	inhabitants	who	 shall	 not	 have	 left	 such	 territories	 shall,	 at	 the	 option	 of	 Japan,	 be	 deemed	 to	 be	Japanese	subjects.	Each	of	the	two	Governments	shall,	immediately	upon	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	the	present	Act,	send	one	or	more	Commissioners	to	Formosa	to	effect	a	final	transfer	of	that	province,	and	within	the	space	of	two	months	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	this	Act	such	transfer	shall	be	completed.	
	Article	VI	All	Treaties	between	Japan	and	China	having	come	to	an	end	as	a	consequence	of	war,	 China	 engages,	 immediately	 upon	 the	 exchange	 of	 the	 ratifications	 of	 this	Act,	 to	appoint	 Plenipotentiaries	 to	 conclude	with	 the	 Japanese	 Plenipotentiaries,	 a	 Treaty	 of	Commerce	and	Navigation	and	a	Convention	to	regulate	Frontier	Intercourse	and	Trade.	The	 Treaties,	 Conventions,	 and	 Regulations	 now	 subsisting	 between	 China	 and	 the	European	Powers	shall	serve	as	a	basis	for	the	said	Treaty	and	Convention	between	Japan	and	China.	From	the	date	of	the	exchange	of	ratifications	of	this	Act	until	the	said	Treaty	and	Convention	are	brought	into	actual	operation,	the	Japanese	Governments,	its	officials,	commerce,	navigation,	frontier	intercourse	and	trade,	industries,	ships,	and	subjects,	shall	in	every	respect	be	accorded	by	China	most	favoured	nation	treatment.	China	makes,	in	addition,	the	following	concessions,	to	take	effect	six	months	after	the	date	of	the	present	Act:	First.	The	following	cities,	towns,	and	ports,	in	addition	to	those	already	opened,	shall	be	 opened	 to	 the	 trade,	 residence,	 industries,	 and	manufactures	 of	 Japanese	 subjects,	under	 the	 same	 conditions	 and	with	 the	 same	 privileges	 and	 facilities	 as	 exist	 at	 the	present	open	cities,	towns,	and	ports	of	China:	1. Shashih,	in	the	province	of	Hupeh.	2. Chungking,	in	the	province	of	Szechwan.	3. Suchow,	in	the	province	of	Kiangsu.	4. Hangchow,	in	the	province	of	Chekiang.	The	Japanese	Government	shall	have	the	right	to	station	consuls	at	any	or	all	of	the	above-named	places.	Second.	Steam	navigation	for	vessels	under	the	Japanese	flag,	for	the	conveyance	of	passengers	and	cargo,	shall	be	extended	to	the	following	places:	1. On	the	Upper	Yangtze	River,	from	Ichang	to	Chungking.	2. On	the	Woosung	River	and	the	Canal,	from	Shanghai	to	Suchow	and	Hangchow.		The	rules	and	regulations	that	now	govern	the	navigation	of	the	inland	waters	of	China	by	Foreign	vessels	 shall,	 so	 far	 as	 applicable,	 be	 enforced,	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 above-named	routes,	until	new	rules	and	regulations	are	conjointly	agreed	to.	Third.	 Japanese	 subjects	 purchasing	 goods	 or	 produce	 in	 the	 interior	 of	 China,	 or	transporting	 imported	 merchandise	 into	 the	 interior	 of	 China,	 shall	 have	 the	 right	temporarily	 to	 rent	or	hire	warehouses	 for	 the	storage	of	 the	articles	so	purchased	or	transported	without	the	payment	of	any	taxes	or	extractions	whatever.	
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Fourth.	 Japanese	 subjects	 shall	 be	 free	 to	 engage	 in	 all	 kinds	 of	 manufacturing	industries	in	all	the	open	cities,	towns,	and	ports	of	China,	and	shall	be	at	liberty	to	import	into	China	all	kinds	of	machinery,	paying	only	the	stipulated	import	duties	thereon.	All	 articles	manufactured	 by	 Japanese	 subjects	 in	 China	 shall,	 in	 respect	 of	 inland	transit	and	internal	taxes,	duties,	charges,	and	exactions	of	all	kinds,	and	also	in	respect	of	warehousing	and	storage	facilities	in	the	interior	of	China,	stand	upon	the	same	footing	and	 enjoy	 the	 same	 privileges	 and	 exemptions	 as	merchandise	 imported	 by	 Japanese	subjects	into	China.	In	the	event	additional	rules	and	regulations	are	necessary	in	connection	with	these	concessions,	they	shall	be	embodied	in	the	Treaty	of	Commerce	and	Navigation	provided	for	by	this	Article.	Article	VII	Subject	to	the	provisions	of	the	next	succeeding	Article,	the	evacuation	of	China	by	the	armies	of	Japan	shall	be	completely	effected	within	three	months	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	the	present	Act.			Article	VIII	As	a	guarantee	of	 the	 faithful	performance	of	 the	 stipulations	of	 this	Act,	China	consents	to	the	temporary	occupation	by	the	military	forces	of	Japan	of	Weihaiwei,	in	the	province	of	Shantung.	Upon	payment	of	the	first	two	instalments	of	the	war	indemnity	herein	stipulated	for	and	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	the	Treaty	of	Commerce	and	navigation,	the	said	place	shall	be	evacuated	by	the	Japanese	forces,	provided	the	Chinese	Government	consents	to	pledge,	under	suitable	and	sufficient	arrangements,	the	Customs	revenue	of	China	 as	 security	 for	 the	 payment	 of	 the	 principal	 and	 interest	 of	 the	 remaining	instalments	of	the	said	indemnity.	In	the	event	that	no	such	arrangements	are	concluded,	such	evacuation	shall	only	 take	place	upon	the	payment	of	 the	 final	 instalment	of	said	indemnity.	It	is,	however,	expressly	understood	that	no	such	evacuation	shall	take	place	until	after	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	the	Treaty	of	Commerce	and	Navigation.		Article	9	Immediately	upon	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	this	Act,	all	prisoners	of	war	then	held	shall	be	restored,	and	China	undertakes	not	to	ill-treat	or	punish	prisoners	of	war	so	restored	to	her	by	Japan.	China	also	engages	to	at	once	release	all	Japanese	subjects	accused	of	being	military	spies	or	charged	with	any	other	military	offences.	China	further	engages	not	to	punish	in	any	manner,	nor	to	allow	to	be	punished,	those	Chinese	subjects	who	have	 in	any	manner	been	compromised	 in	their	relations	with	the	 Japanese	army	during	the	war.					
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Article	10	All	offensive	military	operations	shall	cease	upon	the	exchange	of	the	ratifications	of	this	Act.			Article	11	The	present	Act	shall	be	ratified	by	their	Majesties	the	Emperor	of	Japan	and	the	Emperor	of	China,	and	the	ratifications	shall	be	exchanged	at	Chefoo	on	the	8th	day	of	the	5th	month	of	the	28th	year	of	MEIJI,	corresponding	to	the	14th	day	of	the	4th	month	of	the	21st	year	of	KUANG	HSU.	In	witness	whereof	the	respective	Plenipotentiaries	have	signed	the	same	and	affixed	thereto	the	seal	of	their	arms.		Source:	http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm																				 	
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8.2.	APPENDIX	II		
The	Cairo	Declaration	November	26,	1943	President	Roosevelt,	Generalissimo	Chiang	Kai-Shek	and	Prime	Minister	Churchill,	together	 with	 their	 respective	 military	 and	 diplomatic	 advisers,	 have	 completed	 a	conference	in	North	Africa.	The	following	general	statement	was	issued:	“The	 several	 military	 missions	 have	 agreed	 upon	 future	 military	 operations	against	 Japan.	 The	 Three	 Great	 Allies	 expressed	 their	 resolve	 to	 bring	 unrelenting	pressure	 against	 their	 brutal	 enemies	 by	 sea,	 land,	 and	 air.	 This	 pressure	 is	 already	mounting.	The	Three	Great	Allies	are	fighting	this	war	to	restrain	and	punish	the	aggression	of	Japan.	They	covet	no	gain	for	themselves	and	have	no	thought	of	territorial	expansion.	It	is	their	purpose	that	Japan	shall	be	stripped	of	all	the	islands	in	the	Pacific	which	she	has	seized	or	occupied	since	the	beginning	of	the	first	World	War	in	1914,	and	that	all	the	territories	Japan	has	stolen	form	the	Chinese,	such	as	Manchuria,	Formosa,	and	the	Pescadores,	shall	be	restored	to	the	Republic	of	China.	Japan	 will	 also	 be	 expelled	 from	 all	 other	 territories	 which	 she	 has	 taken	 by	violence	and	greed.	The	aforesaid	three	great	powers,	mindful	of	the	enslavement	of	the	people	 of	 Korea,	 are	 determined	 that	 in	 due	 course	 Korea	 shall	 become	 free	 and	independent.	With	these	objects	in	view	the	three	Allies,	in	harmony	with	those	of	the	United	Nations	 at	 war	 with	 Japan,	 will	 continue	 to	 persevere	 in	 the	 serious	 and	 prolonged	operations	necessary	to	procure	the	unconditional	surrender	of	Japan.”		Source:	http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html										
	84		
	 	
	85	 	
8.3.	APPENDIX	III		
Potsdam	Declaration	Proclamation	defining	terms	for	Japanese	surrender	issued	at	Potsdam,	July	26,	1945.	I. We-the	President	of	the	United	States,	the	President	of	the	National	Government	of	the	Republic	of	China,	and	the	Prime	Minister	of	Great	Britain,	representing	the	hundreds	of	millions	of	our	countrymen,	have	conferred	and	agree	that	Japan	shall	be	given	an	opportunity	to	end	this	war.	II. The	prodigious	land,	sea	and	air	forces	of	the	United	States,	the	British	Empire	and	of	China,	many	times	reinforced	by	their	armies	and	air	fleets	from	the	west,	are	poised	to	strike	the	final	blows	upon	Japan.	This	military	power	is	sustained	and	inspired	by	the	determination	of	all	the	Allied	Nations	to	prosecute	the	war	against	Japan	until	she	ceases	to	resist.	III. The	result	of	the	futile	and	senseless	German	resistance	to	the	might	of	the	aroused	free	peoples	of	the	world	stands	forth	in	awful	clarity	as	an	example	to	the	people	of	Japan.	The	might	that	now	converges	on	Japan	is	immeasurably	greater	than	that	which,	when	applied	to	the	resisting	Nazis,	necessarily	laid	waste	to	the	lands,	the	industry	and	the	method	of	life	of	the	whole	German	people.	The	full	application	of	our	military	power,	backed	by	our	resolve,	will	mean	the	inevitable	and	complete	destruction	 of	 the	 Japanese	 armed	 forces	 and	 just	 as	 inevitably	 the	 utter	devastation	of	the	Japanese	homeland.	IV. The	time	has	come	for	Japan	to	decide	whether	she	will	continue	to	be	controlled	by	 those	 self-willed	 militaristic	 advisers	 whose	 unintelligent	 calculations	 have	brought	the	Empire	of	Japan	to	the	threshold	of	annihilation,	or	whether	she	will	follow	the	path	of	reason.	V. Following	are	our	terms.	We	will	not	deviate	from	them.	There	are	no	alternatives.	We	shall	brook	no	delay.	VI. There	must	be	eliminated	for	all	time	the	authority	and	influence	of	those	who	have	deceived	and	misled	the	people	of	Japan	into	embarking	on	world	conquest,	for	we	insist	 that	 a	 new	 order	 of	 peace,	 security	 and	 justice	 will	 be	 impossible	 until	irresponsible	militarism	is	driven	from	the	world.	VII. Until	 such	 a	 new	 order	 is	 established	 and	 until	 there	 is	 convincing	 proof	 that	Japan's	 war-making	 power	 is	 destroyed,	 points	 in	 Japanese	 territory	 to	 be	designated	by	the	Allies	shall	be	occupied	to	secure	the	achievement	of	the	basic	objectives	we	are	here	setting	forth.	VIII. The	terms	of	the	Cairo	Declaration	shall	be	carried	out	and	Japanese	sovereignty	shall	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 islands	 of	Honshu,	Hokkaido,	 Kyushu,	 Shikoku	 and	 such	minor	islands	as	we	determine.	IX. The	Japanese	military	forces,	after	being	completely	disarmed,	shall	be	permitted	to	return	to	their	homes	with	the	opportunity	to	lead	peaceful	and	productive	lives.	X. We	do	not	intend	that	the	Japanese	shall	be	enslaved	as	a	race	or	destroyed	as	a	nation,	but	stern	 justice	shall	be	meted	out	to	all	war	criminals,	 including	those	who	have	 visited	 cruelties	 upon	 our	 prisoners.	 The	 Japanese	Government	 shall	remove	 all	 obstacles	 to	 the	 revival	 and	 strengthening	of	 democratic	 tendencies	among	the	Japanese	people.	Freedom	of	speech,	of	religion,	and	of	thought,	as	well	as	respect	for	the	fundamental	human	rights	shall	be	established.	
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XI. Japan	shall	be	permitted	to	maintain	such	industries	as	will	sustain	her	economy	and	permit	 the	exaction	of	 just	 reparations	 in	kind,	but	not	 those	which	would	enable	her	to	re-arm	for	war.	To	this	end,	access	to,	as	distinguished	from	control	of,	 raw	materials	 shall	 be	 permitted.	 Eventual	 Japanese	 participation	 in	 world	trade	relations	shall	be	permitted.	XII. The	occupying	forces	of	the	Allies	shall	be	withdrawn	from	Japan	as	soon	as	these	objectives	have	been	accomplished	and	there	has	been	established	in	accordance	with	 the	 freely	 expressed	will	 of	 the	 Japanese	 people	 a	 peacefully	 inclined	 and	responsible	government.	XIII. We	 call	 upon	 the	 government	 of	 Japan	 to	 proclaim	 now	 the	 unconditional	surrender	 of	 all	 Japanese	 armed	 forces,	 and	 to	 provide	 proper	 and	 adequate	assurances	of	their	good	faith	in	such	action.	The	alternative	for	Japan	is	prompt	and	utter	destruction.		Source:	http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html								 					 		
	87	 	
8.4.	APPENDIX	IV	
Treaty	of	San	Francisco	
TREATY	OF	PEACE	WITH	JAPAN	WHEREAS	the	Allied	Powers	and	Japan	are	resolved	that	henceforth	their	relations	shall	be	those	of	nations	which,	as	sovereign	equals,	cooperate	in	friendly	association	to	promote	their	common	welfare	and	to	maintain	international	peace	and	security,	and	are	therefore	 desirous	 of	 concluding	 a	 Treaty	 of	 Peace	 which	 will	 settle	 questions	 still	outstanding	as	a	result	of	the	existence	of	a	state	of	war	between	them;	WHEREAS	Japan	for	its	part	declares	its	intention	to	apply	for	membership	in	the	United	Nations	and	in	all	circumstances	to	conform	to	the	principles	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations;	to	strive	to	realize	the	objectives	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights;	to	seek	to	create	within	Japan	conditions	of	stability	and	well-being	as	defined	in	Articles	55	 and	56	of	 the	Charter	of	 the	United	Nations	 and	already	 initiated	by	post-surrender	Japanese	legislation;	and	in	public	and	private	trade	and	commerce	to	conform	to	internationally	accepted	fair	practices;	WHEREAS	the	 Allied	 Powers	 welcome	 the	 intentions	 of	 Japan	 set	 out	 in	 the	foregoing	paragraph;	THE	ALLIED	POWERS	AND	JAPAN	have	 therefore	 determined	 to	 conclude	 the	present	 Treaty	 of	 Peace,	 and	 have	 accordingly	 appointed	 the	 undersigned	Plenipotentiaries,	who,	 after	 presentation	 of	 their	 full	 powers,	 found	 in	 good	 and	 due	form,	have	agreed	on	the	following	provisions:	
CHAPTER	I	PEACE	
Article	1	(a)	The	state	of	war	between	Japan	and	each	of	the	Allied	Powers	is	terminated	as	from	the	 date	 on	which	 the	 present	 Treaty	 comes	 into	 force	 between	 Japan	 and	 the	 Allied	Power	concerned	as	provided	for	in	Article	23.	(b)	The	Allied	Powers	recognize	the	full	sovereignty	of	the	Japanese	people	over	Japan	and	its	territorial	waters.	
CHAPTER	II	TERRITORY	
Article	2	(a)	Japan	recognizing	the	independence	of	Korea,	renounces	all	right,	title	and	claim	to	Korea,	including	the	islands	of	Quelpart,	Port	Hamilton	and	Dagelet.	(b)	Japan	renounces	all	right,	title	and	claim	to	Formosa	and	the	Pescadores.	(c)	Japan	renounces	all	right,	title	and	claim	to	the	Kurile	Islands,	and	to	that	portion	of	Sakhalin	 and	 the	 islands	 adjacent	 to	 it	 over	 which	 Japan	 acquired	 sovereignty	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	Treaty	of	Portsmouth	of	5	September	1905.	(d)	 Japan	renounces	all	 right,	 title	and	claim	 in	connection	with	 the	League	of	Nations	Mandate	System,	and	accepts	the	action	of	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	of	2	April	
	88		
1947,	extending	the	trusteeship	system	to	the	Pacific	Islands	formerly	under	mandate	to	Japan.	(e)	Japan	renounces	all	claim	to	any	right	or	title	to	or	interest	in	connection	with	any	part	of	 the	 Antarctic	 area,	 whether	 deriving	 from	 the	 activities	 of	 Japanese	 nationals	 or	otherwise.	(f)	 Japan	 renounces	 all	 right,	 title	 and	 claim	 to	 the	 Spratly	 Islands	 and	 to	 the	 Paracel	Islands.	
	
Article	3	Japan	will	concur	in	any	proposal	of	the	United	States	to	the	United	Nations	to	place	under	its	trusteeship	system,	with	the	United	States	as	the	sole	administering	authority,	Nansei	Shoto	south	of	29deg.	north	latitude	(including	the	Ryukyu	Islands	and	the	Daito	Islands),	Nanpo	 Shoto	 south	 of	 Sofu	 Gan	 (including	 the	 Bonin	 Islands,	 Rosario	 Island	 and	 the	Volcano	 Islands)	 and	 Parece	 Vela	 and	 Marcus	 Island.	 Pending	 the	 making	 of	 such	 a	proposal	and	affirmative	action	thereon,	the	United	States	will	have	the	right	to	exercise	all	and	any	powers	of	administration,	legislation	and	jurisdiction	over	the	territory	and	inhabitants	of	these	islands,	including	their	territorial	waters.	
	
Article	4	(a)	Subject	to	the	provisions	of	paragraph	(b)	of	this	Article,	the	disposition	of	property	of	Japan	and	of	its	nationals	in	the	areas	referred	to	in	Article	2,	and	their	claims,	including	debts,	 against	 the	 authorities	 presently	 administering	 such	 areas	 and	 the	 residents	(including	 juridical	 persons)	 thereof,	 and	 the	 disposition	 in	 Japan	 of	 property	 of	 such	authorities	and	residents,	and	of	claims,	including	debts,	of	such	authorities	and	residents	against	Japan	and	its	nationals,	shall	be	the	subject	of	special	arrangements	between	Japan	and	such	authorities.	The	property	of	any	of	the	Allied	Powers	or	its	nationals	in	the	areas	referred	to	in	Article	2	shall,	insofar	as	this	has	not	already	been	done,	be	returned	by	the	administering	 authority	 in	 the	 condition	 in	 which	 it	 now	 exists.	 (The	 term	 nationals	whenever	used	in	the	present	Treaty	includes	juridical	persons.)	(b)	 Japan	 recognizes	 the	 validity	 of	 dispositions	 of	 property	 of	 Japan	 and	 Japanese	nationals	made	by	or	pursuant	to	directives	of	the	United	States	Military	Government	in	any	of	the	areas	referred	to	in	Articles	2	and	3.	(c)	 Japanese	 owned	 submarine	 cables	 connection	 Japan	 with	 territory	 removed	 from	Japanese	control	pursuant	to	the	present	Treaty	shall	be	equally	divided,	Japan	retaining	the	 Japanese	 terminal	 and	 adjoining	 half	 of	 the	 cable,	 and	 the	 detached	 territory	 the	remainder	of	the	cable	and	connecting	terminal	facilities.	
CHAPTER	III	SECURITY	
Article	5	(a)	Japan	accepts	the	obligations	set	forth	in	Article	2	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	and	in	particular	the	obligations	(i)	 to	 settle	 its	 international	 disputes	 by	 peaceful	 means	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 that	international	peace	and	security,	and	justice,	are	not	endangered;	
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(ii)	 to	 refrain	 in	 its	 international	 relations	 from	 the	 threat	 or	 use	 of	 force	 against	 the	territorial	 integrity	 or	 political	 independence	 of	 any	 State	 or	 in	 any	 other	 manner	inconsistent	with	the	Purposes	of	the	United	Nations;	(iii)	to	give	the	United	Nations	every	assistance	in	any	action	it	takes	in	accordance	with	the	Charter	and	to	refrain	from	giving	assistance	to	any	State	against	which	the	United	Nations	may	take	preventive	or	enforcement	action.	(b)	The	Allied	Powers	confirm	that	they	will	be	guided	by	the	principles	of	Article	2	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	in	their	relations	with	Japan.	(c)	The	Allied	Powers	for	their	part	recognize	that	Japan	as	a	sovereign	nation	possesses	the	inherent	right	of	individual	or	collective	self-defense	referred	to	in	Article	51	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	that	Japan	may	voluntarily	enter	into	collective	security	arrangements.	
	
Article	6	(a)	All	occupation	forces	of	the	Allied	Powers	shall	be	withdrawn	from	Japan	as	soon	as	possible	after	the	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty,	and	in	any	case	not	later	than	90	days	 thereafter.	Nothing	 in	 this	provision	 shall,	 however,	prevent	 the	 stationing	or	retention	of	foreign	armed	forces	in	Japanese	territory	under	or	in	consequence	of	any	bilateral	or	multilateral	agreements	which	have	been	or	may	be	made	between	one	or	more	of	the	Allied	Powers,	on	the	one	hand,	and	Japan	on	the	other.	(b)	The	provisions	of	Article	9	of	the	Potsdam	Proclamation	of	26	July	1945,	dealing	with	the	return	of	Japanese	military	forces	to	their	homes,	to	the	extent	not	already	completed,	will	be	carried	out.	(c)	All	Japanese	property	for	which	compensation	has	not	already	been	paid,	which	was	supplied	for	the	use	of	the	occupation	forces	and	which	remains	in	the	possession	of	those	forces	at	the	time	of	the	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty,	shall	be	returned	to	the	Japanese	Government	within	the	same	90	days	unless	other	arrangements	are	made	by	mutual	agreement.	
CHAPTER	IV	POLITICAL	AND	ECONOMIC	CLAUSES	
Article	7	(a)	Each	of	the	Allied	Powers,	within	one	year	after	the	present	Treaty	has	come	into	force	between	 it	 and	 Japan,	 will	 notify	 Japan	 which	 of	 its	 pre-war	 bilateral	 treaties	 or	conventions	 with	 Japan	 it	 wishes	 to	 continue	 in	 force	 or	 revive,	 and	 any	 treaties	 or	conventions	 so	 notified	 shall	 continue	 in	 force	 or	 by	 revived	 subject	 only	 to	 such	amendments	 as	may	 be	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 conformity	with	 the	 present	 Treaty.	 The	treaties	and	conventions	so	notified	shall	be	considered	as	having	been	continued	in	force	or	 revived	 three	months	after	 the	date	of	notification	and	shall	be	 registered	with	 the	Secretariat	of	the	United	Nations.	All	such	treaties	and	conventions	as	to	which	Japan	is	not	so	notified	shall	be	regarded	as	abrogated.	(b)	 Any	 notification	 made	 under	 paragraph	 (a)	 of	 this	 Article	 may	 except	 from	 the	operation	or	revival	of	a	treaty	or	convention	any	territory	for	the	international	relations	of	which	the	notifying	Power	is	responsible,	until	three	months	after	the	date	on	which	notice	is	given	to	Japan	that	such	exception	shall	cease	to	apply.	
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Article	8	(a)	 Japan	will	recognize	the	full	 force	of	all	 treaties	now	or	hereafter	concluded	by	the	Allied	Powers	for	terminating	the	state	of	war	initiated	on	1	September	1939,	as	well	as	any	other	arrangements	by	the	Allied	Powers	for	or	in	connection	with	the	restoration	of	peace.	Japan	also	accepts	the	arrangements	made	for	terminating	the	former	League	of	Nations	and	Permanent	Court	of	International	Justice.	(b)	Japan	renounces	all	such	rights	and	interests	as	it	may	derive	from	being	a	signatory	power	of	the	Conventions	of	St.	Germain-en-Laye	of	10	September	1919,	and	the	Straits	Agreement	of	Montreux	of	20	July	1936,	and	from	Article	16	of	the	Treaty	of	Peace	with	Turkey	signed	at	Lausanne	on	24	July	1923.	(c)	Japan	renounces	all	rights,	title	and	interests	acquired	under,	and	is	discharged	from	all	obligations	resulting	from,	the	Agreement	between	Germany	and	the	Creditor	Powers	of	20	January	1930	and	its	Annexes,	including	the	Trust	Agreement,	dated	17	May	1930,	the	Convention	of	20	 January	1930,	respecting	 the	Bank	 for	 International	Settlements;	and	the	Statutes	of	the	Bank	for	International	Settlements.	Japan	will	notify	to	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	Paris	within	six	months	of	the	first	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty	its	renunciation	of	the	rights,	title	and	interests	referred	to	in	this	paragraph.	
	
Article	9	Japan	will	 enter	promptly	 into	negotiations	with	 the	Allied	Powers	 so	desiring	 for	 the	conclusion	 of	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 agreements	 providing	 for	 the	 regulation	 or	limitation	of	fishing	and	the	conservation	and	development	of	fisheries	on	the	high	seas.	
	
Article	10	Japan	 renounces	 all	 special	 rights	 and	 interests	 in	 China,	 including	 all	 benefits	 and	privileges	 resulting	 from	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 final	 Protocol	 signed	 at	 Peking	 on	 7	September	 1901,	 and	 all	 annexes,	 notes	 and	 documents	 supplementary	 thereto,	 and	agrees	 to	 the	 abrogation	 in	 respect	 to	 Japan	 of	 the	 said	 protocol,	 annexes,	 notes	 and	documents.	
	
Article	11	Japan	accepts	the	judgments	of	the	International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East	and	of	other	Allied	War	Crimes	Courts	 both	within	 and	outside	 Japan,	 and	will	 carry	 out	 the	sentences	imposed	thereby	upon	Japanese	nationals	imprisoned	in	Japan.	The	power	to	grant	clemency,	to	reduce	sentences	and	to	parole	with	respect	to	such	prisoners	may	not	be	exercised	except	on	the	decision	of	the	Government	or	Governments	which	imposed	the	sentence	in	each	instance,	and	on	recommendation	of	Japan.	In	the	case	of	persons	sentenced	by	the	International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East,	such	power	may	not	be	exercised	except	on	 the	decision	of	a	majority	of	 the	Governments	represented	on	 the	Tribunal,	and	on	the	recommendation	of	Japan.		
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Article	12	(a)	 Japan	declares	 its	 readiness	promptly	 to	enter	 into	negotiations	 for	 the	conclusion	with	each	of	the	Allied	Powers	of	treaties	or	agreements	to	place	their	trading,	maritime	and	other	commercial	relations	on	a	stable	and	friendly	basis.	(b)	Pending	the	conclusion	of	the	relevant	treaty	or	agreement,	Japan	will,	during	a	period	of	four	years	from	the	first	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty	(1)	accord	to	each	of	the	Allied	Powers,	its	nationals,	products	and	vessels	(i)	most-favoured-nation	treatment	with	respect	to	customs	duties,	charges,	restrictions	and	other	regulations	on	or	in	connection	with	the	importation	and	exportation	of	goods;	(ii)	national	treatment	with	respect	to	shipping,	navigation	and	imported	goods,	and	with	respect	to	natural	and	juridical	persons	and	their	interests	-	such	treatment	to	include	all	matters	pertaining	to	the	levying	and	collection	of	taxes,	access	to	the	courts,	the	making	and	performance	of	contracts,	rights	to	property	(tangible	and	intangible),	participating	in	juridical	entities	constituted	under	Japanese	law,	and	generally	the	conduct	of	all	kinds	of	business	and	professional	activities;	(2)	ensure	that	external	purchases	and	sales	of	Japanese	state	trading	enterprises	shall	be	based	solely	on	commercial	considerations.	(c)	In	respect	to	any	matter,	however,	Japan	shall	be	obliged	to	accord	to	an	Allied	Power	national	treatment,	or	most-favored-nation	treatment,	only	to	the	extent	that	the	Allied	Power	concerned	accords	Japan	national	treatment	or	most-favored-nation	treatment,	as	the	case	may	be,	in	respect	of	the	same	matter.	The	reciprocity	envisaged	in	the	foregoing	sentence	shall	be	determined,	in	the	case	of	products,	vessels	and	juridical	entities	of,	and	persons	domiciled	in,	any	non-metropolitan	territory	of	an	Allied	Power,	and	in	the	case	of	juridical	entities	of,	and	persons	domiciled	in,	any	state	or	province	of	an	Allied	Power	having	a	 federal	government,	by	 reference	 to	 the	 treatment	accorded	 to	 Japan	 in	 such	territory,	state	or	province.	(d)	In	the	application	of	this	Article,	a	discriminatory	measure	shall	not	be	considered	to	derogate	from	the	grant	of	national	or	most-favored-nation	treatment,	as	the	case	may	be,	if	 such	measure	 is	 based	on	 an	 exception	 customarily	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 commercial	treaties	of	the	party	applying	it,	or	on	the	need	to	safeguard	that	party's	external	financial	position	or	balance	of	payments	(except	in	respect	to	shipping	and	navigation),	or	on	the	need	 to	 maintain	 its	 essential	 security	 interests,	 and	 provided	 such	 measure	 is	proportionate	 to	 the	 circumstances	 and	 not	 applied	 in	 an	 arbitrary	 or	 unreasonable	manner.	(e)	Japan's	obligations	under	this	Article	shall	not	be	affected	by	the	exercise	of	any	Allied	rights	under	Article	14	of	the	present	Treaty;	nor	shall	the	provisions	of	this	Article	be	understood	as	limiting	the	undertakings	assumed	by	Japan	by	virtue	of	Article	15	of	the	Treaty.	
	
Article	13	(a)	Japan	will	enter	into	negotiations	with	any	of	the	Allied	Powers,	promptly	upon	the	request	 of	 such	 Power	 or	 Powers,	 for	 the	 conclusion	 of	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral	agreements	relating	to	international	civil	air	transport.	
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(b)	Pending	the	conclusion	of	such	agreement	or	agreements,	Japan	will,	during	a	period	of	four	years	from	the	first	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty,	extend	to	such	Power	treatment	not	 less	 favorable	with	respect	 to	air-traffic	rights	and	privileges	than	those	exercised	 by	 any	 such	 Powers	 at	 the	 date	 of	 such	 coming	 into	 force,	 and	will	 accord	complete	 equality	 of	 opportunity	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 operation	 and	 development	 of	 air	services.	(c)	 Pending	 its	 becoming	 a	 party	 to	 the	 Convention	 on	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	 in	accordance	 with	 Article	 93	 thereof,	 Japan	 will	 give	 effect	 to	 the	 provisions	 of	 that	Convention	applicable	to	the	international	navigation	of	aircraft,	and	will	give	effect	to	the	standards,	practices	and	procedures	adopted	as	annexes	to	the	Convention	in	accordance	with	the	terms	of	the	Convention.	
CHAPTER	V	CLAIMS	AND	PROPERTY	
Article	14	(a)	It	is	recognized	that	Japan	should	pay	reparations	to	the	Allied	Powers	for	the	damage	and	 suffering	 caused	 by	 it	 during	 the	war.	 Nevertheless	 it	 is	 also	 recognized	 that	 the	resources	of	 Japan	are	not	presently	sufficient,	 if	 it	 is	 to	maintain	a	viable	economy,	to	make	complete	reparation	for	all	such	damage	and	suffering	and	at	the	same	time	meet	its	other	obligations.	Therefore,	1.	 Japan	will	 promptly	 enter	 into	 negotiations	 with	 Allied	 Powers	 so	 desiring,	 whose	present	territories	were	occupied	by	Japanese	forces	and	damaged	by	Japan,	with	a	view	to	assisting	to	compensate	those	countries	for	the	cost	of	repairing	the	damage	done,	by	making	available	the	services	of	the	Japanese	people	in	production,	salvaging	and	other	work	for	the	Allied	Powers	in	question.	Such	arrangements	shall	avoid	the	imposition	of	additional	 liabilities	 on	 other	 Allied	 Powers,	 and,	 where	 the	 manufacturing	 of	 raw	materials	is	called	for,	they	shall	be	supplied	by	the	Allied	Powers	in	question,	so	as	not	to	throw	any	foreign	exchange	burden	upon	Japan.	2.	(I)	Subject	to	the	provisions	of	subparagraph	(II)	below,	each	of	the	Allied	Powers	shall	have	the	right	to	seize,	retain,	liquidate	or	otherwise	dispose	of	all	property,	rights	and	interests	of	(a)	Japan	and	Japanese	nationals,	(b)	persons	acting	for	or	on	behalf	of	Japan	or	Japanese	nationals,	and	(c)	entities	owned	or	controlled	by	Japan	or	Japanese	nationals,	which	on	the	first	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty	were	subject	to	its	jurisdiction.	The	property,	rights	and	interests	specified	in	this	subparagraph	shall	include	those	now	blocked,	vested	or	in	the	possession	or	under	the	control	of	enemy	property	authorities	of	 Allied	 Powers,	 which	 belong	 to,	 or	 were	 held	 or	managed	 on	 behalf	 of,	 any	 of	 the	persons	or	entities	mentioned	in	(a),	(b)	or	(c)	above	at	the	time	such	assets	came	under	the	controls	of	such	authorities.	(II)	The	following	shall	be	excepted	from	the	right	specified	in	subparagraph	(I)	above:	(i)	 property	 of	 Japanese	 natural	 persons	who	 during	 the	war	 resided	with	 the	permission	 of	 the	 Government	 concerned	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 one	 of	 the	 Allied	Powers,	 other	 than	 territory	 occupied	 by	 Japan,	 except	 property	 subjected	 to	
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restrictions	during	the	war	and	not	released	from	such	restrictions	as	of	the	date	of	the	first	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty;	(ii)	all	real	property,	furniture	and	fixtures	owned	by	the	Government	of	Japan	and	used	 for	 diplomatic	 or	 consular	 purposes,	 and	 all	 personal	 furniture	 and	furnishings	 and	 other	 private	 property	 not	 of	 an	 investment	 nature	which	was	normally	 necessary	 for	 the	 carrying	 out	 of	 diplomatic	 and	 consular	 functions,	owned	by	Japanese	diplomatic	and	consular	personnel;	(iii)	property	belonging	to	religious	bodies	or	private	charitable	institutions	and	used	exclusively	for	religious	or	charitable	purposes;	(iv)	 property,	 rights	 and	 interests	 which	 have	 come	 within	 its	 jurisdiction	 in	consequence	of	 the	resumption	of	 trade	and	 financial	relations	subsequent	 to	2	September	1945,	between	the	country	concerned	and	Japan,	except	such	as	have	resulted	from	transactions	contrary	to	the	laws	of	the	Allied	Power	concerned;	(v)	obligations	of	Japan	or	Japanese	nationals,	any	right,	title	or	interest	in	tangible	property	 located	 in	 Japan,	 interests	 in	 enterprises	 organized	 under	 the	 laws	 of	Japan,	or	any	paper	evidence	thereof;	provided	that	this	exception	shall	only	apply	to	obligations	of	Japan	and	its	nationals	expressed	in	Japanese	currency.	(III)	Property	referred	to	in	exceptions	(i)	through	(v)	above	shall	be	returned	subject	to	reasonable	 expenses	 for	 its	preservation	and	administration.	 If	 any	 such	property	has	been	liquidated	the	proceeds	shall	be	returned	instead.	(IV)	The	right	to	seize,	retain,	liquidate	or	otherwise	dispose	of	property	as	provided	in	subparagraph	(I)	above	shall	be	exercised	in	accordance	with	the	laws	of	the	Allied	Power	concerned,	and	the	owner	shall	have	only	such	rights	as	may	be	given	him	by	those	laws.	(V)	The	Allied	Powers	agree	to	deal	with	Japanese	trademarks	and	literary	and	artistic	property	rights	on	a	basis	as	favorable	to	Japan	as	circumstances	ruling	in	each	country	will	permit.	(b)	 Except	 as	 otherwise	 provided	 in	 the	 present	 Treaty,	 the	 Allied	 Powers	 waive	 all	reparations	 claims	 of	 the	 Allied	 Powers,	 other	 claims	 of	 the	 Allied	 Powers	 and	 their	nationals	arising	out	of	any	actions	taken	by	Japan	and	its	nationals	in	the	course	of	the	prosecution	 of	 the	 war,	 and	 claims	 of	 the	 Allied	 Powers	 for	 direct	 military	 costs	 of	occupation.			
Article	15	(a)	Upon	application	made	within	nine	months	of	 the	coming	 into	 force	of	 the	present	Treaty	between	Japan	and	the	Allied	Power	concerned,	Japan	will,	within	six	months	of	the	date	of	such	application,	return	the	property,	tangible	and	intangible,	and	all	rights	or	interests	of	any	kind	 in	 Japan	of	each	Allied	Power	and	 its	nationals	which	was	within	Japan	at	any	time	between	7	December	1941	and	2	September	1945,	unless	the	owner	has	freely	disposed	thereof	without	duress	or	fraud.	Such	property	shall	be	returned	free	of	all	encumbrances	and	charges	to	which	it	may	have	become	subject	because	of	the	war,	and	without	any	charges	for	its	return.	Property	whose	return	is	not	applied	for	by	or	on	behalf	of	the	owner	or	by	his	Government	within	the	prescribed	period	may	be	disposed	of	by	the	Japanese	Government	as	it	may	determine.	In	cases	where	such	property	was	within	 Japan	 on	 7	 December	 1941,	 and	 cannot	 be	 returned	 or	 has	 suffered	 injury	 or	damage	as	a	result	of	the	war,	compensation	will	be	made	on	terms	not	less	favorable	than	
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the	terms	provided	in	the	draft	Allied	Powers	Property	Compensation	Law	approved	by	the	Japanese	Cabinet	on	13	July	1951.	(b)	With	respect	to	industrial	property	rights	impaired	during	the	war,	Japan	will	continue	to	accord	to	the	Allied	Powers	and	their	nationals	benefits	no	less	than	those	heretofore	accorded	 by	 Cabinet	 Orders	 No.	 309	 effective	 1	 September	 1949,	 No.	 12	 effective	 28	January	1950,	and	No.	9	effective	1	February	1950,	all	as	now	amended,	provided	such	nationals	have	applied	for	such	benefits	within	the	time	limits	prescribed	therein.	(c)	(i)	Japan	acknowledges	that	the	literary	and	artistic	property	rights	which	existed	in	Japan	on	6	December	1941,	 in	 respect	 to	 the	published	and	unpublished	works	of	 the	Allied	Powers	and	their	nationals	have	continued	in	force	since	that	date,	and	recognizes	those	rights	which	have	arisen,	or	but	for	the	war	would	have	arisen,	in	Japan	since	that	date,	by	the	operation	of	any	conventions	and	agreements	to	which	Japan	was	a	party	on	that	date,	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	such	conventions	or	agreements	were	abrogated	or	suspended	upon	or	since	the	outbreak	of	war	by	the	domestic	law	of	Japan	or	of	the	Allied	Power	concerned.	(ii)	 Without	 the	 need	 for	 application	 by	 the	 proprietor	 of	 the	 right	 and	 without	 the	payment	of	any	fee	or	compliance	with	any	other	formality,	the	period	from	7	December	1941	until	the	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty	between	Japan	and	the	Allied	Power	concerned	shall	be	excluded	from	the	running	of	the	normal	term	of	such	rights;	and	such	period,	with	an	additional	period	of	six	months,	shall	be	excluded	from	the	time	within	which	 a	 literary	work	must	 be	 translated	 into	 Japanese	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 translating	rights	in	Japan.		
Article	16	As	an	expression	of	 its	desire	 to	 indemnify	 those	members	of	 the	armed	 forces	of	 the	Allied	Powers	who	suffered	undue	hardships	while	prisoners	of	war	of	Japan,	Japan	will	transfer	its	assets	and	those	of	its	nationals	in	countries	which	were	neutral	during	the	war,	or	which	were	at	war	with	any	of	the	Allied	Powers,	or,	at	its	option,	the	equivalent	of	such	assets,	to	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	which	shall	liquidate	such	assets	and	distribute	the	resultant	fund	to	appropriate	national	agencies,	for	the	benefit	of	 former	prisoners	of	war	and	 their	 families	on	such	basis	as	 it	may	determine	 to	be	equitable.	The	categories	of	assets	described	in	Article	14(a)2(II)(ii)	through	(v)	of	the	present	 Treaty	 shall	 be	 excepted	 from	 transfer,	 as	 well	 as	 assets	 of	 Japanese	 natural	persons	not	residents	of	Japan	on	the	first	coming	into	force	of	the	Treaty.	It	is	equally	understood	 that	 the	 transfer	provision	of	 this	Article	has	no	application	 to	 the	19,770	shares	in	the	Bank	for	International	Settlements	presently	owned	by	Japanese	financial	institutions.		
Article	17	(a)	Upon	the	request	of	any	of	the	Allied	Powers,	the	Japanese	Government	shall	review	and	 revise	 in	 conformity	with	 international	 law	any	decision	or	order	of	 the	 Japanese	Prize	Courts	in	cases	involving	ownership	rights	of	nationals	of	that	Allied	Power	and	shall	supply	 copies	 of	 all	 documents	 comprising	 the	 records	 of	 these	 cases,	 including	 the	decisions	taken	and	orders	issued.	In	any	case	in	which	such	review	or	revision	shows	that	restoration	is	due,	the	provisions	of	Article	15	shall	apply	to	the	property	concerned.	
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(b)	The	Japanese	Government	shall	take	the	necessary	measures	to	enable	nationals	of	any	of	the	Allied	Powers	at	any	time	within	one	year	from	the	coming	into	force	of	the	present	 Treaty	 between	 Japan	 and	 the	 Allied	 Power	 concerned	 to	 submit	 to	 the	appropriate	 Japanese	 authorities	 for	 review	 any	 judgment	 given	 by	 a	 Japanese	 court	between	7	December	1941	and	such	coming	into	force,	in	any	proceedings	in	which	any	such	national	was	unable	to	make	adequate	presentation	of	his	case	either	as	plaintiff	or	defendant.	The	Japanese	Government	shall	provide	that,	where	the	national	has	suffered	injury	by	reason	of	any	such	judgment,	he	shall	be	restored	in	the	position	in	which	he	was	before	the	 judgment	was	given	or	shall	be	afforded	such	relief	as	may	be	 just	and	equitable	in	the	circumstances.		
Article	18	(a)	It	is	recognized	that	the	intervention	of	the	state	of	war	has	not	affected	the	obligation	to	pay	pecuniary	debts	arising	out	of	obligations	and	contracts	(including	those	in	respect	of	bonds)	which	existed	and	rights	which	were	acquired	before	the	existence	of	a	state	of	war,	and	which	are	due	by	the	Government	or	nationals	of	Japan	to	the	Government	or	nationals	of	one	of	the	Allied	Powers,	or	are	due	by	the	Government	or	nationals	of	one	of	the	Allied	Powers	to	the	Government	or	nationals	of	Japan.	The	intervention	of	a	state	of	war	shall	equally	not	be	regarded	as	affecting	the	obligation	to	consider	on	their	merits	claims	for	loss	or	damage	to	property	or	for	personal	injury	or	death	which	arose	before	the	 existence	 of	 a	 state	 of	 war,	 and	 which	 may	 be	 presented	 or	 re-presented	 by	 the	Government	 of	 one	 of	 the	 Allied	 Powers	 to	 the	 Government	 of	 Japan,	 or	 by	 the	Government	of	Japan	to	any	of	the	Governments	of	the	Allied	Powers.	The	provisions	of	this	paragraph	are	without	prejudice	to	the	rights	conferred	by	Article	14.	(b)	Japan	affirms	its	liability	for	the	pre-war	external	debt	of	the	Japanese	State	and	for	debts	of	corporate	bodies	subsequently	declared	to	be	liabilities	of	the	Japanese	State,	and	expresses	its	intention	to	enter	into	negotiations	at	an	early	date	with	its	creditors	with	respect	 to	 the	 resumption	 of	 payments	 on	 those	 debts;	 to	 encourage	 negotiations	 in	respect	 to	 other	pre-war	 claims	 and	obligations;	 and	 to	 facilitate	 the	 transfer	 of	 sums	accordingly.		
Article	19	(a)	Japan	waives	all	claims	of	Japan	and	its	nationals	against	the	Allied	Powers	and	their	nationals	arising	out	of	the	war	or	out	of	actions	taken	because	of	the	existence	of	a	state	of	war,	and	waives	all	claims	arising	from	the	presence,	operations	or	actions	of	forces	or	authorities	of	any	of	the	Allied	Powers	in	Japanese	territory	prior	to	the	coming	into	force	of	the	present	Treaty.	(b)	The	foregoing	waiver	includes	any	claims	arising	out	of	actions	taken	by	any	of	the	Allied	Powers	with	respect	to	Japanese	ships	between	1	September	1939	and	the	coming	into	 force	 of	 the	 present	Treaty,	 as	well	 as	 any	 claims	 and	debts	 arising	 in	 respect	 to	Japanese	prisoners	of	war	and	civilian	internees	in	the	hands	of	the	Allied	Powers,	but	does	not	include	Japanese	claims	specifically	recognized	in	the	laws	of	any	Allied	Power	enacted	since	2	September	1945.	(c)	Subject	to	reciprocal	renunciation,	the	Japanese	Government	also	renounces	all	claims	(including	 debts)	 against	 Germany	 and	 German	 nationals	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Japanese	Government	and	Japanese	nationals,	including	intergovernmental	claims	and	claims	for	
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loss	or	damage	sustained	during	the	war,	but	excepting	(a)	claims	in	respect	of	contracts	entered	into	and	rights	acquired	before	1	September	1939,	and	(b)	claims	arising	out	of	trade	and	financial	relations	between	Japan	and	Germany	after	2	September	1945.	Such	renunciation	shall	not	prejudice	actions	taken	in	accordance	with	Articles	16	and	20	of	the	present	Treaty.	(d)	 Japan	 recognizes	 the	 validity	 of	 all	 acts	 and	 omissions	 done	 during	 the	 period	 of	occupation	 under	 or	 in	 consequence	 of	 directives	 of	 the	 occupation	 authorities	 or	authorized	by	Japanese	law	at	that	time,	and	will	take	no	action	subjecting	Allied	nationals	to	civil	or	criminal	liability	arising	out	of	such	acts	or	omissions.		
Article	20	Japan	will	 take	all	necessary	measures	 to	ensure	such	disposition	of	German	assets	 in	Japan	as	has	been	or	may	be	determined	by	those	powers	entitled	under	the	Protocol	of	the	proceedings	of	the	Berlin	Conference	of	1945	to	dispose	of	those	assets,	and	pending	the	 final	 disposition	 of	 such	 assets	 will	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 conservation	 and	administration	thereof.		
Article	21	Notwithstanding	the	provisions	of	Article	25	of	the	present	Treaty,	China	shall	be	entitled	to	the	benefits	of	Articles	10	and	14(a)2;	and	Korea	to	the	benefits	of	Articles	2,	4,	9	and	12	of	the	present	Treaty.			
CHAPTER	VI	SETTLEMENT	OF	DISPUTES	
Article	22	If	in	the	opinion	of	any	Party	to	the	present	Treaty	there	has	arisen	a	dispute	concerning	the	interpretation	or	execution	of	the	Treaty,	which	is	not	settled	by	reference	to	a	special	claims	tribunal	or	by	other	agreed	means,	the	dispute	shall,	at	the	request	of	any	party	thereto,	 be	 referred	 for	decision	 to	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice.	 Japan	 and	 those	Allied	Powers	which	are	not	already	parties	to	the	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice	 will	 deposit	 with	 the	 Registrar	 of	 the	 Court,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 respective	ratifications	of	 the	present	Treaty,	and	 in	conformity	with	the	resolution	of	 the	United	Nations	 Security	 Council,	 dated	 15	 October	 1946,	 a	 general	 declaration	 accepting	 the	jurisdiction,	without	special	agreement,	of	the	Court	generally	in	respect	to	all	disputes	of	the	character	referred	to	in	this	Article.	
CHAPTER	VII	FINAL	CLAUSES	
Article	23	(a)	The	present	Treaty	shall	be	ratified	by	the	States	which	sign	it,	including	Japan,	and	will	come	 into	 force	 for	all	 the	States	which	have	then	ratified	 it,	when	 instruments	of	ratification	have	been	deposited	by	Japan	and	by	a	majority,	including	the	United	States	of	America	as	the	principal	occupying	Power,	of	the	following	States,	namely	Australia,	Canada,	 Ceylon,	 France,	 Indonesia,	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 New	 Zealand,	
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Pakistan,	 the	 Republic	 of	 the	 Philippines,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 of	 Great	 Britain	 and	Northern	Ireland,	and	the	United	States	of	America.	The	present	Treaty	shall	come	into	force	 of	 each	 State	 which	 subsequently	 ratifies	 it,	 on	 the	 date	 of	 the	 deposit	 of	 its	instrument	of	ratification.	(b)	If	the	Treaty	has	not	come	into	force	within	nine	months	after	the	date	of	the	deposit	of	 Japan's	 ratification,	 any	 State	which	 has	 ratified	 it	may	 bring	 the	 Treaty	 into	 force	between	itself	and	Japan	by	a	notification	to	that	effect	given	to	the	Governments	of	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America	not	later	than	three	years	after	the	date	of	deposit	of	Japan's	ratification.		
Article	24	All	instruments	of	ratification	shall	be	deposited	with	the	Government	of	the	United	States	of	America	which	will	notify	all	the	signatory	States	of	each	such	deposit,	of	the	date	of	the	coming	into	force	of	the	Treaty	under	paragraph	(a)	of	Article	23,	and	of	any	notifications	made	under	paragraph	(b)	of	Article	23.		
Article	25	For	the	purposes	of	the	present	Treaty	the	Allied	Powers	shall	be	the	States	at	war	with	Japan,	or	any	State	which	previously	formed	a	part	of	the	territory	of	a	State	named	in	Article	 23,	 provided	 that	 in	 each	 case	 the	 State	 concerned	has	 signed	 and	 ratified	 the	Treaty.	Subject	 to	 the	provisions	of	Article	21,	 the	present	Treaty	shall	not	 confer	any	rights,	titles	or	benefits	on	any	State	which	is	not	an	Allied	Power	as	herein	defined;	nor	shall	any	right,	title	or	interest	of	Japan	be	deemed	to	be	diminished	or	prejudiced	by	any	provision	of	the	Treaty	in	favour	of	a	State	which	is	not	an	Allied	Power	as	so	defined.		
Article	26	Japan	will	be	prepared	to	conclude	with	any	State	which	signed	or	adhered	to	the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	1	January	1942,	and	which	is	at	war	with	Japan,	or	with	any	State	which	previously	formed	a	part	of	the	territory	of	a	State	named	in	Article	23,	which	is	not	a	signatory	of	the	present	Treaty,	a	bilateral	Treaty	of	Peace	on	the	same	or	substantially	the	same	terms	as	are	provided	for	in	the	present	Treaty,	but	this	obligation	on	the	part	of	 Japan	will	expire	 three	years	after	 the	 first	 coming	 into	 force	of	 the	present	Treaty.	Should	Japan	make	a	peace	settlement	or	war	claims	settlement	with	any	State	granting	that	 State	 greater	 advantages	 than	 those	 provided	 by	 the	 present	 Treaty,	 those	 same	advantages	shall	be	extended	to	the	parties	to	the	present	Treaty.		
Article	27	The	present	Treaty	shall	be	deposited	in	the	archives	of	the	Government	of	the	United	States	of	America	which	shall	furnish	each	signatory	State	with	a	certified	copy	thereof.		Source:	https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf		
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8.5.	APPENDIX	V	
Okinawa	Reversion	Agreement	1972	Published	June	17,	1971.	 Article	I	
1.	With	respect	to	the	Ryukyu	Islands	and	the	Daito	Islands,	as	defined	in	paragraph	2	below,	the	United	States	of	America	relinquishes	in	favor	of	Japan	all	rights	and	interests	under	Article	3	of	the	Treaty	of	Peace	with	Japan	signed	at	the	city	of	San	Francisco	on	September	8,	1951,	effective	as	of	the	date	of	entry	into	force	of	this	Agreement.	Japan,	as	of	 such	 date,	 assumes	 full	 responsibility	 and	 authority	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 all	 and	 any	powers	of	administration,	legislation	and	jurisdiction	over	the	territory	and	inhabitants	of	the	said	islands.	
2.	For	the	purpose	of	this	Agreement,	the	term	"the	Ryukyu	Islands	and	the	Daito	Islands"	means	all	 the	territories	and	their	 territorial	waters	with	respect	 to	which	the	right	to	exercise	all	and	any	powers	of	administration,	legislation	and	jurisdiction	was	accorded	to	the	United	States	of	America	under	Article	3	of	the	Treaty	of	Peace	with	Japan	other	than	 those	 with	 respect	 to	 which	 such	 right	 has	 already	 been	 returned	 to	 Japan	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 Agreement	 concerning	 the	 Amami	 Islands	 and	 the	 Agreement	concerning	Nanpo	Shoto	and	Other	Islands	signed	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America,	respectively	on	December	24,	1953	and	April	5,	1968.	
Article	II	
It	is	confirmed	that	treaties,	conventions	and	other	agreements	concluded	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America,	including,	but	without	limitation,	the	Treaty	of	Mutual	Cooperation	 and	 Security	 between	 Japan	 and	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 signed	 at	Washington	 on	 January	 19,	 1960	 and	 its	 related	 arrangements	 and	 the	 Treaty	 of	Friendship,	Commerce	and	Navigation	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America	signed	at	Tokyo	on	April	2,	1953,	become	applicable	to	the	Ryukyu	Islands	and	the	Daito	Islands	as	of	the	date	of	entry	into	force	of	this	Agreement.	
Article	III	
1.	 Japan	will	 grant	 the	United	States	of	America	on	 the	date	of	 entry	 into	 force	of	 this	Agreement	the	use	of	facilities	and	areas	in	the	Ryukyu	Islands	and	the	Daito	Islands	in	accordance	with	the	Treaty	of	Mutual	Cooperation	and	Security	between	Japan	and	the	United	 States	 of	 America	 signed	 at	 Washington	 on	 January	 19,	 1960	 and	 its	 related	arrangements.	
2.	 In	 the	 application	 of	 Article	 VI	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Mutual	 Cooperation	 and	 Security	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America,	regarding	Facilities	and	Areas	and	the	Status	of	United	Sates	Armed	Forces	in	Japan	signed	on	January	19,	1960,	to	the	facilities	
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and	areas	the	use	of	which	will	be	granted	in	accordance	with	paragraph	1	above	to	the	United	States	of	America	on	the	date	of	entry	into	force	of	this	Agreement,	it	is	understood	that	the	phrase	"the	condition	in	which	they	were	at	the	time	they	became	available	to	the	United	States	armed	forces"	in	paragraph	1	of	the	said	Article	IV	refers	to	the	condition	in	which	the	facilities	and	areas	first	came	into	the	use	of	the	United	States	armed	forces,	and	that	the	term	"improvements"	in	paragraph	2	of	the	said	Article	includes	those	made	prior	to	the	date	of	entry	into	force	of	this	Agreement.	
	Source:	http://www.cfr.org/japan/okinawa-reversion-agreement-1972/p30266		 													 	
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8.6.	APPENDIX	VI	
Japan-US	Security	Treaty	Published	January	19,	1960.	
Treaty	of	Mutual	Cooperation	and	Security	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	
America	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America,	desiring	to	strengthen	the	bonds	of	peace	and	 friendship	 traditionally	 existing	 between	 them,	 and	 to	 uphold	 the	 principles	 of		democracy,	individual	liberty,	and	the	rule	of	law,		Desiring	further	to	encourage	closer	economic	cooperation	between	them	and	to	promote	conditions	of	economic	stability	and	well-being	in	their	countries,		Reaffirming	their	faith	in	the	purposes	and	principles	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	and	their	desire	to	live	in	peace	with	all	peoples	and	all	governments,		Recognizing	 that	 they	 have	 the	 inherent	 right	 of	 individual	 or	 collective	 self-defense	as	affirmed	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	Considering	that	they	have	a	common	concern	in	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	in	the	Far	East,	Having	resolved	to	conclude	a	treaty	of	mutual	cooperation	and	security,	Therefore	agree	as	follows:	Article	I	The	Parties	undertake,	as	set	forth	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	to	settle	any	 international	disputes	 in	which	they	may	be	 involved	by	peaceful	means	 in	such	a	manner	 that	 international	 peace	 and	 security	 and	 justice	 are	 not	 endangered	 and	 to	refrain	in	their	international	relations	from	the	threat	or	use	of	force	against	the	territorial	integrity	or	political	independence	of	any	state,	or	in	any	other	manner	inconsistent	with	the	purposes	of	the	United	Nations.	The	Parties	will	endeavor	in	concert	with	other	peace-loving	 countries	 to	 strengthen	 the	 United	 Nations	 so	 that	 its	 mission	 of	 maintaining	international	peace	and	security	may	be	discharged	more	effectively.		Article	II	The	 Parties	 will	 contribute	 toward	 the	 further	 development	 of	 peaceful	 and	friendly	international	relations	by	strengthening	their	free	institutions,	by	bringing	about	a	better	understanding	of	the	principles	upon	which	these	institutions	are	founded,	and	by	promoting	conditions	of	stability	and	well-being.	They	will	seek	to	eliminate	conflict	in	their	international	economic	policies	and	will	encourage	economic	collaboration	between	them.	 	
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Article	III	The	 Parties,	 individually	 and	 in	 cooperation	 with	 each	 other,	 by	 means	 of	continuous	and	effective	self-help	and	mutual	aid	will	maintain	and	develop,	subject	to	their	constitutional	provisions,	their	capacities	to	resist	armed	attack.		Article	IV	The	Parties	will	consult	together	from	time	to	time	regarding	the	implementation	of	 this	 Treaty,	 and,	 at	 the	 request	 of	 either	 Party,	 whenever	 the	 security	 of	 Japan	 or	international	peace	and	security	in	the	Far	East	is	threatened.		Article	V	Each	Party	recognizes	that	an	armed	attack	against	either	Party	in	the	territories	under	the	administration	of	Japan	would	be	dangerous	to	its	own	peace	and	safety	and	declares	 that	 it	 would	 act	 to	 meet	 the	 common	 danger	 in	 accordance	 with	 its	constitutional	provisions	and	processes.	Any	such	armed	attack	and	all	measures	taken	as	a	result	 thereof	shall	be	 immediately	reported	 to	 the	Security	Council	of	 the	United	Nations	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	Article	51	of	the	Charter.	Such	measures	shall	be	terminated	when	the	Security	Council	has	taken	the	measures	necessary	to	restore	and	maintain	international	peace	and	security.		Article	VI	For	the	purpose	of	contributing	to	the	security	of	Japan	and	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	in	the	Far	East,	the	United	States	of	America	is	granted	the	use	by	its	land,	air	and	naval	forces	of	facilities	and	areas	in	Japan.	The	use	of	these	facilities	and	areas	as	well	as	the	status	of	United	States	armed	forces	in	Japan	shall	be	governed	by	a	separate	agreement,	replacing	the	Administrative	Agreement	under	Article	III	of	the	Security	Treaty	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America,	signed	at	Tokyo	on	February	28,	1952,	as	amended,	and	by	such	other	arrangements	as	may	be	agreed	upon.		Article	VII	This	Treaty	does	not	affect	and	shall	not	be	interpreted	as	affecting	in	any	way	the	rights	 and	 obligations	 of	 the	 Parties	 under	 the	 Charter	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 or	 the	responsibility	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 international	 peace	 and	security.		Article	VIII	This	 Treaty	 shall	 be	 ratified	 by	 Japan	 and	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America	 in	accordance	with	their	respective	constitutional	processes	and	will	enter	into	force	on	the	date	on	which	the	 instruments	of	ratification	thereof	have	been	exchanged	by	 them	in	Tokyo.			
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Article	IX	The	Security	Treaty	between	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America	signed	at	the	city	of	San	Francisco	on	September	8,	1951	shall	expire	upon	the	entering	into	force	of	this	Treaty.		Article	X	This	Treaty	shall	remain	in	force	until	in	the	opinion	of	the	Governments	of	Japan	and	the	United	States	of	America	there	shall	have	come	into	force	such	United	Nations	arrangements	as	will	 satisfactorily	provide	 for	 the	maintenance	of	 international	peace	and	security	in	the	Japan	area.	However,	after	the	Treaty	has	been	in	force	for	ten	years,	either	Party	may	give	notice	to	the	other	Party	of	its	intention	to	terminate	the	Treaty,	in	which	case	the	Treaty	shall	terminate	one	year	after	such	notice	has	been	given.		Source:	http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html		 										 		
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8.7.	APPENDIX	VII	
ADIZ	Announcement	by	China	
Announcement	of	the	Aircraft	Identification	Rules	for	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	
Identification	Zone	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	Issued	by	the	Ministry	of	National	Defense	on	November	23,	2013.	The	Ministry	of	National	Defense	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China,	in	accordance	with	the	Statement	by	the	Government	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	on	Establishing	the	 East	 China	 Sea	 Air	 Defense	 Identification	 Zone,	 now	 announces	 the	 Aircraft	Identification	Rules	for	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	Identification	Zone	as	follows:	First,	 aircraft	 flying	 in	 the	 East	 China	 Sea	Air	Defense	 Identification	 Zone	must	abide	by	these	rules.	Second,	aircraft	flying	in	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	Identification	Zone	must	provide	the	following	means	of	identification:	1.	Flight	plan	identification.	Aircraft	flying	in	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	Identification	Zone	should	report	the	flight	plans	to	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	or	the	Civil	Aviation	Administration	of	China.	2.	 Radio	 identification.	 Aircraft	 flying	 in	 the	 East	 China	 Sea	 Air	 Defense	Identification	 Zone	 must	 maintain	 the	 two-way	 radio	 communications,	 and	respond	in	a	timely	and	accurate	manner	to	the	identification	inquiries	from	the	administrative	organ	of	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	Identification	Zone	or	the	unit	authorized	by	the	organ.	3.	 Transponder	 identification.	 Aircraft	 flying	 in	 the	 East	 China	 Sea	 Air	Defense	 Identification	Zone,	 if	 equipped	with	 the	 secondary	 radar	 transponder,	should	keep	the	transponder	working	throughout	the	entire	course.	4.	 Logo	 identification.	 Aircraft	 flying	 in	 the	 East	 China	 Sea	 Air	 Defense	Identification	 Zone	 must	 clearly	 mark	 their	 nationalities	 and	 the	 logo	 of	 their	registration	identification	in	accordance	with	related	international	treaties.	Third,	aircraft	flying	in	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	Identification	Zone	should	follow	 the	 instructions	 of	 the	 administrative	 organ	 of	 the	 East	 China	 Sea	 Air	 Defense	Identification	Zone	or	the	unit	authorized	by	the	organ.	China's	armed	forces	will	adopt	defensive	 emergency	 measures	 to	 respond	 to	 aircraft	 that	 do	 not	 cooperate	 in	 the	identification	or	refuse	to	follow	the	instructions.	Fourth,	the	Ministry	of	National	Defense	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	is	the	administrative	organ	of	the	East	China	Sea	Air	Defense	Identification	Zone.	
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Fifth,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 National	 Defense	 of	 the	 People's	 Republic	 of	 China	 is	responsible	for	the	explanation	of	these	rules.	Sixth,	these	rules	will	come	into	force	at	10	a.m.	November	23,	2013.		Source:	http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm									 	
